A New Thread fot the Current Israel/Palestine/Lebanon mess

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I hope the subject doesn't come up at dinner with my gf's parents tonight.

-- A-ron Hubbard (Hurtingchie...), August 5th, 2006.

How did the tongue-biting go? I was at a friend's house a couple weeks ago, and his father was claiming George W Bush will go down as one of the greatest presidents in history. I nearly had to sever my tongue that night...

-- Edward III (ehonaue...), August 7th, 2006.

It wasn't so bad - didn't really come up in conversation much. I guess our upcoming wedding is more on everyone's minds. My gf's parents are also not right-wing nutsos like some of their friends, but they've kind of given up on the peacenik side.

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Monday, 7 August 2006 19:51 (nineteen years ago)

>If you have a patient with cancer in an organ, do you remove the >organ, or do you start by smashing the patient in the head with a >mallet, saying "This will cut off the flow of blood to the tumor"?

Do you remove the organ, or do you put the patient under,
make an incision and step outside for a coffee break?
"Shouldn't escalate too soon, could get messy."

>War is the failure of diplomacy, and we've rigged this game to >ensure the maximum chance of armed conflict.

Let me ask you a question. At what point, in your mind, is
it appropriate to give up on diplomacy? What will Hezbollah
and the other Islamic radicals have to do? At what point
do we have to say that "they" are using western-style
diplomacy as just one more tool in their radical campaign?

Because it seems to me, some people are under the impression
that it's NEVER too late for diplomacy. I disagree. On a
smaller scale, sometimes you just HAVE to take strong and
unrelenting action against abusive persons; hence our need for
jails and police. When does a nation or group become so
out-of-control that responsible parties have no choice but
to forcibly alter their behavior?

Shakey says:
>But it seems well established that there's no point in
>arguing with you.

Well, there's no point in arguing at all, really. The fact is,
all of my opinions are tentative pending further data.
I've already stated that the creation of Israel was an
aggressive, invasive act, and truly irresponsible. But that's
50 years moot and they have a right to defend themselves.


Squirrel_Police (Squirrel_Police), Monday, 7 August 2006 20:32 (nineteen years ago)

Gorgeous George Galloway on Sky earlier today

Dave B (daveb), Monday, 7 August 2006 20:41 (nineteen years ago)

Lovely, isn't he?

http://static.flickr.com/82/207283646_f19a907e42.jpg?v=0

Ed (dali), Monday, 7 August 2006 20:44 (nineteen years ago)

It irritates me that when you cut through his ranting hyperbole he makes some good points. He is a master of his own twisted realpolitik.

Ed (dali), Monday, 7 August 2006 20:57 (nineteen years ago)

So he's like the Brit Ann Coulter?

Squirrel_Police (Squirrel_Police), Monday, 7 August 2006 20:59 (nineteen years ago)

More like matter and antimatter, but they do cancel each other out.

Ned Raggett (Ned), Monday, 7 August 2006 21:00 (nineteen years ago)

>If you have a patient with cancer in an organ, do you remove the >organ, or do you start by smashing the patient in the head with a >mallet, saying "This will cut off the flow of blood to the tumor"?

Do you remove the organ, or do you put the patient under,
make an incision and step outside for a coffee break?
"Shouldn't escalate too soon, could get messy."

Or do you anesthetize the patient through hypnosis, make your incision, remove the organ and accidentally drop your watch in?

What is the geopolitical equivalent of getting really pissed off every time your care provider fuck's up billing your insurance company? There have been days when I would have loved to go Fallujah on their asses.

Fluffy Bear Hearts Rainbows (Fluffy Bear Hearts Rainbows), Monday, 7 August 2006 21:12 (nineteen years ago)

Squirrell, click on the photo and read my debate with one of his ex constituents. He's a divisive opportunist. A socialist who would cosy up with the worst of the islamic far right to get elected.

Ed (dali), Monday, 7 August 2006 21:17 (nineteen years ago)

Hitchens in the WSJ:

To suffer all the consequences of being imperialistic, while acting with all the resolution and consistency and authority of, say, Belgium, is to have failed rather badly. Fortunately, the U.S. has a secret weapon in all this. Iran's Arab neighbors do not relish its bid for regional and nuclear hegemony. Iran's population, to judge from many samplings of its opinion, wants improved relations with the U.S. and not the projection of a dead-handed theocracy through fanatical foreign militias and wasteful nuclear expenditure. Many Lebanese, including many Shiites, are openly resentful of Hezbollah for the impasse into which it has brought them. Democratic and secular forces exist in Syria and are fighting extremism in Iraq. Had the Palestinians been asked (as President Abbas was planning to ask them in a referendum before the Hamas/Hezbollah sabotage) they would very probably have voted to recognize Israel as a negotiating partner.

But what use is being made of this civil and democratic element in the equation? Opinion is curdling, in many instances, into a simple revulsion against the incompetence and cruelty of Israel's highly visible actions. Has Karen Hughes been heard from lately, or at all? Who decided that the president should ignore the eccentric recent letter from Ahmadinejad, and thus miss the chance of addressing the Iranian people over the heads of their self-selected leaders? Whose job is it to consider the whole intricate web of which Tehran constitutes the center? John Wayne, a hero to many "stand tall" conservatives, used to say modestly that he didn't really "act," he just "reacted." That seems a regrettably apt description of the administration over the past three weeks, as it appears to find absolutely everything coming to it as a surprise.

http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB115456787667625298-lMyQjAxMDE2NTA0MzUwNjM3Wj.html

Alfred, Lord Sotosyn (Alfred Soto), Monday, 7 August 2006 21:19 (nineteen years ago)

King Edward III is my hero. Well-put.

-- Jessie the Monster (scarymonsterrr...), August 7th, 2006.

King? I'm more of a royal pain the ass, but thanks just the same...

Do you remove the organ, or do you put the patient under,
make an incision and step outside for a coffee break?
"Shouldn't escalate too soon, could get messy."

Unfortunately this is an appropriate description of Israel's approach to the ground offensive in southern Lebanon. If you think I don't support military action against Hezbollah, you're wrong. I agree with Israel's ends, but not their means.

Let me ask you a question. At what point, in your mind, is
it appropriate to give up on diplomacy?

