Hiroshima: necessary?

Frightening the Soviets was a happy coincidence.

I am not sure if I remember correctly but when the Smithsonian put up a WW2 exhibit which didn't really take any sides on the necessary v. unnecessary arguement the US Veterans had hissy fits, lobbying senators, who in turn threatened to remove funding unless the Smithsonian put the usual pro-American, saved a lotta lives thing in.

I don't actually know a lot of WW2 history, and one could talk about lives saved, lives taken, bad science/scientists/research, necessity to prove to Russia that we had something, Nagasaki (spelling?), and the third bomb that was ready to fall, for years and still not come to a decision.

Personally, I live in fear of an H bomb being dropped on a city. Far far more scary than the atom bomb.

(NB: Lame bit in Gravity's Rainbow - Ensign Morituri wants to go home and see his wife and kids in a lovely peaceful city called Hiroshima yes Hiroshima DO YOU SEE? Paging Tharg's Future Shocks.)

Ironically, the reason why the Japanese hadn't surrendered after Hiroshima was that their communications were so fucked up that the leadership was only learning about it when the Nagasaki bomb was dropped.

I'm not certain of this, but I think that after they bombed Nagasaki the Americans had no atomic bombs left and would not have any more for some months.

Not knowing the ending yet (the ending WE know) is one of the many things GR is abt: Slothrop somewhere sees a pic of the Hiroshima blast in a fragment of german newspaper, doesn't understand what it is. It reminds him of a cock.

Aside: I think every aspiring scientist should take an ethics class during their education. I also think every highschool student should take a mandatory philosophy class...

My wonderful high school does not offer either.

Try reading about the Thirty Years War in 17th century Germany. The siege of Magdeburg - where a city of 36,000 people saw its population reduced overnight to a few hundred, with barely two stones left on top of each other - rivals anything twentieth century warfare throws up.

Imagine a man / When it all began / The pilot of "Enola Gay" / Flying out of the shockwave / On that August day / All the powers that be / And the course of history / Would be changed for evermore...

Enola Gay, you should have stayed at home yesterday/Oho it can't describe the feeling and the way you lied

These games you play, they're gonna end it all in tears someday/Oho Enola Gay, it shouldn't ever have to end this way

It's 8:15, that's the time that it's always been/We got your message on the radio, condition's normal and you're coming home

Enola Gay, is mother proud of little boy today/Oho, this kiss you give, it's never ever gonna fade away

Enola Gay, it shouldn't ever have to end this way/Oho Enola Gay, it should've faded our dreams away

It's 8:15, oh that's the time that it's always been/We got your message on the radio, condition's normal and you're coming home

Enola Gay, is mother proud of little boy today/Oho, this kiss you give, it's never ever gonna fade away

Conscription muddies this argument a little, does it not?

Have to say it sounds v.powerful, judging by the review. (Among other things looks at SF fantasies from 1880s on, abt Euro nations subduing — exterminating — other nations by attacks from the air: such as Samuel W. Odell's novel The Last War, or the Triumph of the English Tongue (1898), in which the United States of the World has wiped out the languages of French, German and Chinese via 1500 airships full of firebombs.)

Lindqvist has divided the book into a labyrinth of 399 short sections that can be read in any number of orders. The author has established 22 entrances into the book and to follow the different themes you have to weave your way backward and forward through the text.

Choose Your Own History Of Bombing Adventure/Bombing Fantasy books = GRATE

Tracer Hand writes (on 8/20/01 no less):
I believe there is a moral difference between killing men in uniform in wartime and killing kids going to piano lessons.

I have always agreed with this logic and have never heard a vaguely convincing argument to the contrary.

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.'"

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

Maybe you'll catch that on second reading.

Maybe.

So you understand that no American lives were saved, as no invasion would have been necessary.

How does that jive with "- it was totally wrong for the us military to value their lives over those of their enemy"?

How were Japanese civilians our enemy?
By your logic, doesn't that make 9/11 acceptable, as Osama considers American civilians his enemy?
Or is it only Americans that get special privileges on this?

This statement is not universally agreed upon.

Whatever other points might be made, you have to recognize a distinction between acts between two nations at war with one another and acts between two nations not at war.

And you have to recognize a distinction between "the actions of a government" (the US, Japan) and "the actions of an individual who is not, at least officially, sanction by a government" (Osama) -- if you don't, then you may as well call the Okalahoma City bombing "an act of civil war."

So we have a document which goes against the direct interests of the government that produces it, and is based on the testimony of the people running Japan (and the US military).

