Another would be the false analogy to "Negroes who refuse to sit at the back of the bus." That would work better if the *Negroes* also felt it was ok to have their brethern attack the bus, and that it was ok to kill the white children sitting at the front of the bus in order to make their point.
Without getting sucked into every detail of the CS Monitor, let's say that the central point it seems to be making is that the idea of maintaining a "Jewish state" is religiously/culturally discriminatory (not really "racist" as Jews are not a single race or ethnic group), and that right of return would be the only real way to right the wrongs of the past, which I admit are very real.
To some extent, I agree with the first part of that formulation. Maintaining a majority Jewish state must by definition be discriminatory, and the best one can hope for is that the balance will be maintained by relatively benign methods.
However, even most modern nations practice some form of discrimination in this sense by limiting immigration. I don't often hear criticism of France, for example, which has an ultra-rigorous standard of cultural assimilation required for citizenship. And forget about most of the nations surrounding Israel, where any Jews remaining live as dhimmi and where any person with even an Israeli stamp on his passport may not enter.
Right of return de facto would mean creating an ethnically Arab state, not a tolerant Western-style democracy. You'd just reverse the situation only I imagine it'd be worse for Jews than Israel for its 1.2 million Arab citizens. You'd have to overturn an entire nation and society. Many Israelis are now third or fourth generation.
Yes, recognize what's been done wrong, but do what's realistic.
― A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Thursday, 10 August 2006 01:24 (nineteen years ago)
My ass can talk, but you are right in that in this case I have slipped into referring to a supposition (ultimately incorrect) as a statement of fact.
― DV (dirtyvicar), Thursday, 10 August 2006 09:35 (nineteen years ago)
This is a surprising and insightful take on the conflict from a Palestinian politician.
The basic gist is that if Israel can survive military defeat that only proves it's here to stay - wars it fights are no longer matters of survival or life and death and should not be treated as such.
― A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Thursday, 10 August 2006 14:52 (nineteen years ago)
That being said, I wouldn't conclude that the IDF have lost the war just yet...it sure doesn't look like it's over.
― starke (starke), Friday, 11 August 2006 01:12 (nineteen years ago)
I've always been somewhat uncomfortable with the bent of post-Rabin/post-Oslo Israeli policy, even when it was in the context of the dubiousness of Arafat's sincerity and his corruption. I've always wrestled with Israel's rash military actions in the territories, even in the context of suicide bombings targeting women and children.
But I can't abide this madness anymore. Israel seems to be increasingly dominated by people who don't believe in peace and who possess a paranoid and exaggerated sense of the threats to Israel's "survival." None of this is helped by a growing fringe religious right movement who believe in "one Israel" and just couldn't care less about anyone else.
I make no excuses for suicide bombers and the organizations that sponsor them. But none of that excuses Israel's conduct, either.
It's not as though I was ever an Israeli flag-waving, rally-going, AIPAC-donating cheerleader, but this conflict has pushed me over the line. I'm not even entirely sure what that means yet - but I did donate money to the Palestinian Red Crescent, and also to Tikkun (a great progressive Jewish organization) to help them run an ad calling for a ceasefire.
If anyone wants to sign their ad/petition and or donate, btw:
http:/www.tikkun.org
― A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Friday, 11 August 2006 01:48 (nineteen years ago)
― A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Friday, 11 August 2006 01:52 (nineteen years ago)
"winning", "losing", it's all relative... those stratfor guys keep saying that for Israel a "draw" is a "loss". It depends where you set your targets.
― DV (dirtyvicar), Friday, 11 August 2006 08:14 (nineteen years ago)
Following on from Krauthammer, they say that if the struggle does not end in unqualified victory for the Israeli state, then its value to the USA will be greatly diminished and radical Islamists emboldened.
Haaretz guy says that Olmert must cut his losses: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/749257.html
― DV (dirtyvicar), Friday, 11 August 2006 11:08 (nineteen years ago)
...He rambled on about how this war had been foretold in the Bible and that the prophet Ezekiel foretold an attack on Israel by Russia, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, although I haven't figured out what that has to do with the current conflict. (Ezekiel says the attackers will come on horses, but Pat didn't address that.) He countered Blitzer's mild criticism of the killing of civilians by talking about the 8,000 soldiers who died on D-Day. He blathered on and on about the Oslo accords and pictures of Auschwitz, and pretty much made no sense.
oh yeah, and ostensibly this trip was a show of support and love for Israel. Hmmm.