When the militia camped out on your northern border starts lobbing missiles at you and making incursions into your country to kidnap soldiers. However, how this is playing out has a lot to do with prior failures in diplomacy and Israel's lack of thinking through the consequences of their overly aggressive military action (which I would not be surprised to learn was strategically orchestrated in tandem with the US government).

What will Hezbollah and the other Islamic radicals have to do? At what point do we have to say that "they" are using western-style
diplomacy as just one more tool in their radical campaign?

Arab opposition groups have been using political means to further their radical ends (which, let's face it, is the complete destruction of Israel) for at least 100 years. This is nothing new. But rather than fighting for stability in the region (the best you can hope for), the US and Israel seem to be aiding the forces destablilizing the region.

Because it seems to me, some people are under the impression
that it's NEVER too late for diplomacy. I disagree. On a
smaller scale, sometimes you just HAVE to take strong and
unrelenting action against abusive persons; hence our need for
jails and police. When does a nation or group become so
out-of-control that responsible parties have no choice but
to forcibly alter their behavior?

I find the "law and order" defense of Israel's actions specious. Here was a comparison I used above: A housing project has a large number of gang members who control a neighborhood via violent means. Is it morally justified to drop a bomb on the housing complex in order to weaken them? That's the root of the "proportionality" argument.

I wouldn't say "Get rid of all policemen" or "Policemen need to negotiate with drug dealers" - however the reason there are drug dealers in the first place is a political problem. Dealing with it only via force is not going to solve any of the underlying issues. Similarly, the current US and Israeli governments seem to be great at blowing shit up, and sucking on all other fronts.

Edward III (edward iii), Tuesday, 8 August 2006 15:21 (nineteen years ago)

Article from the Political Animal blog that points out some of the diplomacy issues:

TALKING TO SYRIA....There are still plenty of nay-sayers, but the chorus calling for Syrian involvement in crafting a Lebanon ceasefire solution now includes Richard Armitage, Warren Christopher, and Mr. Flat World himself, Tom Friedman.

The idea isn't limited to diplomacy's backseat drivers. With the notable exception of France (which is trying to seduce Syria's closest ally, Iran), most EU governments believe the path to peace runs through Damascus. In the same way that the U.S. is the only party that can influence Israel to stop the bombing, they say, then like it or not, Syria is the only actor with the clout — and the willingness — to do the same on the other side. European and Arab ministers have been shuttling in and out of Damascus for days now. The Spanish foreign minister met with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad yesterday, and his German counterpart — who spent several days chatting up officials here — has already laid out the outlines of a deal that could simultaneously end the current conflict, get Syria out of the diplomatic doghouse, and pry it loose from the Iranian death grip.

For their part, the Syrians say they're ready to play ball. Officials I've spoken with here in Damascus say the regime is ready to help convince Hezbollah to sign on to an immediate ceasefire and enter sincere prisoner exchange negotiations that could return the two kidnapped Israeli soldiers. They'd also like to return to talks with Israel over a permanent land-for-peace deal. It's far from a perfect plan — there's plenty here that won't play particularly well in Washington or Jerusalem — but it's a decent starting point. Even a growing cadre of Israeli analysts seem to think that now is the moment to draw Syria out of the international isolation it's endured since the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri last year.

But Washington doesn't want any help from Damascus — not until the regime fulfills an array of demands (ranging from an Iraq-related wish list to an immediate and public sea change in its chummy relationship with Hezbollah). But not even the regime's most die-hard opponents think their actions one way or the other will make much difference in Iraq. And even if they wanted to rein in Hezbollah, says Syrian journalist Sami Moubayed, there's no way any Arab leader could make the sort of statements or take the sort of action Washington is looking for. Take a quick stroll around Damascus these days — with its swarm of Nasrallah posters and yellow-and-green Hezbollah banners — and you start to see a bit of what he's talking about. "The Americans are unable to accept the fact that some things are not under anyone's control, cannot be under their control," he says. "The Arab street is behind Hezbollah right now. When Hassan Nasrallah is talking, people are listening."

Syrian officials say they've made too many compromises — including unacknowledged Iraq assistance — already. "We have a saying here in Syria — we have 'nose.' Do you know what that means?" Information Minister Mohsen Bilal asked me the other day. "It means we have pride, so that we walk with our faces up, like this" — he jutted out his chin. "We have tried to work with the Americans. We have tried to talk to them. Our help isn't good enough for them." He leaned back in his chair. "If they want to speak now, they will have to come to us."

It looks like Bilal may be waiting a while. The U.S. embassy here in Damascus remains open, but hasn't been staffed with a permanent ambassador or senior-level diplomats for months. And the Syrian capital — long a major stop on the Mideast peacemaking circuit — was never under consideration for Condoleezza Rice's recent itinerary. Meanwhile, Syria's ambassador to the U.S., Imad Moustapha (you can see his blog here) is still communicating with the White House the only way he can: via forlorn op-eds, like the one that appears in today's LA Times. (Moustapha has been called the "loneliest ambassador in Washington": he's there in case the administration ever decides to talk; so far, U.S. officials remain under strict orders not to speak with him.) "Whether President Bush likes it or not, Syria is a regional power. And Syria will remain a regional power," Moubayed told me a few days ago. "This conflict can't be resolved without its help." The rest of the world seems to be coming around to his point of view. But for the U.S. — as the crisis enters its fourth week — the "Syrian option" is still off the table.

- Rebecca Sinderbrand

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2006_08/009286.php

Edward III (edward iii), Tuesday, 8 August 2006 16:00 (nineteen years ago)

Meantime, Stratfor is back with its latest:

We have not written publicly available alerts on the Israel-Hezbollah conflict for several days, simply because there has been nothing to report. This is not to say that nothing was happening; brutal fighting was going on, rockets were being fired and airstrikes were being carried out. However, the basic pattern of the war appeared to be fixed, with Israeli troops fighting well-entrenched Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, and with the results of those battles uncertain. The diplomatic process was lurching along without any clear direction.

We are now beginning to detect some changes on the Israeli side. At its meeting Aug. 7, the Israeli Cabinet appeared to have given up on a diplomatic solution -- if it ever actually believed diplomacy would work -- and made it clear that Israeli forces were going to be given a much freer hand in Lebanon. Today, Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz announced that Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky was to become Halutz's representative at Northern Command -- which owns the Lebanese operation -- for the duration of the war.

