A New Thread fot the Current Israel/Palestine/Lebanon mess

is this, like, the only line he can remember?

Stratfor's latest tea-leaf reading:

Special Report: Behind the Israeli Cabinet's Decisions
After a long night of debate, the Israeli security Cabinet led by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided the military campaign in south Lebanon would not be expanded, and that any modifications to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation, such as deploying more troops, would require Cabinet approval.

Israel is essentially broadcasting to the world that its political and military circles are severely divided over the current operation, and that it might have no choice but to cave in to diplomatic pressure to put an end to the fighting and draw up a cease-fire. This might not be true to Israeli thinking, but it is certainly a message they are trying to send to Hezbollah's chain of command. Which then raises the question: Why?

Israel is likely exaggerating the extent to which the military and Cabinet are divided over how to continue in this military campaign, but a real disagreement exists between those promoting a sustained air campaign and those pushing for a ground offensive because IDF forces are getting restive. A compromise might have been reached in the July 27 Cabinet meeting to bolster the air campaign but prepare ground forces for an invasion if it becomes apparent that the Israeli air force will be unable to deliver on its own.

There could be some faith within Israel's defense circles that an air campaign will eventually pan out and succeed in undermining Hezbollah's capabilities, but such an operation takes time and costs an exorbitant amount of money, since ground troops are standing by. As support for a continued air campaign is weakening by the day, something else must be factoring into Israel's war strategy.

The thought of Israel even considering scaling down its military operation at this point -- though golden news for Hezbollah -- carries devastating consequences for Israel. If the fighting were to come to a halt over the next few days, Hezbollah would claim victory and present itself as the only Arab force capable of standing up to Israeli aggression. Merely resisting and surviving a fight against Israel represents a major win for the Islamist militant movement and its sponsors in Iran and Syria -- something Israel, the United States and even the surrounding Arab regimes are unable to cope with. Moreover, an imminent cease-fire would allow Hezbollah to retain the capability to carry out attacks against Israel whenever the need arises.

Israel, therefore, cannot agree to a cease-fire. At the same time, the current operational tempo has not yet yielded a satisfactory outcome for Israel. Katyusha rockets continue to rain down over the northern part of the country as Israel continues its attempts to take out Hezbollah's rocket launch sites. Though Israel's massive air campaign could gradually wear down Hezbollah's offensive capabilities, it will take several weeks before any definitive results will come to light. Hezbollah, meanwhile, is locked in its own military strategy. Hezbollah commanders have long been preparing for this battle and are ready to stand their ground for an extended period of time and draw the Israelis into bloody insurgent combat.

And time does not appear to be on Israel's side. Israel has already incurred a steady barrage of rocket attacks over the past two weeks, and the IDF experienced one of its deadliest days in ground fighting July 26, when nine soldiers were killed in a battle against Hezbollah fighters in the village of Bent Jbail. The numbers of Lebanese civilian deaths are also escalating by the day, fueling worldwide criticism of the extensive Israeli air campaign. The United States is carefully buying Israel time to carry out its military objectives by postponing a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but political pressure on the U.S. government will mount over the next few days, following the argument that Israel cannot be given a blank check for a permanent air campaign against Lebanon. An end to the war in the next few weeks, without a dramatic improvement in effectiveness from the Israeli perspective, would leave Hezbollah in a prime position.

With this in mind, it strikes us as exceedingly peculiar that Israel, a country with a heavy track record of fighting experience despite its youth, is so intent on promoting the idea that its defense and political figures are running in circles trying to revise their military strategy while Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is brimming with confidence in his regular video appearances. It is simply not intelligent war strategy to expose your weaknesses in the midst of a major war campaign -- unless your objective is to spread disinformation to prepare for a larger surprise.

In making the decision to restrict the ground operation in southern Lebanon, the Israeli Cabinet carefully inserted a statement that said any future decisions regarding the IDF strategy would take into account "the need to prepare forces for possible developments." This nuance becomes especially critical in light of Israel's decision to call up three additional divisions of reservists July 27. The reservists are ostensibly being called up to "refresh" troops in Lebanon who have been on the battlefield for a short time, but will not be deployed until further notice. It is difficult to see how IDF troops on the front can be relieved if the additional forces have not even been deployed, unless Israel is quietly building up its ground forces for a major assault to clear Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River.