― kingfish trapped under ice (kingfish 2.0), Friday, 11 August 2006 20:24 (nineteen years ago)
The Israeli Defence Forces have been heavily influenced by contemporary philosophy, highlighting the fact that there is considerable overlap among theoretical texts deemed essential by military academies and architectural schools
by Eyal Weizman
Israeli Military Using Post-Structuralism as “Operational Theory”
“If, as some writers claim, the space for criticality has withered away in late 20th-century capitalist culture, it seems now to have found a place to flourish in the military...”
Here is a full text article from www.frieze.com discussing the appropriation of post-structuralism and urban theory by the Israeli military. The often-quoted comment by Foucault that “maybe one day this century with be known as Deleuzian” comes to mind. Interestingly, it seems the quasi-theological work of Derrida escapes from the military–”too opaque” for their crowd. I find the implications of that interesting to consider…
The Art of War
The Israeli Defence Forces have been heavily influenced by contemporary philosophy, highlighting the fact that there is considerable overlap among theoretical texts deemed essential by military academies and architectural schools by Eyal Weizman
The attack conducted by units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the city of Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier-General Aviv Kokhavi, as ‘inverse geometry’, which he explained as ‘the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of micro-tactical actions’.1 During the battle soldiers moved within the city across hundreds of metres of ‘overground tunnels’ carved out through a dense and contiguous urban structure. Although several thousand soldiers and Palestinian guerrillas were manoeuvring simultaneously in the city, they were so ‘saturated’ into the urban fabric that very few would have been visible from the air. Furthermore, they used none of the city’s streets, roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved horizontally through walls and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as ‘infestation’, seeks to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares. The IDF’s strategy of ‘walking through walls’ involves a conception of the city as not just the site but also the very medium of warfare – a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux.
Contemporary military theorists are now busy re-conceptualizing the urban domain. At stake are the underlying concepts, assumptions and principles that determine military strategies and tactics. The vast intellectual field that geographer Stephen Graham has called an international ‘shadow world’ of military urban research institutes and training centres that have been established to rethink military operations in cities could be understood as somewhat similar to the international matrix of élite architectural academies. However, according to urban theorist Simon Marvin, the military-architectural ‘shadow world’ is currently generating more intense and well-funded urban research programmes than all these university programmes put together, and is certainly aware of the avant-garde urban research conducted in architectural institutions, especially as regards Third World and African cities. There is a considerable overlap among the theoretical texts considered essential by military academies and architectural schools. Indeed, the reading lists of contemporary military institutions include works from around 1968 (with a special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Guy Debord), as well as more contemporary writings on urbanism, psychology, cybernetics, post-colonial and post-Structuralist theory. If, as some writers claim, the space for criticality has withered away in late 20th-century capitalist culture, it seems now to have found a place to flourish in the military.
I conducted an interview with Kokhavi, commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, who at 42 is considered one of the most promising young officers of the IDF (and was the commander of the operation for the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip).2 Like many career officers, he had taken time out from the military to earn a university degree; although he originally intended to study architecture, he ended up with a degree in philosophy from the Hebrew University. When he explained to me the principle that guided the battle in Nablus, what was interesting for me was not so much the description of the action itself as the way he conceived its articulation. He said: ‘this space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. […] The question is how do you interpret the alley? […] We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. […] I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win […] This is why that we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing. […] I said to my troops, “Friends! […] If until now you were used to move along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls!”’2 Kokhavi’s intention in the battle was to enter the city in order to kill members of the Palestinian resistance and then get out. The horrific frankness of these objectives, as recounted to me by Shimon Naveh, Kokhavi’s instructor, is part of a general Israeli policy that seeks to disrupt Palestinian resistance on political as well as military levels through targeted assassinations from both air and ground.
If you still believe, as the IDF would like you to, that moving through walls is a relatively gentle form of warfare, the following description of the sequence of events might change your mind. To begin with, soldiers assemble behind the wall and then, using explosives, drills or hammers, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Stun grenades are then sometimes thrown, or a few random shots fired into what is usually a private living-room occupied by unsuspecting civilians. When the soldiers have passed through the wall, the occupants are locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the operation is concluded, often without water, toilet, food or medicine. Civilians in Palestine, as in Iraq, have experienced the unexpected penetration of war into the private domain of the home as the most profound form of trauma and humiliation. A Palestinian woman identified only as Aisha, interviewed by a journalist for the Palestine Monitor, described the experience: ‘Imagine it – you’re sitting in your living-room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal, and suddenly that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders. You have no idea if they’re after you, if they’ve come to take over your home, or if your house just lies on their route to somewhere else. The children are screaming, panicking. Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, 12 soldiers, their faces painted black, sub-machine-guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall?’3
Naveh, a retired Brigadier-General, directs the Operational Theory Research Institute, which trains staff officers from the IDF and other militaries in ‘operational theory’ – defined in military jargon as somewhere between strategy and tactics. He summed up the mission of his institute, which was founded in 1996: ‘We are like the Jesuit Order. We attempt to teach and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John Forester, and other architects. We are reading Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz. Not myself, but our soldiers, our generals are reflecting on these kinds of materials. We have established a school and developed a curriculum that trains “operational architects”.’4 In a lecture Naveh showed a diagram resembling a ‘square of opposition’ that plots a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labelled with phrases such as ‘Difference and Repetition – The Dialectics of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Manoeuvre’, ‘Velocity vs. Rhythms’, ‘The Wahabi War Machine’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists’ and ‘Nomadic Terrorists’, they often reference the work of Deleuze and Guattari. War machines, according to the philosophers, are polymorphous; diffuse organizations characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of small groups that split up or merge with one another, depending on contingency and circumstances. (Deleuze and Guattari were aware that the state can willingly transform itself into a war machine. Similarly, in their discussion of ‘smooth space’ it is implied that this conception may lead to domination.)