There are political ramifications for this in Israel Defense Forces, but what is essentially being done is that Kaplinsky, an army officer who commanded the elite Golani Brigade, has been put in charge of the Lebanese operation. Halutz, an air force officer who had been criticized for waging an extended air campaign that did not shut down rocket attacks, is ceding authority over the war. Obviously, this is also a criticism of Northern Command's performance over the past weeks -- but the important message, following recent Israeli Cabinet decisions, is that the Israelis are going to unleash their ground forces.

What this means is unclear. It might mean that one or more additional divisions will be thrown into the southern Lebanese campaign, trying to force a decision. It might mean that the attack into the Bekaa Valley that we have discussed is in the works. It could also mean that Israel might move toward Beirut. What seems to be happening, however, is that the Israelis are moving beyond the current phase of the war.

As we have said, Hezbollah has relatively few options. In the south, the militants are committed to a static defense that they seem to be executing well. In the Bekaa Valley, they might opt to resist or to draw the Israelis in and then try to impose an insurgency on them. The same in the southern Beirut area. They might also decide to try and launch some of the longer-range rockets they claim to have, assuming the Israeli air force hasn't taken them out.

Much is unclear. However, this is intended to alert you that the Israelis are vigorously signaling a shift in their war fighting strategy. This may be intended to induce a new round of diplomacy, but we rather doubt it. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has run out of room on the strategy he was following. A new one is likely.

Ned Raggett (Ned), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 04:50 (nineteen years ago)

Stratfor in suggesting major Israeli ground offensive shock!

DV (dirtyvicar), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 08:42 (nineteen years ago)

I don't know if any of you read Carl Bildt's blog, but he was talking about how the American right-wingers are getting really sulky with the Israeli leadership. Yer man Charles Krauthammer feels that Olmert has sold the USA a pup (and then berates him for not killing enough Lebanese people). So yeah. Anyway, I think that whatever your a priori perspective on this, it is hard not to see Olmert's Lebanese adventure as a gross miscalculation.

DV (dirtyvicar), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 09:07 (nineteen years ago)

To be fair, I think that Krauthammer was saying Israel should have made a stronger ground offensive sooner - which might have actually resulted in fewer dead Lebanese civilians, not more.

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 12:32 (nineteen years ago)

Yeah, fair enough. He was saying in particular that Israel should have gone in and decisively kicked arse from the get go rather than faff about with bombing offensives, and that the Olmert government should try and look a bit more like they know what they are doing. I think his point was they are not currently behaving like an American asset.

It is odd, because earlier Krauthammer posts have been all about our shared values with Israel and so on, but now suddenly it's all "hey, if those guys aren't helping us out, fuck them".

DV (dirtyvicar), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 13:44 (nineteen years ago)

Loving how the US is turning to France to help them out here. Fuck you Blair and your shithole of a country!

My Mind's Not Made of Gravel (Dada), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 13:47 (nineteen years ago)

US turning to France just shows how poor US/British relations with the Arab world are at this point. France does have a unique historical relationship w/ Lebanon, though they were probably taken aback by the Lebanese resistance to the ceasefire proposal.

NY Times today has a front page article on the disappearence of the peace camp in Israel. Supposedly there is near-zero opposition to the war, though there is plenty of criticism of Olmert's leadership. As in, Ehud, you're not a wartime consigliere...

Also a front-pager about how pro-democracy groups in the Arab world are finding their positions increasingly difficult given the US & Israeli actions during the conflict. Much frustration that the current hostilities are merely reinforcing the existing power structures rather than bringing about real change.

Edward III (edward iii), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 14:16 (nineteen years ago)

NY Times today has a front page article on the disappearence of the peace camp in Israel. Supposedly there is near-zero opposition to the war, though there is plenty of criticism of Olmert's leadership. As in, Ehud, you're not a wartime consigliere...

Like a lot of polls in Israel, they may not bother polling the 20% of the population who are not Jewish. Arab members of the Knesset have been quite vocal in their opposition to the bombardment of Lebanon... one has to assume that that to some extent represents the opinions of their electorate (or maybe not, as some of them have been killed by Hezbollah missiles).

But yeah, I have read how the peace camp in Israel is more interested in peace with the Palestinians rather than with the Lebanese. I have also read that the media in Israel has not done much in the way of reporting what their armed forces are doing in Lebanon.

DV (dirtyvicar), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 16:12 (nineteen years ago)

Like a lot of polls in Israel, they may not bother polling the 20% of the population who are not Jewish.

I see you've chosen to talk out of your ass (as usual) rather than do a bit of reading. ("The telephone interviews were carried out by the B. I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University on July 31-August 1, 2006, and included 617 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and the kibbutzim.")

I have also read that the media in Israel has not done much in the way of reporting what their armed forces are doing in Lebanon.

More stupidity.

NoTimeBeforeTime (Barry Bruner), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 16:38 (nineteen years ago)

haaretz seems to be covering it pretty well!

Shakey Mo Collier (Shakey Mo Collier), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 16:39 (nineteen years ago)

There's also the usual double-standard being applied here, i.e. it's expected that the Lebanese/Arab/Muslim people would become more radicalized by Israeli military action, but Israelis need to take a long hard look at themselves for being in favour of this war. In other words, Israeli attacks -> Lebanese radicalization = Israel's fault, but Hezbollah attacks -> Israeli radicalization = also Israel's fault.

NoTimeBeforeTime (Barry Bruner), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 16:42 (nineteen years ago)

I think the issue is this (and I'm completely making these numbers up for illustrative purposes, feel free to set my strawman on fire):

Pre-conflict:
Israelis sympathetic to anti-Hezbollah Lebanese = 50%
Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese sypathetic to Israelis = 50%

Hezbollah attacks Israel:
Israelis sympathetic to anti-Hezbollah Lebanese = 0%
Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese sympathetic to Israelis = 50%

Israel attacks Hezbollah:
Israelis sympathetic to anti-Hezbollah Lebanese = 0%
Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese sympathetic to Israelis = 50%

Israel attacks Lebanon:
Israelis sympathetic to anti-Hezbollah Lebanese = 0%
Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese sypathetic to Israelis = 0%

So who's responsible for Lebanese radicalization?

The root issue is whether you think Israel's campaign is excessive or not. Some people are not willing to agree with, "If Israel is attacked it can do anything it wants," just like some people are not willing to agree with, "If the US is attacked it can do anything it wants."