The Israeli Cabinet also agreed to send forces up to the Aouali River -- just north of Sidon in Lebanon -- as a necessary move to destroy Hezbollah's rocket-launching platforms, according to Israeli radio. This is an extensive reach into Lebanon that would place the IDF within striking distance of the Bekaa Valley -- Hezbollah's main base of operations. We also have received indications that reserves belonging to Israel's elite fighting force, the Golani Brigade, have already moved north up to the Bekaa Valley. Fighting on Hezbollah's turf in the Bekaa Valley will undoubtedly be the most difficult stage of Israel's military campaign. At the same time, moving ground forces into the Bekaa is also necessary for Israel to meet its objective of sterilizing Hezbollah's military capabilities.

Moving into the Bekaa Valley also complicates matters with Syria, which could very well view an Israeli push into the Bekaa as a trigger for a Syrian military response. Major smuggling routes for heroin and opium run through the Bekaa and provide a major source of income for Hezbollah forces and Alawite businessmen. Though Israel is not too worried about its ability to defeat Syrian forces, it is not interested in expanding its military campaign across Lebanon's western border into Syria for fear of the aftermath of such an attack. The crumbling of Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime would create a new set of problems that Israel is not prepared to deal with, especially while a major upset is occurring in Lebanon. At the same time, al Assad wants to get out of this conflict unscathed and in a prime negotiating position so he can demonstrate his worth in brokering a cease-fire with Hezbollah while putting the issue of the Golan Heights back on the table. With these considerations in mind, the issue of keeping Syria in check will heavily factor into the timing of Israel's push into the Bekaa.

The Bekaa is crucial to Israel's ground campaign, but will have to be dealt with carefully and will likely require more time for major ground combat. In the meantime, Israel is carefully regaining the element of tactical surprise by reducing the war to routine and strongly suggesting that its forces are getting bogged down. Each day Israel and Hezbollah exchange fire, but no developments have dramatically changed the course of the war. While Israel may be developing an atmosphere of complacency around Hezbollah, it will launch its ground offensive when everyone least expects it.

The fact that a major ground offensive is the last thing on anyone's mind does not necessarily decrease the possibility -- it increases it. The movement of troops, rather than the public statements, will only tell if we are right.

It reminds me a bit of Operation Grapes of Wrath, when Peres decided to start blowing the fuck out of Lebanon when the Israel-Hezbollah agreement to only target each other's combatants had started to break down. Again, like Olmert, Peres is not a military man, so maybe the civilian types feel under more pressure to establish themselves as hard nuts. For all that Sharon was the man who sent Israel up to Beirut in 1982, as Prime Minister he was always very reticent about engaging with Hezbollah, suggesting a military man's inclination to only fight one war at a time.

This of course all breaks down if it is the military types who are pushing for extreme action.

ttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/27/AR2006072701725.html

James Wolcott and Hitchens have decried the neoconservative tendency to unload WWII analogies for any occasion; Krauthammer's latest may be the most ludicrous. Hezbollah is not Japan! (and, for that matter, neither is Beirut).

http://d.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/nm/20060728/2006_07_28t035019_450x344_us_asean.jpg?x=380&y=290&sig=if_GZPWCGVpNwi6aJ1MXVQ--

In keeping with her “serious� mood the Secretary of State performed two pieces from the brooding repertoire of Johannes Brahms – a solo Intermezzo number two, and Brahms Sonata for violin and piano, opus 108, with a Malaysian guest soloist.

(Filed: 28/07/2006)

Everyone remaining in southern Lebanon will be regarded as a terrorist, Israel's justice minister said yesterday as the military prepared to employ "huge firepower" from the air in its campaign to crush Hizbollah.

Haim Ramon issued the warning as the Israeli government decided against expanding ground operations after the death of nine soldiers in fighting on Wednesday.