What better source is there for deciding this?

Whatever other points might be made, you have to recognize a distinction between acts between two nations at war with one another and acts between two nations not at war.
Why?

So it would be acceptable to hijack planes and fly them into the WTC, if the people doing it had the sanction of a government?

And you have to recognize a distinction between "the actions of a government" (the US, Japan) and "the actions of an individual who is not, at least officially, sanction by a government" (Osama) -- if you don't, then you may as well call the Okalahoma City bombing "an act of civil war."
I don't consider any of them acceptable, declared "war" or no. Why does a three-letter word make mass murder, whether it's firebombing Dresden, attacking Hiroshima, napalming Vietnamese villagers or slaughtering Iraqi soldiers as they retreat acceptable?

How does the sanction of anyone make the action 'better' or 'worse'? 3,000 people would still be dead, if Saudi Arabia had sponsored the attack. 250,000+ would still be dead, if the Enola Gay had gone rogue.

The distinction is there. It's important for a million reasons, not least of which are:

1) War and unsanctioned terrorist attacks -- McVeigh's bombing, the WTC attack -- have different potential responses.

2) War and unsanctioned terrorist attacks -- assuming for the moment that the acts of war in question don't include acts of terrorism (I'm not arguing that's universally or even usually the case, but there doesn't happen to be a word for 'non-terrorist acts of war') -- are precipitated by different motivations, which is after all why we have a word for terrorism in the first place. Terrorist acts are first and foremost emotional: they aim to inspire terror, fear, panic. There's a difference between blowing up a munitions factory and blowing up a convent, and even if you think both are wrong in any circumstance, if you can't see the difference, you're blind.

3) Because distinctions matter. Recognizing distinctions is one of the fundamental functions of rational thought, maybe second only to perceiving causality. If you can't make them, if you allow emotional objections to deny them, you are quite simply incapable of a useful discussion and may as well just hang up a sign that says "I think X," and let everyone ignore you from the get-go.

What's the difference in:

Nineteen Saudi Arabian soldiers hijack US planes and kill 3000 US civilians

and

Nineteen Saudi Arabian civilians hijack US planes and kill 3000 US civilians?

Aren't the civilians still dead? Weren't they a non-threat to anyone's life either way?

The logic behind excusing murder in war is based on self-defense. You kill the other guy because he poses a direct threat to your health and well-being. That simply doesn't exist for Hiroshima, Nagasaki or most other US actions of the last half-century.

(And before it's pointed out, yes, absolutely the same goes for other nations. I happen to be a US citizen, and as such have a vested interest in the actions of my government.)

how would the american military have had perfect access to the relevant information abt japan's capabilities and morale etc while the fighting was still going on?

Nineteen Saudi Arabian civilians hijack US planes and kill 3000 US civilians?

The distinction isn't only between the jobs of the people responsible. Hiroshima happened in the context of an existing war which had been raged for years; it was, in broad terms but obviously not specifics, predictable. It was not entirely out of the blue -- i.e. even if Hiroshima was unjustified (and I'm not making an argument that it was, you know), even if that specific attack was a surprise, "Americans attacking Japan" certainly wasn't. It was the latest action in a context of war.

Flying a plane through the World Trade Center wasn't. Blowing up a federal building in Oklahome City wasn't.

I'm not saying you should kill civilians in a war. I'm not saying we should've dropped a bomb on Hiroshima. I'm saying that pretending there's any real parallel between those actions and the World Trade Center bombing, for the sake of some perceived scored point, is asinine.

2) War and unsanctioned terrorist attacks -- assuming for the moment that the acts of war in question don't include acts of terrorism (I'm not arguing that's universally or even usually the case, but there doesn't happen to be a word for 'non-terrorist acts of war') -- are precipitated by different motivations, which is after all why we have a word for terrorism in the first place. Terrorist acts are first and foremost emotional: they aim to inspire terror, fear, panic. There's a difference between blowing up a munitions factory and blowing up a convent, and even if you think both are wrong in any circumstance, if you can't see the difference, you're blind.

The key sentence here : assuming for the moment that the acts of war in question don't include acts of terrorism.

That's a false assumption. Modern war is one long act of terrorism. From the Blitz to "shock and awe."

And the events I've mentioned - 9/11 v. Hiroshima, certainly falls under the terrorist banner.

As such, no distinction between them based on 'declared war.'