I asked Naveh why Deleuze and Guattari were so popular with the Israeli military. He replied that ‘several of the concepts in A Thousand Plateaux became instrumental for us […] allowing us to explain contemporary situations in a way that we could not have otherwise. It problematized our own paradigms. Most important was the distinction they have pointed out between the concepts of “smooth” and “striated” space [which accordingly reflect] the organizational concepts of the “war machine” and the “state apparatus”. In the IDF we now often use the term “to smooth out space” when we want to refer to operation in a space as if it had no borders. […] Palestinian areas could indeed be thought of as “striated” in the sense that they are enclosed by fences, walls, ditches, roads blocks and so on.’5 When I asked him if moving through walls was part of it, he explained that, ‘In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem. […] Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and practice.’6
To understand the IDF’s tactics for moving through Palestinian urban spaces, it is necessary to understand how they interpret the by now familiar principle of ‘swarming’ – a term that has been a buzzword in military theory since the start of the US post cold War doctrine known as the Revolution in Military Affairs. The swarm manoeuvre was in fact adapted, from the Artificial Intelligence principle of swarm intelligence, which assumes that problem-solving capacities are found in the interaction and communication of relatively unsophisticated agents (ants, birds, bees, soldiers) with little or no centralized control. The swarm exemplifies the principle of non-linearity apparent in spatial, organizational and temporal terms. The traditional manoeuvre paradigm, characterized by the simplified geometry of Euclidean order, is transformed, according to the military, into a complex fractal-like geometry. The narrative of the battle plan is replaced by what the military, using a Foucaultian term, calls the ‘toolbox approach’, according to which units receive the tools they need to deal with several given situations and scenarios but cannot predict the order in which these events would actually occur.7 Naveh: ‘Operative and tactical commanders depend on one another and learn the problems through constructing the battle narrative; […] action becomes knowledge, and knowledge becomes action. […] Without a decisive result possible, the main benefit of operation is the very improvement of the system as a system.’8
This may explain the fascination of the military with the spatial and organizational models and modes of operation advanced by theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, as far as the military is concerned, urban warfare is the ultimate Postmodern form of conflict. Belief in a logically structured and single-track battle-plan is lost in the face of the complexity and ambiguity of the urban reality. Civilians become combatants, and combatants become civilians. Identity can be changed as quickly as gender can be feigned: the transformation of women into fighting men can occur at the speed that it takes an undercover ‘Arabized’ Israeli soldier or a camouflaged Palestinian fighter to pull a machine-gun out from under a dress. For a Palestinian fighter caught up in this battle, Israelis seem ‘to be everywhere: behind, on the sides, on the right and on the left. How can you fight that way?’9
Critical theory has become crucial for Nave’s teaching and training. He explained: ‘we employ critical theory primarily in order to critique the military institution itself – its fixed and heavy conceptual foundations. Theory is important for us in order to articulate the gap between the existing paradigm and where we want to go. Without theory we could not make sense of the different events that happen around us and that would otherwise seem disconnected. […] At present the Institute has a tremendous impact on the military; [it has] become a subversive node within it. By training several high-ranking officers we filled the system [IDF] with subversive agents […] who ask questions; […] some of the top brass are not embarrassed to talk about Deleuze or [Bernard] Tschumi.’10 I asked him, ‘Why Tschumi?’ He replied: ‘The idea of disjunction embodied in Tschumi’s book Architecture and Disjunction (1994) became relevant for us […] Tschumi had another approach to epistemology; he wanted to break with single-perspective knowledge and centralized thinking. He saw the world through a variety of different social practices, from a constantly shifting point of view. [Tschumi] created a new grammar; he formed the ideas that compose our thinking.11 I then asked him, why not Derrida and Deconstruction? He answered, ‘Derrida may be a little too opaque for our crowd. We share more with architects; we combine theory and practice. We can read, but we know as well how to build and destroy, and sometimes kill.’12
In addition to these theoretical positions, Naveh references such canonical elements of urban theory as the Situationist practices of dérive (a method of drifting through a city based on what the Situationists referred to as ‘psycho-geography’) and détournement (the adaptation of abandoned buildings for purposes other than those they were designed to perform). These ideas were, of course, conceived by Guy Debord and other members of the Situationist International to challenge the built hierarchy of the capitalist city and break down distinctions between private and public, inside and outside, use and function, replacing private space with a ‘borderless’ public surface. References to the work of Georges Bataille, either directly or as cited in the writings of Tschumi, also speak of a desire to attack architecture and to dismantle the rigid rationalism of a postwar order, to escape ‘the architectural strait-jacket’ and to liberate repressed human desires.In no uncertain terms, education in the humanities – often believed to be the most powerful weapon against imperialism – is being appropriated as a powerful vehicle for imperialism. The military’s use of theory is, of course, nothing new – a long line extends all the way from Marcus Aurelius to General Patton.