Ehud Olmert surrounded by bodyguards in northern Israel

"What we should do in southern Lebanon is employ huge firepower before a ground force goes in," Mr Ramon said at a security cabinet meeting headed by Ehud Olmert, the prime minister. "Everyone in southern Lebanon is a terrorist and is connected to Hizbollah. Our great advantage vis-a-vis Hizbollah is our firepower, not in face-to-face combat."

Mr Olmert promised that the army would "continue toward the established goals".

Mr Ramon's comments suggested that civilian casualties in Lebanon, which stand at about 600 after 16 days of bombardment, could rise yet higher.

The government's unrelenting line has the backing of the Israeli media, which are demanding a harsh response to an ambush in the Hizbollah stronghold of Bint Jbeil, in which eight soldiers died.

The country's biggest-selling paper, Yedioth Ahronoth, said the army had raised the threshold of response to Katyusha rockets.

"In other words: a village from which rockets are fired at Israel will simply be destroyed by fire," it said.

"This decision should have been made and executed after the first Katyusha. But better late than never."

Three divisions of reserve soldiers, up to 15,000 men, are to be called up.

Almost 50 Hizbollah missiles landed in northern Israel yesterday, wounding four people and bringing the total number of rockets fired into the country to about 1,400.

No "Bombs Over Baghdad"?!? what a ripoff.

CNN's day with Hezbollah:

http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/anderson.cooper.360/blog/2006/07/our-very-strange-day-with-hezbollah.html

My favourite bit is the part where they were taken to talk to the ambulance drivers and rescue workers but QUELLE COINCIDENCE they had to quickly drive away to attend to "injured civilians". The whole thing was later revealed to be staged, of course.

Iran is now claiming that we've all got it wrong and that they do not, in fact, send arms to Hezbollah.

this goes back to that op-ed I posted, wherein all civilians "in the way" may be deemed terrorists for not leaving.

'm no fan of syria or iran, either. but even secular, moderate lebanese are probably now saying "better syria mess with us than israel."

I don't doubt this, but perception and reality might be very different here ... Israel's invasion of Lebanon was a big disaster but they still killed "only" a fraction of the number that the Syrians did during the Lebanese civil war. And it's safe to assume that under post-1990 Syrian domination, there were plenty of Lebanese arrested, tortured, and killed each year by the Syrian military.

i'd pay to see that.

reading it again, actually, it's pretty clear to me that they thought they had an exclusive, and suddenly they see all these OTHER reporters behind them.. dicks!!!!

If you google this phrase, "these ambulances aren’t responding to any new bombings", you'll find that a bunch of rightwing fuckos have written about this at length. Cooper reflected on his day with Hezbollah in a follow-up segment on air. I didn't see the segment and I normally don't pay much attention to media watchdog blogs, but the quotes are extensive (and the airing of the segment should be easily verifiable) so I'm inclined to believe this.

Or, in brief: come on, do you *really* think that a group like Hezbollah doesn't stage shit for American media outlets? Does anything you know about Hezbollah suggest that they drive around like Batman, always on call, ready to protect the injured and heal the sick?

Sure, they were probably pissed about the non-exclusive, but it's not hard to tell you're being manipulated when pictures, names, and places you're allowed to visit are all being tightly controlled by the people who are supposed to be, you know, telling you stuff and answering your questions (which is not to say that conventional governments don't do this stuff sometimes).

because of course no other governments, certainly not the us or canada or israel, ever stage anything.

hahaha

According to the stuff I read, Cooper did do a story on exactly that*. If you're asking "why don't they do stories about this stuff more often", then it's probably because journalists don't like to advertise the fact that they were manipulated and may have reported bullshit disguised as facts.

*from this, I'm figuring that they did some fact-checking before airing the follow-up, because it makes you look 10X stupider if you air false news, and then follow it up by "exposing" that false news with unverifiable speculation. Although who's gonna take the time to investigate *that* in detail and call CNN on their bullshit *twice*? (as you noted, that's what the internet is for)

1) they left some mortars in them and realized at the last second. woops!
2) they were driving AWAY from injured people, because they are MEAN and HATE FREEDOM.
3) quittin' time

xpost oh alright. so what did the story say? if hezbollah has ambulances and even semi-skilled people inside them, why are they stopping their runs?

that's a pretty big assumption given it's cnn. or of any news organization in general. of course fact-checking should happen, but doesn't always, when you've got deadlines. and cnn has made shit up before.