Not sure how useful this is, but here's how I'd apply your equation to different situations:

Hezbollah attacks Israel -> Israel attacks Hezbollah = Hezbollah's fault
Hezbollah attacks Israel -> Israel attacks Lebanon = Israel's fault

Al Qaeda attacks US -> US attacks Iraq = US's fault
Al Qaeda attacks US -> US scales back civil liberties = US's fault

A country that doesn't take responsibility for how it responds to an attack is, well, irresponsible.

Edward III (edward iii), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 18:01 (nineteen years ago)

Again, all of that can be applied in both directions (and the Iraq comparison is irrelevant because Iraq never attacked the US, nor was it threatening to do so). Why isn't "the root issue" the Hezbollah rocket attacks? Are the 3500 rockets launched at Israel not "excessive", plus the constant repeated threats to launch more (particularly on Tel Aviv)? I'll remind you again that about 1Mil people have been displaced in Israel, or roughly the same number as in Lebanon. There are fewer deaths, but plenty of property damage (those rockets still have to hit *something*) and when the war is over I think the direct cost of Hezbollah attacks on Israel will surprise a lot of people.

NoTimeBeforeTime (Barry Bruner), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 18:23 (nineteen years ago)

The UN ceasefire resolution is probably imminent, so I will ask this question: why is it that the same countries who can't wait to see a UN force in Lebanon are completely against it in Sudan?

Also, why is Siniora trying to push for a better deal with the UN as if he's in any position of power at this point?

NoTimeBeforeTime (Barry Bruner), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 18:27 (nineteen years ago)

I mean, the guy is a complete tool who goes on TV and makes shit up about massacres that didn't happen. Now he essentially wants to move his army into place to quell a weakened Hezbollah (no thanks to Israel for doing the work that he wouldn't, or couldn't do) (and probably with fewer deaths and economic damage too, the current war sucks but it's nothing compared to the 2nd civil war he would have faced) plus the Shaba Farms as a consolation prize (this is some serious bullshit, btw).

NoTimeBeforeTime (Barry Bruner), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 18:33 (nineteen years ago)

the Iraq comparison is irrelevant because Iraq never attacked the US, nor was it threatening to do so

9/11 gave the Bush administration the "reason" to attack Iraq - they never would've been able to build support for it without 9/11 as a motivating factor. Hence all the pathetic attempts to link Saddam to
Al Qaeda.

Why isn't "the root issue" the Hezbollah rocket attacks? Are the 3500 rockets launched at Israel not "excessive", plus the constant repeated threats to launch more (particularly on Tel Aviv)? I'll remind you again that about 1Mil people have been displaced in Israel, or roughly the same number as in Lebanon. There are fewer deaths, but plenty of property damage (those rockets still have to hit *something*) and when the war is over I think the direct cost of Hezbollah attacks on Israel will surprise a lot of people.

I agree with you completely. There's going to be a huge economic fallout from the evacuation/bombing of northern Israel. There is no Hezbollah sympathy in my outlook. I'm not sure why you're unable to view the actions of Hezbollah as separate from Lebanon, though.

why is Siniora trying to push for a better deal with the UN as if he's in any position of power at this point?

I don't blame him for rejecting the terms of a ceasefire that is guaranteed not to cease the fire. His position is as unenviable as Israel's in this. Can't back down, can't move forward.

Now he essentially wants to move his army into place to quell a weakened Hezbollah (no thanks to Israel for doing the work that he wouldn't, or couldn't do) (and probably with fewer deaths and economic damage too, the current war sucks but it's nothing compared to the 2nd civil war he would have faced)

To quote Chris Rock, this is like being grateful to the uncle who paid your way through college... but molested you.

Edward III (edward iii), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 19:04 (nineteen years ago)

the Iraq comparison is irrelevant because Iraq never attacked the US, nor was it threatening to do so

I'll add that Lebanon never attacked Israel, nor was it threatening to do so.

Edward III (edward iii), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 19:07 (nineteen years ago)

haaretz seems to be covering it pretty well!

God bless them. What I actually read was that they weren't showing that much in the way of TV footage of bomb strikes in Lebanon (this pre-Qana), though I read somewhere else on a pro-Israel place that they do not like showing images of injured and dead people generally, whether foreign or Israeli.

DV (dirtyvicar), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 20:57 (nineteen years ago)

Hezbollah attacks Israel -> Israel attacks Hezbollah = Hezbollah's fault
Hezbollah attacks Israel -> Israel attacks Lebanon = Israel's fault

Your logic works, but the examples don't really correlate to real life. It's impossible to attack a militant group who are heavily integrated in Lebanese urban areas without, at least to a certain extent, attacking the Lebanese urban areas.

I'll add that Lebanon never attacked Israel, nor was it threatening to do so.

When a de facto Lebanese government attacks Israel, it's still a form of Lebanon attacking Israel.

Also, interesting NYTimes article: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/04/magazine/04lebanon.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin

starke (starke), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 23:30 (nineteen years ago)

kinda like bombing south vietnam to defeat north vietnam, maybe

Euai Kapaui (tracerhand), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 23:36 (nineteen years ago)

Since when is Hezbollah the de facto Lebanese government?

Jessie the Monster (scarymonsterrr), Wednesday, 9 August 2006 23:49 (nineteen years ago)

"A" not "the".

It controls territory, provides its own governmental services and has an army...

starke (starke), Thursday, 10 August 2006 00:17 (nineteen years ago)

Hizbullah's attacks stem from Israeli incursions into Lebanon
By Anders Strindberg
NEW YORK

As pundits and policymakers scramble to explain events in Lebanon, their conclusions are virtually unanimous: Hizbullah created this crisis. Israel is defending itself. The underlying problem is Arab extremism.

Sadly, this is pure analytical nonsense. Hizbullah's capture of two Israeli soldiers on July 12 was a direct result of Israel's silent but unrelenting aggression against Lebanon, which in turn is part of a six-decades long Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since its withdrawal of occupation forces from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Israel has violated the United Nations-monitored "blue line" on an almost daily basis, according to UN reports. Hizbullah's military doctrine, articulated in the early 1990s, states that it will fire Katyusha rockets into Israel only in response to Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians or Hizbullah's leadership; this indeed has been the pattern.