Future military attacks on urban terrain will increasingly be dedicated to the use of technologies developed for the purpose of ‘un-walling the wall’, to borrow a term from Gordon Matta-Clark. This is the new soldier/architect’s response to the logic of ‘smart bombs’. The latter have paradoxically resulted in higher numbers of civilian casualties simply because the illusion of precision gives the military-political complex the necessary justification to use explosives in civilian environments.
Here another use of theory as the ultimate ‘smart weapon’ becomes apparent. The military’s seductive use of theoretical and technological discourse seeks to portray war as remote, quick and intellectual, exciting – and even economically viable. Violence can thus be projected as tolerable and the public encouraged to support it. As such, the development and dissemination of new military technologies promote the fiction being projected into the public domain that a military solution is possible – in situations where it is at best very doubtful.
Although you do not need Deleuze to attack Nablus, theory helped the military reorganize by providing a new language in which to speak to itself and others. A ‘smart weapon’ theory has both a practical and a discursive function in redefining urban warfare. The practical or tactical function, the extent to which Deleuzian theory influences military tactics and manoeuvres, raises questions about the relation between theory and practice. Theory obviously has the power to stimulate new sensibilities, but it may also help to explain, develop or even justify ideas that emerged independently within disparate fields of knowledge and with quite different ethical bases. In discursive terms, war – if it is not a total war of annihilation – constitutes a form of discourse between enemies. Every military action is meant to communicate something to the enemy. Talk of ‘swarming’, ‘targeted killings’ and ‘smart destruction’ help the military communicate to its enemies that it has the capacity to effect far greater destruction. Raids can thus be projected as the more moderate alternative to the devastating capacity that the military actually possesses and will unleash if the enemy exceeds the ‘acceptable’ level of violence or breaches some unspoken agreement. In terms of military operational theory it is essential never to use one’s full destructive capacity but rather to maintain the potential to escalate the level of atrocity. Otherwise threats become meaningless.
When the military talks theory to itself, it seems to be about changing its organizational structure and hierarchies. When it invokes theory in communications with the public – in lectures, broadcasts and publications – it seems to be about projecting an image of a civilized and sophisticated military. And when the military ‘talks’ (as every military does) to the enemy, theory could be understood as a particularly intimidating weapon of ‘shock and awe’, the message being: ‘You will never even understand that which kills you.’
Eyal Weizman is an architect, writer and Director of Goldsmith’s College Centre for Research Architecture. His work deals with issues of conflict territories and human rights.
A full version of this article was recently delivered at the conference ‘Beyond Bio-politics’ at City University, New York, and in the architecture program of the Sao Paulo Biennial. A transcript can be read in the March/April, 2006 issue of Radical Philosophy.
