The Colombia/Ecuador/Venezuela Mess or Let's Place Bets on How Long Before the U.S. Backs a Colombian War With Venezuela

i don't think there's anything that gets me madder than sophemoric, "anti-imperialist" boilerplate takes on Venezuela (pollyannaish pro-opposition takes suck too)

Otm. That and anti-imperialist boilerplate takes on the Yugoslav civil war. Those two things are the worst for me.

agreed. although of course milosevic was not guilty of all charges and was killed in jail by nato ...

Feeling the anti-imperialism everyday tbh

The outcome that is satisfactory is for the reforms that have benefitted the majority of the people over the years to be built upon.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/02/labour-concerns-on-venezuela-raise-pressure-on-jeremy-corbyn-to-speak-out

I hate the concern-trolling from MPs.

Those reforms depended on oil income that simply isn't there anymore. They were always unsustainable without broadening the economy. Which is not to say that what came before was any better, or that right-wing austerity would do anyone any good apart from IMF connected cronies. But there doesn't really seem to be any foundation to build anything upon.

From my reading on it the oil was used to build quite a few organisational schemes and a mass of social movements. That is the foundation that won't just disappear overnight, whether there is oil money or not.

You need money to run programs. Also and not trivial in the slightest: there are now shortages of p much everything. Which obv effect the poor most acutely.

Sanctions will obviously work a treat of course and not exacerbate humanitarian crisis

Venezuela is a specific situation however I don't agree that a country is purely restricted by a natural resource and that everything is lost...

there are now shortages of p much everything. Which obv effect the poor most acutely.

Is there any good analysis of how this has affected Maduro's popularity with the poor, in particular? Lower-income voters, who have been most affected by shortages, still appear to be the core of the Bolivarian / Chavista movement.

I'm not sure it's that simple. The states that still supported the movement in 2015 elections were on the one hand quite poor, but on the other hand agricultural, and probably less hurt by shortages. I haven't read any really good analysis as well, and I think it's hard to do when no statistics are that trustworthy.

There are substantially more GPP voters in the areas that they lost than the ones they won, though.

I can't really recall any good pieces about the nature of the 2015 swing in places like Caracas or how the support has held up over the last two years either.

I've got students whose parents scrounge for food in garbage cans in Caracas.

There are substantially more GPP voters in the areas that they lost than the ones they won, though.

I can't really recall any good pieces about the nature of the 2015 swing in places like Caracas or how the support has held up over the last two years either.

― Wag1 Shree Rajneesh (ShariVari), 3. august 2017 11:47 (three hours ago) Bookmark Flag Post Permalink

Well, of course there are more GPP voters in those areas, they are far more populated, period. There are also more Trump-voters in California and New York than in Nebraska, but this doesn't really say anything. But I don't know, I don't have the information I would want to have, so... Who knows, you might be right.

there are now shortages of p much everything. Which obv effect the poor most acutely.
Is there any good analysis of how this has affected Maduro's popularity with the poor, in particular? Lower-income voters, who have been most affected by shortages, still appear to be the core of the Bolivarian / Chavista movement.

― Wag1 Shree Rajneesh (ShariVari), Thursday, August 3, 2017 1:35 AM (seven hours ago) Bookmark Flag Post Permalink

i dunno but PSUV lost the parliamentary elections in 2015 under maduro quite handily to the opposition and with a swing of 16% away from the government under conditions that were not necessarily completely fair https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-idUSKCN0SZ33U20151110

Yep, they got a heavy beating in 2015 but still retained about 40% of the vote in the middle of the crisis. I'm interested in understanding how much of the 40% they have retained and how that breaks down demographically.

It's basically impossible from press reports (whether it's Telesur or the Washington Post) to get a sense of who is still supporting Maduro and why.

Indeed, however its safe to assume a coup won't go well and the people calling for democracy in this coutry behave in a rather undignified way on other issues so I won't pay lots of attention to what they have to say.

#Venezuela: a army unit from #Valencia (#Carabobo) has announced its defection from the regime. Stating its now in rebellion against #Maduro pic.twitter.com/PviOhpX7vN

— Thomas van Linge (@arabthomness) August 6, 2017

That didn't last long
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40843494

https://deleteyouraccount.libsyn.com/renovate-the-state

Might be worth a listen.