In the process of its violations, Israel has terrorized the general population, destroyed private property, and killed numerous civilians. This past February, for instance, 15-year-old shepherd Yusuf Rahil was killed by unprovoked Israeli cross-border fire as he tended his flock in southern Lebanon. Israel has assassinated its enemies in the streets of Lebanese cities and continues to occupy Lebanon's Shebaa Farms area, while refusing to hand over the maps of mine fields that continue to kill and cripple civilians in southern Lebanon more than six years after the war supposedly ended. What peace did Hizbullah shatter?

Hizbullah's capture of the soldiers took place in the context of this ongoing conflict, which in turn is fundamentally shaped by realities in the Palestinian territories. To the vexation of Israel and its allies, Hizbullah - easily the most popular political movement in the Middle East - unflinchingly stands with the Palestinians.

Since June 25, when Palestinian fighters captured one Israeli soldier and demanded a prisoner exchange, Israel has killed more than 140 Palestinians. Like the Lebanese situation, that flare-up was detached from its wider context and was said to be "manufactured" by the enemies of Israel; more nonsense proffered in order to distract from the apparently unthinkable reality that it is the manner in which Israel was created, and the ideological premises that have sustained it for almost 60 years, that are the core of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.

Once the Arabs had rejected the UN's right to give away their land and to force them to pay the price for European pogroms and the Holocaust, the creation of Israel in 1948 was made possible only by ethnic cleansing and annexation. This is historical fact and has been documented by Israeli historians, such as Benny Morris. Yet Israel continues to contend that it had nothing to do with the Palestinian exodus, and consequently has no moral duty to offer redress.

For six decades the Palestinian refugees have been refused their right to return home because they are of the wrong race. "Israel must remain a Jewish state," is an almost sacral mantra across the Western political spectrum. It means, in practice, that Israel is accorded the right to be an ethnocracy at the expense of the refugees and their descendants, now close to 5 million.

Is it not understandable that Israel's ethnic preoccupation profoundly offends not only Palestinians, but many of their Arab brethren? Yet rather than demanding that Israel acknowledge its foundational wrongs as a first step toward equality and coexistence, the Western world blithely insists that each and all must recognize Israel's right to exist at the Palestinians' expense.

Western discourse seems unable to accommodate a serious, as opposed to cosmetic concern for Palestinians' rights and liberties: The Palestinians are the Indians who refuse to live on the reservation; the Negroes who refuse to sit in the back of the bus.

By what moral right does anyone tell them to be realistic and get over themselves? That it is too much of a hassle to right the wrongs committed against them? That the front of the bus must remain ethnically pure? When they refuse to recognize their occupier and embrace their racial inferiority, when desperation and frustration causes them to turn to violence, and when neighbors and allies come to their aid - some for reasons of power politics, others out of idealism - we are astonished that they are all such fanatics and extremists.

The fundamental obstacle to understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict is that we have given up on asking what is right and wrong, instead asking what is "practical" and "realistic." Yet reality is that Israel is a profoundly racist state, the existence of which is buttressed by a seemingly endless succession of punitive measures, assassinations, and wars against its victims and their allies.

A realistic understanding of the conflict, therefore, is one that recognizes that the crux is not in this or that incident or policy, but in Israel's foundational and per- sistent refusal to recognize the humanity of its Palestinian victims. Neither Hizbullah nor Hamas are driven by a desire to "wipe out Jews," as is so often claimed, but by a fundamental sense of injustice that they will not allow to be forgotten.

These groups will continue to enjoy popular legitimacy because they fulfill the need for someone - anyone - to stand up for Arab rights. Israel cannot destroy this need by bombing power grids or rocket ramps. If Israel, like its former political ally South Africa, has the capacity to come to terms with principles of democracy and human rights and accept egalitarian multiracial coexistence within a single state for Jews and Arabs, then the foundation for resentment and resistance will have been removed. If Israel cannot bring itself to do so, then it will continue to be the vortex of regional violence.

• Anders Strindberg, formerly a visiting professor at Damascus University, Syria, is a consultant on Middle East politics working with European government and law-enforcement agencies. He has also covered Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories as a journalist since the late 1990s, primarily for European publications.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0801/p09s02-coop.html

Rockist_Scientist (RSLaRue), Thursday, 10 August 2006 00:23 (nineteen years ago)

actually, shit, i meant bombing north vietnam AND south vietnam to defeat south vietnam (yes, that IS what i mean cuz that's what happened)

Euai Kapaui (tracerhand), Thursday, 10 August 2006 00:31 (nineteen years ago)

(except for the defeat part)

Euai Kapaui (tracerhand), Thursday, 10 August 2006 00:32 (nineteen years ago)

The fundamental obstacle to understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict is that we have given up on asking what is right and wrong, instead asking what is "practical" and "realistic."

Errr....

starke (starke), Thursday, 10 August 2006 00:37 (nineteen years ago)

Yeah, actually I'd say the exact opposite is the case.

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Thursday, 10 August 2006 00:50 (nineteen years ago)

And I mean that as much for Israelis as for Arabs, if not moreso.

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Thursday, 10 August 2006 00:59 (nineteen years ago)

I have a variety of problems with the CS Monitor piece. One would be its one-sided portrayal that only Israel has failed to "maintain the peace." For example, at one point during the "peace," Hezbollah planted mines on the Israeli side of the border and then fired a missile at and killed a worker hired to remove them.

Another would be the false analogy to "Negroes who refuse to sit at the back of the bus." That would work better if the *Negroes* also felt it was ok to have their brethern attack the bus, and that it was ok to kill the white children sitting at the front of the bus in order to make their point.

Without getting sucked into every detail of the CS Monitor, let's say that the central point it seems to be making is that the idea of maintaining a "Jewish state" is religiously/culturally discriminatory (not really "racist" as Jews are not a single race or ethnic group), and that right of return would be the only real way to right the wrongs of the past, which I admit are very real.

To some extent, I agree with the first part of that formulation. Maintaining a majority Jewish state must by definition be discriminatory, and the best one can hope for is that the balance will be maintained by relatively benign methods.

However, even most modern nations practice some form of discrimination in this sense by limiting immigration. I don't often hear criticism of France, for example, which has an ultra-rigorous standard of cultural assimilation required for citizenship. And forget about most of the nations surrounding Israel, where any Jews remaining live as dhimmi and where any person with even an Israeli stamp on his passport may not enter.