1 Quoted in Hannan Greenberg, ‘The Limited Conflict: This Is How You Trick Terrorists’, in Yediot Aharonot; www.ynet.co.il (23 March 2004)2 Eyal Weizman interviewed Aviv Kokhavi on 24 September at an Israeli military base near Tel Aviv. Translation from Hebrew by the author; video documentation by Nadav Harel and Zohar Kaniel3 Sune Segal, ‘What Lies Beneath: Excerpts from an Invasion’, Palestine Monitor, November, 2002;www.palestinemonitor.org/eyewitness/Westbank/what_lies_beneath_by_sune_segal.html 9 June, 20054 Shimon Naveh, discussion following the talk ‘Dicta Clausewitz: Fractal Manoeuvre: A Brief History of Future Warfare in Urban Environments’, delivered in conjunction with ‘States of Emergency: The Geography of Human Rights’, a debate organized by Eyal Weizman and Anselm Franke as part of ‘Territories Live’, B’tzalel Gallery, Tel Aviv,5 November 20045 Eyal Weizman, telephone interview with Shimon Naveh, 14 October 20056 Ibid.7 Michel Foucault’s description of theory as a ‘toolbox’ was originally developed in conjunction with Deleuze in a 1972 discussion; see Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, ‘Intellectuals and Power’, in Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and intro. Donald F. Bouchard, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980, p. 2068 Weizman, interview with Naveh9 Quoted in Yagil Henkin, ‘The Best Way into Baghdad’, The New York Times, 3 April 200310 Weizman, interview with Naveh11 Naveh is currently working on a Hebrew translation of Bernard Tschumi’s Architecture and Disjunction, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997.12 Weizman, interview with Naveh
― M. V. (M.V.), Friday, 11 August 2006 22:45 (nineteen years ago)
― M. V. (M.V.), Friday, 11 August 2006 22:48 (nineteen years ago)
― Raw Patrick (Raw Patrick), Saturday, 12 August 2006 10:17 (nineteen years ago)
― DV (dirtyvicar), Saturday, 12 August 2006 10:36 (nineteen years ago)
The situation in Israel tonight has become extremely confused, verging on the chaotic. Government ministers, like the foreign minister and prime minister, are publicly feuding. The government is saying that the assault into Lebanon will definitely be rolling tonight while it has simultaneously implied that it intends to accept the cease-fire resolution. Leaders of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are demanding to be unleashed while leaks from some government members hint that they have no confidence in the military. The media has now surged into the battle with highly contentious columns and editorials.
There is a saying in Israel: "When the cannon roar, we fall silent." It means that, while there is a war on, politics -- and even public controversy -- are impermissible. That rule has clearly collapsed. Controversy has raged inside the government and military during wars, and some of it has been savage. But this combination of contradictory signals from the government and increasingly open battling is fairly unprecedented. The closest Israel has come to this was in 1967, between the time Egypt imposed a blockade on Israel's port of Eilat and the time Israel launched its attack on Egypt. We would judge this as worse.
There appear to be two basic and competing schools of thought. One argues that Israel cannot defeat Hezbollah without incurring unacceptable losses and re-occupying parts of Lebanon, thereby winding up in a counterinsurgency situation. The other school of thought argues that the price of accepting a cease-fire that leaves Hezbollah intact is much higher than the cost of war.
The interesting thing is that Olmert himself seems to embody both views. On the one hand he is saying that the offensive is on while at the same time asserting that he is inclined to accept the cease-fire. In some ways, either position would be more comforting to Israelis than the apparent vacillation. There had been a belief that Olmert was using this as psychological warfare against Hezbollah, but the view is now spreading that it is doing more damage to the Israeli psyche than to Hezbollah's.
The cease-fire that appears to be on the table is rather extraordinary. It lacks a timetable and turns over the problem of disarming Hezbollah to the Lebanese government, which probably has neither the means nor the appetite for the job. In the unlikely event that this is achieved, French forces would then join the existing U.N. force. They would have the authority to actively suppress any breaches of the cease-fire. The argument against the cease-fire is obvious from the Israeli point of view. Olmert's view might be that accepting it means nothing since it has no time limit and the disarming of Hezbollah won't happen. Therefore, it allows Israel to accept the cease-fire without halting operations.
Hezbollah has certainly achieved an extraordinary degree of success. It has fought IDF to a draw, with the Israelis clearly being concerned about the price of going up against it. It has also created an unprecedented political crisis in Israel, while its own base remains firm. Hezbollah's strategy has worked thus far, establishing it as the most effective force ever to confront the Israelis.
The pressure on Olmert from IDF is intense. But it is also intense politically. Benyamin Netanyahu, leader of Likud, has remained virtually silent, holding off criticizing the government. He has even restrained some of his colleagues. Clearly, he does not want to destabilize the government now. Yet, at the same time, his relative steadfastness while the government tries to sort things out remains odd.
In looking at Israeli behavior -- which has become the most interesting and perplexing aspect of this conflict -- we are struck by an oddity. The Israeli leadership seems genuinely concerned about something, and it is not clear what it is. Obviously, the government doesn't want to take casualties, but this is not a political problem. The Israeli public can deal with high casualties as long as the mission -- in this case the dismantling of Hezbollah's capabilities -- is accomplished. The normal pattern of Israeli behavior is to be increasingly aggressive rather than restrained, and the government is supported.