Then one by one, they've been told to turn on their sirens and zoom off so that all the photographers here can get shots of ambulances rushing off to treat civilians. That's the story that Hezbollah wants people to know about.

These ambulances aren't responding to any new bombings. The sirens are strictly for effect.

let's assume that he knows this to be true. that anderson cooper, his cameraman and his producer have figured out something that all the other newsguys at this exact same location, filming the same stuff, didn't "figure out." now. i don't know if you've ever seen a television news crew operate, but this happens ALL THE TIME with TOTALLY INNOCUOUS STORIES. i'll tell you why. it feels very fake the first few times you see it in action. let's say you're interviewing the director of a children's health charity. you set up a camera outside the building. you shoot her walking through the front door several times. she comes back out each time and walks through again. then you shoot her chatting with the receptionist. "talk about pencils or something," you say. then, in her office, you get a wide shot of her at her desk. "get a stack of papers together and and pen, and look through them," you say. this is just how it works. with any news crew anywhere. an equally - and i'll say more likely - interpretation of anderson's "scoop" about the ambulances is that hezbollah was doing the news a FAVOR. are they really going to sit around waiting for those ambulances to respond to something? that image on the screen is going to be the same regardless: an ambulance zooming off. presumably the camera crews that were shooting that needed that image in order to tell their story. we can disagree about whether this is ethical but all newsrooms EVERYWHERE have already agreed, a long time ago, that if the story itself is true, and the words coming out of people's mouths are uncoached, and the images are things that would be happening anyway, the specific shots can be just as rehearsed as you like. now, if these news crews were actually bamboozled somehow by the ambulances, and seized on them and were like "news flash! ambulances have just pulled away from our incredibly stage-managed tour with hezbollah" than yeah they're incredibly stupid and hezbollah is going to have a cake-walk in the american media.

Was just talking to a plugged-in U.S. observer who is pretty depressed about where this thing could be headed diplomatically. He worries that the UN meeting next week could be something of a fiasco. If Condi comes to New York for a ministerial meeting of the Security Council, she could be hammered even harder than she was in Rome and the storyline about the isolation of the U.S. could get even more traction. He sees a basic disconnect between the U.S. diplomatic holding pattern (which won't last forever and may soon give way) and the Israeli military campaign (which seems to lack a sense of every-minute-counts urgency). This raises the possibility of the diplomatic window closing before Israel really gets the job done—because Israel thinks it has more time than it really does. The Arabs, Russians, and Chinese will be hammering away at us next week, and while it probably won't get to the point where there's a resolution we have to veto, it might get very hard to keep a call for an immediate cease-fire out of it. He says everything that is coming of Lebanon suggests that Hezbollah is gaining political support rather than losing it, and if this thing ends without Israel having landed a very grave military blow against Hezbollah, the terror group might gain from it after all. It's doubtful that Condi is going to get much for the Lebanese during her trip over the week, since they are in no position to do anything but call for an immediate ceasefire. The Brits still seem to be holding firm, but there's some wobble in Foreign Secretary Beckett and her top staff. For what it's worth...

The Israeli-Hezbollah war has become routinized. Israeli aircraft fly daily air strikes in Lebanon. Hezbollah rockets strike at Israel. Ground combat takes place among small units just north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. It is a situation that appears, on the surface, to have settled into a sustainable routine. Neither side is clearly making military progress; neither side is under military compulsion to end hostilities; neither side appears to be changing the military equation. Such a war can continue for a long time from a military standpoint. The political dimension determines what happens next. That can range from indefinite continuation of the current pattern of conflict, to an attempt by one side to change the pattern in some decisive way, or the suspension of conflict by means of a political resolution.

Let's begin by considering the war from Hezbollah's point of view. To this point, the war has gone better than the militants could possibly have hoped. First, although they have undoubtedly been hurt by the Israeli air campaign, Hezbollah's operational infrastructure appears intact. The militants continue to fire rockets into Israel, although one gets the sense that the rate of fire is decreasing somewhat. Most important, their forces in south Lebanon appear to have offered significant resistance to elite Israeli units.