Right of return de facto would mean creating an ethnically Arab state, not a tolerant Western-style democracy. You'd just reverse the situation only I imagine it'd be worse for Jews than Israel for its 1.2 million Arab citizens. You'd have to overturn an entire nation and society. Many Israelis are now third or fourth generation.

Yes, recognize what's been done wrong, but do what's realistic.

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Thursday, 10 August 2006 01:24 (nineteen years ago)

I see you've chosen to talk out of your ass (as usual)

My ass can talk, but you are right in that in this case I have slipped into referring to a supposition (ultimately incorrect) as a statement of fact.

DV (dirtyvicar), Thursday, 10 August 2006 09:35 (nineteen years ago)

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/748534.html

This is a surprising and insightful take on the conflict from a Palestinian politician.

The basic gist is that if Israel can survive military defeat that only proves it's here to stay - wars it fights are no longer matters of survival or life and death and should not be treated as such.

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Thursday, 10 August 2006 14:52 (nineteen years ago)

That's a fantastic article.

That being said, I wouldn't conclude that the IDF have lost the war just yet...it sure doesn't look like it's over.

starke (starke), Friday, 11 August 2006 01:12 (nineteen years ago)

This conflict is becoming something of a watershed for my views of Israel.

I've always been somewhat uncomfortable with the bent of post-Rabin/post-Oslo Israeli policy, even when it was in the context of the dubiousness of Arafat's sincerity and his corruption. I've always wrestled with Israel's rash military actions in the territories, even in the context of suicide bombings targeting women and children.

But I can't abide this madness anymore. Israel seems to be increasingly dominated by people who don't believe in peace and who possess a paranoid and exaggerated sense of the threats to Israel's "survival." None of this is helped by a growing fringe religious right movement who believe in "one Israel" and just couldn't care less about anyone else.

I make no excuses for suicide bombers and the organizations that sponsor them. But none of that excuses Israel's conduct, either.

It's not as though I was ever an Israeli flag-waving, rally-going, AIPAC-donating cheerleader, but this conflict has pushed me over the line. I'm not even entirely sure what that means yet - but I did donate money to the Palestinian Red Crescent, and also to Tikkun (a great progressive Jewish organization) to help them run an ad calling for a ceasefire.

If anyone wants to sign their ad/petition and or donate, btw:

http:/www.tikkun.org

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Friday, 11 August 2006 01:48 (nineteen years ago)

< /self-important delcaration >

A-ron Hubbard (Hurting), Friday, 11 August 2006 01:52 (nineteen years ago)

We should have a thread for self important declarations.

That being said, I wouldn't conclude that the IDF have lost the war just yet...it sure doesn't look like it's over.

"winning", "losing", it's all relative... those stratfor guys keep saying that for Israel a "draw" is a "loss". It depends where you set your targets.

DV (dirtyvicar), Friday, 11 August 2006 08:14 (nineteen years ago)

Two guys on a UN Subcommittee on Human Rights call for uncompromising war against Hezbollah: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/749293.html

Following on from Krauthammer, they say that if the struggle does not end in unqualified victory for the Israeli state, then its value to the USA will be greatly diminished and radical Islamists emboldened.

Haaretz guy says that Olmert must cut his losses: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/749257.html

DV (dirtyvicar), Friday, 11 August 2006 11:08 (nineteen years ago)

meanwhile, guess who trucked his ass over there to get a front row seat for the Apocalypse:
...He rambled on about how this war had been foretold in the Bible and that the prophet Ezekiel foretold an attack on Israel by Russia, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, although I haven't figured out what that has to do with the current conflict. (Ezekiel says the attackers will come on horses, but Pat didn't address that.) He countered Blitzer's mild criticism of the killing of civilians by talking about the 8,000 soldiers who died on D-Day. He blathered on and on about the Oslo accords and pictures of Auschwitz, and pretty much made no sense.

oh yeah, and ostensibly this trip was a show of support and love for Israel. Hmmm.

kingfish trapped under ice (kingfish 2.0), Friday, 11 August 2006 20:24 (nineteen years ago)


Israeli Military Using Post-Structuralism as “Operational Theory”


The Israeli Defence Forces have been heavily influenced by contemporary philosophy, highlighting the fact that there is considerable overlap among theoretical texts deemed essential by military academies and architectural schools

by Eyal Weizman

Israeli Military Using Post-Structuralism as “Operational Theory”

“If, as some writers claim, the space for criticality has withered away in late 20th-century capitalist culture, it seems now to have found a place to flourish in the military...”

Here is a full text article from www.frieze.com discussing the appropriation of post-structuralism and urban theory by the Israeli military. The often-quoted comment by Foucault that “maybe one day this century with be known as Deleuzian” comes to mind. Interestingly, it seems the quasi-theological work of Derrida escapes from the military–”too opaque” for their crowd. I find the implications of that interesting to consider…

The Art of War

The Israeli Defence Forces have been heavily influenced by contemporary philosophy, highlighting the fact that there is considerable overlap among theoretical texts deemed essential by military academies and architectural schools by Eyal Weizman

The attack conducted by units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the city of Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier-General Aviv Kokhavi, as ‘inverse geometry’, which he explained as ‘the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of micro-tactical actions’.1 During the battle soldiers moved within the city across hundreds of metres of ‘overground tunnels’ carved out through a dense and contiguous urban structure. Although several thousand soldiers and Palestinian guerrillas were manoeuvring simultaneously in the city, they were so ‘saturated’ into the urban fabric that very few would have been visible from the air. Furthermore, they used none of the city’s streets, roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved horizontally through walls and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as ‘infestation’, seeks to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares. The IDF’s strategy of ‘walking through walls’ involves a conception of the city as not just the site but also the very medium of warfare – a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux.

Contemporary military theorists are now busy re-conceptualizing the urban domain. At stake are the underlying concepts, assumptions and principles that determine military strategies and tactics. The vast intellectual field that geographer Stephen Graham has called an international ‘shadow world’ of military urban research institutes and training centres that have been established to rethink military operations in cities could be understood as somewhat similar to the international matrix of élite architectural academies. However, according to urban theorist Simon Marvin, the military-architectural ‘shadow world’ is currently generating more intense and well-funded urban research programmes than all these university programmes put together, and is certainly aware of the avant-garde urban research conducted in architectural institutions, especially as regards Third World and African cities. There is a considerable overlap among the theoretical texts considered essential by military academies and architectural schools. Indeed, the reading lists of contemporary military institutions include works from around 1968 (with a special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Guy Debord), as well as more contemporary writings on urbanism, psychology, cybernetics, post-colonial and post-Structuralist theory. If, as some writers claim, the space for criticality has withered away in late 20th-century capitalist culture, it seems now to have found a place to flourish in the military.