When a government becomes uncertain, it normally reverts to established patterns. We would have expected a major invasion weeks ago, and we did expect it. Something is holding the Israelis back and it is not simply fear of casualties. The increasing confusion and even paralysis of the Israeli government could be explained simply by division and poor leadership. But we increasingly have the feeling that there is an aspect to Israeli thinking that we do not understand, some concern that is not apparent that is holding them back from doing what they would normally do.
Hezbollah has fought well, but it is hard to believe that the Israelis can't defeat them or that Israel can't take casualties. (Interestingly enough, Iran and Hezbollah, who are aiming for an imminent cease-fire to claim victory in this conflict, have remained silent while the discussion of a coming cease-fire intensifies.) As the pressure to act mounts and Israel doesn't act, the question of what is restraining them becomes increasingly important. We can't speculate on what their concern might be, because we don't know it. However, Olmert is acting as if he doesn't want to become too aggressive, and the reasoning is unclear.
When dawn comes over Lebanon, we might well find Israeli troops attacking in their traditional fashion, and the entire debate in Israel tonight will be of little importance. Then the question will be whether Hezbollah can continue to resist. However, while there are those who would argue that Israel's inability to decide clearly on a path is simply cover for action, our view is that the situation has gone well beyond that. Hezbollah is not being rattled at all. The Israelis are.
This said, of course, we have the news just now:
Israel says it has tripled the number of its troops in southern Lebanon in an expanded offensive, despite a United Nations vote backing a ceasefire.
The soldiers are moving towards the strategically significant Litani River, the military said.
Hezbollah's leader has said the group will abide by the UN Security Council resolution, which calls for a "full cessation of hostilities".
Israel's Cabinet will discuss the issue on Sunday.
It says it will only halt military action after taking a vote.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 12 August 2006 14:50 (nineteen years ago)
I am not convinced by Stratfor's assumption that Hezbollah can be defeated... if Hezbollah was not defeatable when Israeli forces occupied south Lebanon and had a quisling force to fight alongside them, why would it be defeatable now? I know the situation is a bit different now - Syria is (probably) weaker and so on - and I am not saying that Hezbollah cannot be defeated, but an assumption that victory is inevitable should Israel really want it seems a bit optimistic.
I have grown more fond of Stratfor's briefings, not necessarily because they say anything new that you couldn't glean from the more advanced media, but because they do not pretend that they know more than they do. Like, when they say Hezbollah is about to start kidnapping westerners or that Israel is about to launch a major ground invasion, they do not pretend that they heard this from some confidential source, but just that it is their prediction on the basis of observable evidence.
― DV (dirtyvicar), Saturday, 12 August 2006 15:13 (nineteen years ago)
Whatever the political crisis was yesterday, Israel has clearly decided to invade southern Lebanon, at the very least. The apparent battle between those who oppose a full invasion and those who support one appears to have been settled in favor of the latter.
...
Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz, Halutz and other senior IDF officers visited Northern Command headquarters in Safed late Aug. 11. This meeting appears to have been to approve last-minute changes to the expanded offensive, and to coordinate the initial phase of the attack.
Bottom line: Whatever the U.N. Security Council might have intended, the outcome in Israel was an IDF order to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. At present, there is only air action in the Bekaa Valley.
The advance seen thus far is methodical and, in spite of reports, fairly conservative. The Israelis do not seem to be carrying out slashing armored attacks, but are concentrating on combined arms operations to isolate and destroy strong points. It is now clear that, unless another shift takes place among Israeli leadership, the destruction we expected in the south is taking place. This has already diminished rocket fire into Israel, but we remain doubtful that all rocket attacks can be shut down by attacking the south. Further operations remain an option, although that option is uncertain in this political environment.
The issue now is Hezbollah's response. The group clearly knows it will be defeated by IDF in the south. One of its goals is obviously to inflict maximum casualties. Another must be to impose as many delays as possible. Hezbollah has been under sustained air attack for more than a month, so the resilience of its forces is a question mark.
However, broader than this issue is the strategic response of Hezbollah. A defeat in the south would obviously hurt Hezbollah greatly. It would not, however, eliminate Hezbollah's warfighting ability, since we assume it holds reserves in the Beirut area and the Bekaa Valley. The group also claims to have longer-range rockets in its arsenal -- we assume with only conventional warheads, but we don't know that for certain. With Israel committed, two questions arise: First, how far does Israel go? And, second, what is Hezbollah's response?