In other words, Hezbollah has done what no other Arab fighting force has done. It has not cracked under Israeli air-land attack. This has set in motion an important political process in the Islamic world. At the beginning of the war, the response of Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia was to condemn Hezbollah for starting a war that could only bring ruin to Lebanon. By extension, the Saudis were attacking Iran for once again generating a conflict in which Tehran took no risks and in which the force it was backing could not prevail.

Hezbollah's ability to resist Israel has shifted that political dynamic. Hezbollah is achieving its strategic political goal. Simply by resisting and not collapsing, it is establishing itself as the most effective fighting force yet to engage the Israelis. Expectations of disaster confounded, the Islamic opponents of Hezbollah -- as well as secular opponents -- are now trapped in Hezbollah's apparent success. They must close ranks and support them.

Hezbollah can't do better than it is doing now. It is not going to invade Israel and at some point, Israeli air force attacks and the sheer passage of time will undermine its ability to resist. At the very least, the militants are not likely in the course of this fighting to be in a better position than they are today. It is, therefore, in their interest that a cease-fire be declared as soon as possible. If the war ended today, Israel would have achieved nothing definitive in its attacks. Rockets would still be available for attacks on Israel. Israel would not have room to maneuver in south Lebanon. A peacekeeping force would stand between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah as equals. It follows that Hezbollah should want an unconditional cease-fire right now.

Turn to Israel's view of the war. Certainly, none of its strategic objectives have been achieved. Hezbollah has not been shattered. Rocket attacks continue. The Israelis have not routed Hezbollah infantry in their probing attacks but have chosen to retreat after suffering casualties. Most important, they have suffered a political defeat. Hezbollah's credibility and standing have been enhanced. More than two weeks into this war, Israel has not achieved its political objectives and is further from its political objectives than when it began.

Most important -- and this is both a military and political evolution -- Israel is in the process of degrading its single most important asset, which is the idee fixe in the Middle East that the IDF is an irresistible force. This perception has shaped military and political thinking in and about the region since 1956, when Israel defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai, and was reinforced in 1967. There has been an assumption that any Arab force that engaged the IDF on the battlefield would be defeated quickly and devastatingly. If that perception is lost, then Israel has in fact suffered a significant military defeat that will have resounding political consequences.

Obviously, nothing we have said here is not thoroughly known to the Israelis. Therefore, the question that needs to be answered is: What exactly they are doing? In particular, this question must be answered: Given that the Israelis have not achieved their goals using the air campaign, why are they choosing to continue it? It is interesting to note that this is not only our question. It is a question that we have had expressed to us by Israelis and Arabs, including those in Lebanon. The perception is that Israel could defeat Hezbollah if it chooses. That view persists. The question is why they have not yet done so. Some potential explanations:

1.The air campaign is actually proceeding as expected. This is on an accelerating curve in which little progress will be apparent until a threshold is reached, at which point Hezbollah's infrastructure will suddenly crumble.

2. Israel has had a massive intelligence failure, deeper than the one that happened in 1973. Israeli intelligence underestimated the maturity of Hezbollah and the robustness of its command and control. The Israelis failed to understand the militants' rocketry capabilities or the sophistication of their defensive positions in south Lebanon. They made assumptions about Hezbollah's capabilities that were simply wrong.

3. Israel knew of Hezbollah's capabilities. They understood that a broad ground attack on Hezbollah would involve massive Israeli casualties. They saw the rocket attacks as less costly than a major ground offensive and therefore went to an air campaign to inflict as much damage possible without incurring unacceptable losses.

4. Israel could defeat Hezbollah but is concerned that the costs of an occupation would outweigh the strategic benefits. Therefore, they are not taking ground that they would have to hold in counterinsurgency operations.

5. Israel has tried the air campaign, hoping that it would work. However, Israel has a plan B standing by that would involve a conventional assault along the lines we have discussed before.

6. Israel intends to broaden the war beyond Hezbollah, toward its patrons in Syria and Iran, and is biding its time in doing this.