I conducted an interview with Kokhavi, commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, who at 42 is considered one of the most promising young officers of the IDF (and was the commander of the operation for the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip).2 Like many career officers, he had taken time out from the military to earn a university degree; although he originally intended to study architecture, he ended up with a degree in philosophy from the Hebrew University. When he explained to me the principle that guided the battle in Nablus, what was interesting for me was not so much the description of the action itself as the way he conceived its articulation. He said: ‘this space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. […] The question is how do you interpret the alley? […] We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. […] I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win […] This is why that we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing. […] I said to my troops, “Friends! […] If until now you were used to move along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls!”’2 Kokhavi’s intention in the battle was to enter the city in order to kill members of the Palestinian resistance and then get out. The horrific frankness of these objectives, as recounted to me by Shimon Naveh, Kokhavi’s instructor, is part of a general Israeli policy that seeks to disrupt Palestinian resistance on political as well as military levels through targeted assassinations from both air and ground.

If you still believe, as the IDF would like you to, that moving through walls is a relatively gentle form of warfare, the following description of the sequence of events might change your mind. To begin with, soldiers assemble behind the wall and then, using explosives, drills or hammers, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Stun grenades are then sometimes thrown, or a few random shots fired into what is usually a private living-room occupied by unsuspecting civilians. When the soldiers have passed through the wall, the occupants are locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the operation is concluded, often without water, toilet, food or medicine. Civilians in Palestine, as in Iraq, have experienced the unexpected penetration of war into the private domain of the home as the most profound form of trauma and humiliation. A Palestinian woman identified only as Aisha, interviewed by a journalist for the Palestine Monitor, described the experience: ‘Imagine it – you’re sitting in your living-room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal, and suddenly that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders. You have no idea if they’re after you, if they’ve come to take over your home, or if your house just lies on their route to somewhere else. The children are screaming, panicking. Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, 12 soldiers, their faces painted black, sub-machine-guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall?’3

Naveh, a retired Brigadier-General, directs the Operational Theory Research Institute, which trains staff officers from the IDF and other militaries in ‘operational theory’ – defined in military jargon as somewhere between strategy and tactics. He summed up the mission of his institute, which was founded in 1996: ‘We are like the Jesuit Order. We attempt to teach and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John Forester, and other architects. We are reading Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz. Not myself, but our soldiers, our generals are reflecting on these kinds of materials. We have established a school and developed a curriculum that trains “operational architects”.’4 In a lecture Naveh showed a diagram resembling a ‘square of opposition’ that plots a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labelled with phrases such as ‘Difference and Repetition – The Dialectics of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Manoeuvre’, ‘Velocity vs. Rhythms’, ‘The Wahabi War Machine’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists’ and ‘Nomadic Terrorists’, they often reference the work of Deleuze and Guattari. War machines, according to the philosophers, are polymorphous; diffuse organizations characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of small groups that split up or merge with one another, depending on contingency and circumstances. (Deleuze and Guattari were aware that the state can willingly transform itself into a war machine. Similarly, in their discussion of ‘smooth space’ it is implied that this conception may lead to domination.)

I asked Naveh why Deleuze and Guattari were so popular with the Israeli military. He replied that ‘several of the concepts in A Thousand Plateaux became instrumental for us […] allowing us to explain contemporary situations in a way that we could not have otherwise. It problematized our own paradigms. Most important was the distinction they have pointed out between the concepts of “smooth” and “striated” space [which accordingly reflect] the organizational concepts of the “war machine” and the “state apparatus”. In the IDF we now often use the term “to smooth out space” when we want to refer to operation in a space as if it had no borders. […] Palestinian areas could indeed be thought of as “striated” in the sense that they are enclosed by fences, walls, ditches, roads blocks and so on.’5 When I asked him if moving through walls was part of it, he explained that, ‘In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem. […] Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and practice.’6

To understand the IDF’s tactics for moving through Palestinian urban spaces, it is necessary to understand how they interpret the by now familiar principle of ‘swarming’ – a term that has been a buzzword in military theory since the start of the US post cold War doctrine known as the Revolution in Military Affairs. The swarm manoeuvre was in fact adapted, from the Artificial Intelligence principle of swarm intelligence, which assumes that problem-solving capacities are found in the interaction and communication of relatively unsophisticated agents (ants, birds, bees, soldiers) with little or no centralized control. The swarm exemplifies the principle of non-linearity apparent in spatial, organizational and temporal terms. The traditional manoeuvre paradigm, characterized by the simplified geometry of Euclidean order, is transformed, according to the military, into a complex fractal-like geometry. The narrative of the battle plan is replaced by what the military, using a Foucaultian term, calls the ‘toolbox approach’, according to which units receive the tools they need to deal with several given situations and scenarios but cannot predict the order in which these events would actually occur.7 Naveh: ‘Operative and tactical commanders depend on one another and learn the problems through constructing the battle narrative; […] action becomes knowledge, and knowledge becomes action. […] Without a decisive result possible, the main benefit of operation is the very improvement of the system as a system.’8

This may explain the fascination of the military with the spatial and organizational models and modes of operation advanced by theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, as far as the military is concerned, urban warfare is the ultimate Postmodern form of conflict. Belief in a logically structured and single-track battle-plan is lost in the face of the complexity and ambiguity of the urban reality. Civilians become combatants, and combatants become civilians. Identity can be changed as quickly as gender can be feigned: the transformation of women into fighting men can occur at the speed that it takes an undercover ‘Arabized’ Israeli soldier or a camouflaged Palestinian fighter to pull a machine-gun out from under a dress. For a Palestinian fighter caught up in this battle, Israelis seem ‘to be everywhere: behind, on the sides, on the right and on the left. How can you fight that way?’9