Anti-imperialism = still good k tx bye

Athletics Weekly‏Verified account @AthleticsWeekly 35m35 minutes ago

Before London 2017, Venezuela's best placing in a World Champs event was 8th. They now have gold (W triple jump) and bronze (W pole vault).

Dunphy and Giles vindicated

Really nice piece -- written around August -- on all sides of the conflict:

https://monthlyreview.org/2017/10/01/venezuelas-fragile-revolution/

And then there's this:

Some upper-class pockets in Venezuela can still afford to eat out. Inside Casa Bistro in Caracas: https://t.co/WOi1zeAICL

— The New York Times (@nytimes) October 20, 2017

Yes, we know there is food scarcity driving up prices. The piece explores some of it and adds more.

The tension between social justice and socialist efficiency plays out on other fronts. One issue is the widespread practice of granting free or excessively low-priced goods and services to poor and working-class communities. The case for the policy is compelling, namely that the government has a responsibility to pay what Chavistas call the “social debt” owed to the most exploited sectors. Yet such artificially low prices on goods produced by state companies undermine their ability to achieve self-sufficiency, and are partly responsible for the chronic scarcity of many products and the emergence of an exploitative black market.

Last night @NicolasMaduro told the #Venezuelan people that the ultra-right in Colombia & Venezuela were responsible for the attack, which he also said was "financed from #Florida". Maduro said ex-Colombian President @JuanManSantos was involved in the plan https://t.co/JnLt4DNESr

— venezuelanalysis.com (@venanalysis) August 5, 2018

Yeah.

Misery links ahead...

With that in mind, where are we now? Between 2.3 and 3 million Venezuelans have now left their country since 2014. As of August 2018, at least seven percent of Venezuela’s total population (as measured in 2014) had fled, and at least 5,000 more Venezuelans leave their homes every day. Assuming that this migration rate continues, 1.8 million Venezuelans will have left their homes in 2018. As of last year, Venezuela was the fourth most prevalent refugee sending country in the world—behind only Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. But with no end in sight, Venezuela’s crisis is in fact on track to become one of the largest national exoduses in world history.

Instead of sidelining those accused of drug trafficking, Maduro has promoted them to the highest offices, perhaps calculating that they have the most to lose if his regime falls and will therefore fight the hardest to preserve it.

"Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis: why don’t we care?"
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/venezuela-humanitarian-crisis-refugees-borders-photography-a8579311.html

With respect Senator Durbin, the US should not anoint the leader of the opposition in Venezuela during an internal, polarized conflict. Let us support Uruguay, Mexico, & the Vatican's efforts for a negotiated settlement & end sanctions that are making the hyperinflation worse. https://t.co/qoAb2ou95g

— Ro Khanna (@RoKhanna) January 24, 2019

Agreed that a lifting of sanctions and increase of humanitarian aid is probably the most urgent necessity, it is just that those need to happen via a legitimate government. Maduro's election was a sham and so is the judiciary atm, so an interim executive appointed by the legislative opposition is not the worst solution. Seems obvious to me, thanks to reading experts of actual Latin America geopolitics, that the wave of recognition was carefully planned: Guaidó gets to be recognized as a legitimate figure by some key nations (US, Colombia) which could allow humanitarian relief, while other stress the importance of free and fair elections (EU), while other key nations propose a neutral role for the settlements to come (Uruguay, Mexico).

After that there is a whole bunch of stuff from the rose-emoji-in-their-twitter-handle-crew stuff that I feel the need to addressed: the legitimacy of Guaidó can be discussed, sure, but his role in all of this has not yet translated unto real power over the nation of Venezuela so one can at least wait before calling it a coup. Or admit that the sham elections of Maduro + his handling of the judiciary and military + the backing of Russia has constituted a much larger coup and he is still firmly in power. Guaidó legitimacy can be discussed sure, but its important that he appointed himself as an interim and that discussion belongs to the Venezuelan people, not a way for say... the American director of one successful indie film to signal is understanding of geopolitics and class struggle. Also, sanctions are only a part of the hyperinflation and aren't the only strain on Venezuela's economy at the moment.

Yeah, the Coup was in 2017, no matter what The Coup says.