All of these are plausible explanations. In figuring out which is most plausible, we must begin with a core premise: From the Israeli point of view the current situation, which leaves Hezbollah in a military draw and a political victory, is unacceptable. There are many reasons for this but for Israel, retaining the IDF's reputation for invincibility is an absolute requirement. Ending the war with the perception that a subnational organization can fight the IDF to a draw is not acceptable, regardless of the level of exertion required.

Seen through this lens, which we are confident shows Israeli thinking, the air campaign can be allowed to continue by itself only if battle damage assessment (BDA) shows that it will shortly prove fruitful. We do not have access to Israeli BDA, and we have heard that there is serious debate among Israel's military leaders over the status of the war, with the army questioning air force estimates. However, in our view, there is nothing that is likely to happen in the next few days that will change Hezbollah's operational capabilities.

Whether this was the result of an intelligence failure or of concern about Hezbollah's capabilities, at this point, the Israelis have little choice but to accept the reality and the casualties. They have mobilized a substantial force, clearly in anticipation that it might be needed for offensive operations. Whether Israel is drawn into counterinsurgency or not, retaining the perception of military supremacy supersedes all other considerations. We expect that a Plan B ground offensive was always present as an option, but whether it was hardwired into the plan or not is no longer an issue. Unless the Israelis plan to come out of the war with Hezbollah more powerful than ever, and if the air campaign doesn't suddenly work, they must go in on the ground.

Israel does not have the reach for Iran. The Israelis could launch nuclear weapons, but that simply isn't an option politically. As for Syria, if Israel toppled al Assad, his successor regime would be worse unless Israel would want to occupy Syria. The United States cannot pacify Iraq with 135,000 troops; Israel doesn't have that many to devote to an occupation. Plus, the IDF has never captured a major enemy city in its history, declining to go into Beirut. If attritional warfare bothers Israel, taking Damascus is not an option. The invasion of Syria is not on the table, although selective air attacks are possible.

The widening of the war is not a serious military option. A cease-fire at this time would be politically disastrous for Israel. It must, given its options, try to inflict a decisive defeat on Hezbollah, and a cease-fire would deny Israel that opportunity. The political effect on the region would be dramatic. It may well be that the Israelis have no appetite for casualties or counterinsurgency. It may be that their view of Hezbollah is that it is more an irritant than a threat. Nevertheless, the current evolution of this conflict forces them to make some dramatic decisions.

We note that the war is routinized. That should not be taken as proof that more dramatic events are not being planned. If it turns out that Israel declines major ground operations and accepts a cease-fire, the political map of the region -- geographically and psychologically -- would change decisively and to Israel's massive disadvantage. Thus we must assume that with cease-fires approaching and no decision on the ground, Israel will shift its strategy.

While I have sympathy for Lebanese civilians, I have little truck with Lebanese ministers who call for an immediate ceasefire period, end of story, without acknowledging the truth. Which is that Israel had left Lebanon alone for years and there is a very clear reason why this conflict broke out.

I would love to see a politician anywhere brave enough to take a "turn the other cheek" strategy: evaculate civilians, impose sanctions and blockades, bankrupt the opposing government through lawsuits, etc., (Yes, I know totally unrealistic.) Somehow you have to make it perfectly clear who the "guilty" party is.

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2006/07/30/world/30qana4_600.jpg

i'm not sure what you find intellectually "dishonest" about that, but i agree there probably isn't any point in discussing it.

They are (and have been) in a position where the only course of action "acceptable" to the world is to let Hezbollah or whoever attack them at will.

this is no one's position. no one finds that acceptable.

Israel had left Lebanon alone for years

this, too, is flatly untrue.

they will always come out of a conflict looking worse.

worse than hamas? worse than hezbollah? please. i think this is the worst, though:

Somehow you have to make it perfectly clear who the "guilty" party is.

by bombing them? assassinating their political leaders? israel has specialized in exactly this kind of "we are the judge, jury and hangman" role, more and more in the last few years - sheik yassin is just one of the more inflammatory examples. i don't think israel has benefited from this mentality.

intellectual honesty is couching your opponents' arguments in the STRONGEST possible way and then arguing against that. then you'll really know you've got a case and your opponents have a tough time arguing back because their big ammo has already been used.