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Saturday, 12 August 2006 15:52 (nineteen years ago)
Granted, the rumours of Israel's potential demise are greatly exagerrated ... but let's be realistic, we know that a majority of Israelis don't think that Israel is fighting for survival, and yet the war has a 90% approval rating. Instead, I think people are united by the "damned if we do, damned if we don't" principle, e.g. rushing to make peace after being attacked makes the country look weak, and attacking back "strengthens Hezbollah" in the eyes of many, so what can you do? France's behaviour epitomizes the problems here -- they dole out condemnations of Israel like candy, but don't want to get involved. How does that help anybody involved? It's about time that the French CONTRIBUTE to peace by committing soldiers and resources to the region rather than sitting back and trying to appear neutral. I can't blame Israelis for being tired of that standoffish approach (while Syria and Iran, the countries responsible for funding Hezb, sink into the shadows without being called out) (in fact, France said that Iran were a stabilizing factor in the region) and thinking "to hell with it, let's take matters into our own hands."
if Hezbollah was not defeatable when Israeli forces occupied south Lebanon and had a quisling force to fight alongside them, why would it be defeatable now?
Hezb can't be engaged like you would a conventional army, they're highly decentralized and spread thin amongst dozens of civilian areas. It's like trying to root out gangs, except these gangs have rockets, machine guns, and anti-tank missiles.
If the UN peace deal comes through, I almost guarantee that we'll see Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon within a month or two of the international force hitting the ground (regardless of the exact time frame, this is inevitable, no?). Has anyone planned ahead to consider what the "acceptable" response should be from all parties?
― NoTimeBeforeTime (Barry Bruner), Saturday, 12 August 2006 16:14 (nineteen years ago)
General idea though seemed to be that there's a fair amount of evidence that 1) Cheney and Bush either pushed for this or enthusiastically supported it because they saw it as an important step toward invading Iran, and 2) There may have been less enthusiasm elsewhere in the administration, with Rumsfeld possibly concerned about the implications for Iraq and Rice possibly growing increasingly concerned that the costs were too great as the conflict wore on.
Also, 3) Relying so heavily on air power was a really bad idea (as if we haven't heard that enough by now), and 4) Kosovo was not really an appropriate model for Israel's actions, despite the Olmert govt's claims.
― A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 00:58 (nineteen years ago)
― Jessie the Monster (scarymonsterrr), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 01:10 (nineteen years ago)
― A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 01:23 (nineteen years ago)
― hstencil (hstencil), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 01:24 (nineteen years ago)
4) Kosovo was not really an appropriate model for Israel's actions, despite the Olmert govt's claims.
The Kosovo example is still instructive, as it was another war where overwhelming air power proved surprisingly ineffective.
The Hersh thing - fascinating that something can, apparently, be planned carefully in advance, and still fuck up.
If you are interested in nerdy military stuff (and who isn't?), this article is interesting: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4794829.stm . In a technological sense, the race between anti-tank weapons and armour seems to have brought us back to 1973.
― DV (dirtyvicar), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 08:14 (nineteen years ago)
http://www.counterpunch.org/chomsky08162006.html
― =[[ (eman), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 19:06 (nineteen years ago)
― hstencil (hstencil), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 19:26 (nineteen years ago)
"Iran spreading viruses through Ahmadinejad’s blog?" asks that Malkin chick.
― kingfish trapped under ice (kingfish 2.0), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 22:05 (nineteen years ago)
"Starting in those days [after 9/11], I felt not merely part of an administration, but part of a story; a noble story."
And so of course we need to invade Iran now now now goddammit, etc, and it doesn't matter that nobody wants another war b/c
"presidential decisions on national security are not primarily made by the divination of public sentiments"
― kingfish trapped under ice (kingfish 2.0), Wednesday, 16 August 2006 22:15 (nineteen years ago)
When the Israeli-Lebanese situation began to deteriorate, I wrote in this space that the conflict amounted to a “futile, little war”. I subsequently regretted this verbiage, only because it could be construed in a manner that appeared to diminish the tragic loss of life on both sides. This was never my intent. I merely sought to explain that I felt Israel’s effort was doomed from the get-go to be rather futile, not least given the manner by which she was pursuing the campaign. I believe events have, more or less, fully borne my analysis out.
About right, I figure. Worth reading through the whole thing.
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Friday, 18 August 2006 05:47 (nineteen years ago)
― DV (dirtyvicar), Friday, 18 August 2006 08:26 (nineteen years ago)
― Squirrel_Police (Squirrel_Police), Tuesday, 22 August 2006 20:50 (nineteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Tuesday, 22 August 2006 20:53 (nineteen years ago)
― Squirrel_Police (Squirrel_Police), Tuesday, 22 August 2006 20:55 (nineteen years ago)
Israeli military chief of staff Lt Gen Dan Halutz has for the first time publicly admitted to failings in the conflict with Hezbollah.
In a letter to troops, he said it had exposed shortcomings in the military's logistics, operations and command.
There would be a thorough and honest investigation, he said.
Can't find a full text version of the letter offhand -- anyone else?