Freeland spoke to Venezuelan opposition leader two weeks before he declared himself interim president, source says https://t.co/WqFuN4uHUV @GlobePolitics pic.twitter.com/vKZL3tI0Mu

— The Globe and Mail (@globeandmail) January 25, 2019

Chrystia Freeland representing Canada the merciless capitalist empire.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-protests-faes.html

This seems like a pretty good summary of the various goings on: https://nacla.org/news/2019/01/24/venezuela-another-crossroads

(Touched on it in the UK politics thread today so was reminded to post this)

It looks like, despite the thinly-veiled threats from the US, CARICOM is pretty strongly behind the Uruguay / Mexico plan at this stage. The outline of the Montevideo Mechanism doesn't say a great deal, and Guaido has already refused to participate, but if the outcomes are on the surface fairly defensible (new elections on a set timetable, international monitors, etc), it'll give the opposition (and some of the countries supporting it) an interesting decision to make.

Wait, why is CARICOM suddenly so important? Neither Venezuela, Columbia or Brazil are full members? And what has Maduro said about the plan, I thought he had shut down elections for anything other than parliament already?

Just to be clear, you're asking why CARICOM countries, some of which border (or are within swimming distance of) Venezuela, that have substantial trade relations with Venezuela - including agreements covering oil, natural gas and food, that are currently experiencing a spike in the number of refugees from Venezuela, present some of the primary opposition to the OAS formally recognising Guaido as President of Venezuela and who are actively participating in the Uruguay / Mexico peace plan are important to the situation in Venezuela?

Do they have any leverage over Brazil?

So... this is the Montevideo Mechanism?

1. Dialogue Phase: Creating conditions for direct contacts among the actors involved, in an environment of security.
2. Negotiation Phase: Strategic presentation of the results of the previous phase to the counterparts, seeking to find common ground and areas of opportunity to allow the relaxation of positions and identify potential agreements.
3. Commitments Phase: Construction and subscription of agreements based on the results of the negotiation phase, with the characteristics and time-frame, previously agreed upon.
4. Implementation Phase: Materialization of the commitments assumed in the previous phase with the international accompaniment.

Does Brazil have any leverage over China, Russia or Mexico? Do they need it?

At this stage, Brazil isn't likely to mount a full-scale invasion. The primary pressure Guaido's backers can exert comes through sanctions and formal diplomatic recognition of the opposition. If regional partners can outline a credible, peaceful solution - aligning to some extent with some of the demands the EU, etc, have been making about new elections, the international case for pressing forward with more sanctions, more countries backing Guaido, etc, is likely to weaken - or at least ensure that Guaido has to outline his own proposals for elections.

Maduro has said he's backing the Montevideo Mechanism and is open to having a full constitutional discussion. The processes have been outlined, albeit somewhat vaguely, but the outcomes (whether there will be elections or not, etc) are still TBC. It's too early to assume what they'll be but it will clearly have an impact on what comes next.

Do you have a link to Maduros comments? I do believe that he would support it, it sounds hilariously vague and mostly designed to take the pressure off, which obviously benefits him.

There's some coverage in the Mexican press from yesterday here:

https://www.excelsior.com.mx/global/maduro-aplaude-a-mexico-y-uruguay-por-propuesta-de-dialogo/1295008

But has has said for some time that he'll actively participate in the dialogue. From the CARICOM perspective, it's less about taking the pressure off, more about avoiding a civil war on their doorstep.

Yeah, sure. And too bad about the Venezuelans who then might be massacred by their own government.

That's snarky, but a solution where the Maduro regime stays in power obviously just kicks the can down the road.

"Yeah, sure". ffs Fred.

The idea that Maduro must be removed from power by someone other than the electorate is central to a lot of the interventionist assumptions. Guaido hasn't set out a proposed timeline for elections but has made it pretty clear that Maduro and his close allies wouldn't be allowed to participate in them, if and when they did happen. I'm not sure how, from that starting point, you'd ever have a process seen as legitimate by the substantial proportion of the country that still backs him. Equally, the opposition is unlikely to participate in any elections run strictly on Maduro's terms. A regionally-managed compromise, however remote the prospect might seem, looks like the only way to square the circle and Uruguay, Mexico and CARICOM (whose members are more or less united on negotiation, but individually split on support for Maduro) are the only ones i can see who might be able to attempt that in good faith.

https://www.lrb.co.uk/2019/02/08/greg-grandin/whats-at-stake-in-venezuela