Critical theory has become crucial for Nave’s teaching and training. He explained: ‘we employ critical theory primarily in order to critique the military institution itself – its fixed and heavy conceptual foundations. Theory is important for us in order to articulate the gap between the existing paradigm and where we want to go. Without theory we could not make sense of the different events that happen around us and that would otherwise seem disconnected. […] At present the Institute has a tremendous impact on the military; [it has] become a subversive node within it. By training several high-ranking officers we filled the system [IDF] with subversive agents […] who ask questions; […] some of the top brass are not embarrassed to talk about Deleuze or [Bernard] Tschumi.’10 I asked him, ‘Why Tschumi?’ He replied: ‘The idea of disjunction embodied in Tschumi’s book Architecture and Disjunction (1994) became relevant for us […] Tschumi had another approach to epistemology; he wanted to break with single-perspective knowledge and centralized thinking. He saw the world through a variety of different social practices, from a constantly shifting point of view. [Tschumi] created a new grammar; he formed the ideas that compose our thinking.11 I then asked him, why not Derrida and Deconstruction? He answered, ‘Derrida may be a little too opaque for our crowd. We share more with architects; we combine theory and practice. We can read, but we know as well how to build and destroy, and sometimes kill.’12

In addition to these theoretical positions, Naveh references such canonical elements of urban theory as the Situationist practices of dérive (a method of drifting through a city based on what the Situationists referred to as ‘psycho-geography’) and détournement (the adaptation of abandoned buildings for purposes other than those they were designed to perform). These ideas were, of course, conceived by Guy Debord and other members of the Situationist International to challenge the built hierarchy of the capitalist city and break down distinctions between private and public, inside and outside, use and function, replacing private space with a ‘borderless’ public surface. References to the work of Georges Bataille, either directly or as cited in the writings of Tschumi, also speak of a desire to attack architecture and to dismantle the rigid rationalism of a postwar order, to escape ‘the architectural strait-jacket’ and to liberate repressed human desires.
In no uncertain terms, education in the humanities – often believed to be the most powerful weapon against imperialism – is being appropriated as a powerful vehicle for imperialism. The military’s use of theory is, of course, nothing new – a long line extends all the way from Marcus Aurelius to General Patton.

Future military attacks on urban terrain will increasingly be dedicated to the use of technologies developed for the purpose of ‘un-walling the wall’, to borrow a term from Gordon Matta-Clark. This is the new soldier/architect’s response to the logic of ‘smart bombs’. The latter have paradoxically resulted in higher numbers of civilian casualties simply because the illusion of precision gives the military-political complex the necessary justification to use explosives in civilian environments.

Here another use of theory as the ultimate ‘smart weapon’ becomes apparent. The military’s seductive use of theoretical and technological discourse seeks to portray war as remote, quick and intellectual, exciting – and even economically viable. Violence can thus be projected as tolerable and the public encouraged to support it. As such, the development and dissemination of new military technologies promote the fiction being projected into the public domain that a military solution is possible – in situations where it is at best very doubtful.

Although you do not need Deleuze to attack Nablus, theory helped the military reorganize by providing a new language in which to speak to itself and others. A ‘smart weapon’ theory has both a practical and a discursive function in redefining urban warfare. The practical or tactical function, the extent to which Deleuzian theory influences military tactics and manoeuvres, raises questions about the relation between theory and practice. Theory obviously has the power to stimulate new sensibilities, but it may also help to explain, develop or even justify ideas that emerged independently within disparate fields of knowledge and with quite different ethical bases. In discursive terms, war – if it is not a total war of annihilation – constitutes a form of discourse between enemies. Every military action is meant to communicate something to the enemy. Talk of ‘swarming’, ‘targeted killings’ and ‘smart destruction’ help the military communicate to its enemies that it has the capacity to effect far greater destruction. Raids can thus be projected as the more moderate alternative to the devastating capacity that the military actually possesses and will unleash if the enemy exceeds the ‘acceptable’ level of violence or breaches some unspoken agreement. In terms of military operational theory it is essential never to use one’s full destructive capacity but rather to maintain the potential to escalate the level of atrocity. Otherwise threats become meaningless.

When the military talks theory to itself, it seems to be about changing its organizational structure and hierarchies. When it invokes theory in communications with the public – in lectures, broadcasts and publications – it seems to be about projecting an image of a civilized and sophisticated military. And when the military ‘talks’ (as every military does) to the enemy, theory could be understood as a particularly intimidating weapon of ‘shock and awe’, the message being: ‘You will never even understand that which kills you.’

Eyal Weizman is an architect, writer and Director of Goldsmith’s College Centre for Research Architecture. His work deals with issues of conflict territories and human rights.

A full version of this article was recently delivered at the conference ‘Beyond Bio-politics’ at City University, New York, and in the architecture program of the Sao Paulo Biennial. A transcript can be read in the March/April, 2006 issue of Radical Philosophy.

1 Quoted in Hannan Greenberg, ‘The Limited Conflict: This Is How You Trick Terrorists’, in Yediot Aharonot; www.ynet.co.il (23 March 2004)
2 Eyal Weizman interviewed Aviv Kokhavi on 24 September at an Israeli military base near Tel Aviv. Translation from Hebrew by the author; video documentation by Nadav Harel and Zohar Kaniel
3 Sune Segal, ‘What Lies Beneath: Excerpts from an Invasion’, Palestine Monitor, November, 2002;
www.palestinemonitor.org/eyewitness/Westbank/what_lies_beneath_by_sune_segal.html 9 June, 2005
4 Shimon Naveh, discussion following the talk ‘Dicta Clausewitz: Fractal Manoeuvre: A Brief History of Future Warfare in Urban Environments’, delivered in conjunction with ‘States of Emergency: The Geography of Human Rights’, a debate organized by Eyal Weizman and Anselm Franke as part of ‘Territories Live’, B’tzalel Gallery, Tel Aviv,
5 November 2004
5 Eyal Weizman, telephone interview with Shimon Naveh, 14 October 2005
6 Ibid.
7 Michel Foucault’s description of theory as a ‘toolbox’ was originally developed in conjunction with Deleuze in a 1972 discussion; see Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, ‘Intellectuals and Power’, in Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and intro. Donald F. Bouchard, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980, p. 206
8 Weizman, interview with Naveh
9 Quoted in Yagil Henkin, ‘The Best Way into Baghdad’, The New York Times, 3 April 2003
10 Weizman, interview with Naveh
11 Naveh is currently working on a Hebrew translation of Bernard Tschumi’s Architecture and Disjunction, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997.
12 Weizman, interview with Naveh

M. V. (M.V.), Friday, 11 August 2006 22:45 (nineteen years ago)


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