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Thursday, 24 August 2006 14:35 (nineteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett (Ned), Sunday, 27 August 2006 22:32 (nineteen years ago)
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-11-08-israel-palestinians_x.htm?csp=34
All I expect to hear is Chuckie Schumer mewling about Israel's right to "defend HERself."
― Dr Morbius (Dr Morbius), Wednesday, 8 November 2006 19:53 (nineteen years ago)
― Ned Raggett, Monday, 30 April 2007 19:33 (nineteen years ago)
― nabisco, Monday, 30 April 2007 20:33 (nineteen years ago)
So it's all gone fairly awry in Lebanon these days (again). My girl's dad's going on a 3 month holiday there starting Thursday.
― Drooone, Monday, 4 June 2007 22:20 (nineteen years ago)
Saudi Arabia has advised its citizens in Lebanon, especially families living there, to leave the country immediately due to the security situation, several Saudi nationals said on Saturday.
The United States had said on Thursday it deployed the USS Cole off the Lebanese coast because it was concerned about the political deadlock in Lebanon, provoking criticism from Hezbollah and Syria.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/01/AR2008030101289.html
― James Mitchell, Sunday, 2 March 2008 12:30 (eighteen years ago)
i assumed the revive was going to be about the stepped-up gaza attacks
― Hurting 2, Sunday, 2 March 2008 15:44 (eighteen years ago)
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804
The Gaza Bombshell After failing to anticipate Hamas’s victory over Fatah in the 2006 Palestinian election, the White House cooked up yet another scandalously covert and self-defeating Middle East debacle: part Iran-contra, part Bay of Pigs. With confidential documents, corroborated by outraged former and current U.S. officials, David Rose reveals how President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and Deputy National-Security Adviser Elliott Abrams backed an armed force under Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan, touching off a bloody civil war in Gaza and leaving Hamas stronger than ever. by David Rose April 2008
― StanM, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 12:12 (eighteen years ago)
"self-defeating" is debatable -- if your intention is to make sure that only the most extreme elements of your opposition survive, thus making your unapologetic eradication of them defensible, the strategy of strengthening hamas has been brilliant
― Tracer Hand, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 12:17 (eighteen years ago)
i.e. that was the american strategy in vietnam and nicaragua, to name just two examples
― Tracer Hand, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 12:18 (eighteen years ago)
So you're OK with this?
― StanM, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 12:48 (eighteen years ago)
xpost
hold on, how has David Rose written that in the future? :-)
― Thomas, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 13:04 (eighteen years ago)
OTM! Maybe it hasn't happened yet!
― StanM, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 13:10 (eighteen years ago)
i don't pretend that i'm saying anything controversial or original here!
― Tracer Hand, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 13:10 (eighteen years ago)
I think it is fairly public knowledge that following the Hamas election victory the USA and its allies decided that Dahlan could be Abbas' hatchet man, and that the best thing to do with Hamas was to exclude them from power and then shut them down by force. The only problem with this strategy is that Dahlan is rubbish and the forces at his disposal were an undisciplined rabble who would have been hard pressed to shut down a pub on saturday night.
― The Real Dirty Vicar, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 13:22 (eighteen years ago)
-- Tracer Hand, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 12:17 (1 hour ago) Link
I'm not sure I follow your argument - you think Israel/The US backed Fatah in order to strengthen Hamas?
― Hurting 2, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 13:39 (eighteen years ago)
Because I would assume it would be much better politically for Israel to have a more *moderate* regime in place that felt dependent on US/Israel backing, and not having the internal political pressure of Israeli civilians feeling their government can't protect them from rocket attacks.
I don't think Israel's goal is the "eradication" of the Palestinians (if that's what you meant). I think Israel wants to keep the Palestinians relatively powerless and maintain its ability to unilaterally dictate the terms of any agreement or lack thereof.
― Hurting 2, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 13:55 (eighteen years ago)
a Fateh commander is quoted in the linked vanity fair article saying, "Since the takeover, we’ve been trying to enter the brains of Bush and Rice, to figure out their mentality. We can only conclude that having Hamas in control serves their overall strategy, because their policy was so crazy otherwise."
this grants a certain cunning to bush and condi that they may not deserve, but as i mentioned above, it fits with past u.s. tactics in places like nicaragua and vietnam. the goal in those places was NOT to preserve "moderate" or reasonable political structures and movements, but to sabotage them, leaving only extremists, who could then be bribed or eliminated with a minimum of outcry.
i don't know what israel's actual goals re: palestine are, but the facts on the ground are that palestine is being slowly ground into dust by the israeli military with every passing day. there are few viable civic organizations left in palestine and it the very idea of "palestine" itself is losing its coherence.
― Tracer Hand, Tuesday, 4 March 2008 16:36 (eighteen years ago)