3) Because distinctions matter. Recognizing distinctions is one of the fundamental functions of rational thought, maybe second only to perceiving causality. If you can't make them, if you allow emotional objections to deny them, you are quite simply incapable of a useful discussion and may as well just hang up a sign that says "I think X," and let everyone ignore you from the get-go.
It's not that I'm "ignoring" distinctions, I fail to see a rational distinction based on "declared war."

How does "declaring war" change the acceptability/morality of an action?

What distinction is created by "declaring war"?

How would 9/11 have been different under a declared war?

Howso? I'm not saying Saudi Arabia was responsible for the attacks. But, as the head of the organization and most of the people involved came from SA, it's a shorthand.

milo, just because people realised AFTERWARDS that the war needn't have been fought the way it was doesn't mean that people at the time were involved in some dastardly plot to pursue evil at all costs, knowing that it wasn't necessary

how would the american military have had perfect access to the relevant information abt japan's capabilities and morale etc while the fighting was still going on?
Perhaps noting the surrender talk being passed through Moscow?

Or listening to Eisenhower or any of the other people in the military who said it was unnecessary?

Or noting that the Soviets would soon join the war, making an American invasion unnecessary or even less costly should it have had to happen? (Of course, this goes back to the real cause - we needed to show we had the bomb and would use it on a civilian population. Prelude to a Cold War.)

This is a discussion on the "necessity" of the bombing. And, thus far, there has been nothing presented to show it being necessary.

The distinction isn't only between the jobs of the people responsible. Hiroshima happened in the context of an existing war which had been raged for years; it was, in broad terms but obviously not specifics, predictable. It was not entirely out of the blue -- i.e. even if Hiroshima was unjustified (and I'm not making an argument that it was, you know), even if that specific attack was a surprise, "Americans attacking Japan" certainly wasn't. It was the latest action in a context of war.

Flying a plane through the World Trade Center wasn't. Blowing up a federal building in Oklahome City wasn't.
In all three cases, people were killed who posed no threat to the lives of the people who killed them.

How does the "context of war" change that?

I'm not saying you should kill civilians in a war. I'm not saying we should've dropped a bomb on Hiroshima. I'm saying that pretending there's any real parallel between those actions and the World Trade Center bombing, for the sake of some perceived scored point, is asinine.

How is there not a parallel? All you keep coming back to is this "context of war," without showing how that "context" excuses or changes any action.

In both cases, non-combatants were killed to serve no purpose outside of "terror." Do you agree?

If so, how does the "context of war" change the events? Unless war mitigates terrorism, there is no difference.

You state that the "context of war" creates "distinctions."

As asked earlier, what is the point of these distinctions, if not to create different standards for identical actions?

What is the point of "distinctions" and "contexts" here, if not to determine acceptability.

I'm not sure he realizes that I don't even necessarily disagree with him about Hiroshima itself.
You don't, not quite.

As I see it, the people who ordered the Enola Gay to attack, and the people who carried it out, are no different from Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 hijackers. Only the former killed many more people.

In both cases, the people involved took actions designed to murder thousands of civilians who posed no threat, in order to serve a political purpose.

I fail to see how any "distinction" or "context of war" mitigates anything.

Finding it acceptable but disapproving = "we shouldn't have done it, but that doesn't make the Americans war criminals."

Finding it unacceptable and disapproving = "we shouldn't have done it and the Americans involved are war criminals."

1) I have not mentioned mitigation. I have not condoned the bombing of Hiroshima. I have not specifically condemned it because I don't feel I'm informed enough to have an educated opinion. My gut feeling is that it was unnecessary -- but I'm not certain I would have been able to determine that in 1945.

2) I could name a thousand types of distinctions that have nothing to do with acceptability -- gender, color, anything perceptible by any sense, and the several-times-mentioned apples versus oranges -- but who has time for that? If you don't get it, you don't get it; if it's inconvenient to the type of rhetoric you want to stick to, you'll pretend not to get it, judging by what Blount implies.

3) The two most important reasons to make a distinction in this case are:

a) intent -- if you automatically lump the WTC bombing and the Hiroshima bombing together, you "pre-win" any arguments about the possible intents or motivations for the Hiroshima bombing. Without doing so, someone could conceivably argue that those who ordered the Hiroshima bombing were motivated by a desire to preserve American life -- whether their actions resulted in that or not, that motivation could be proposed. By equating it with the WTC bombing, you are automatically denying that possibility without bothering to argue it -- Osama couldn't possibly have thought the lives of his people would be preserved by the WTC bombing, and therefore no one could have thought the same for the Hiroshima bombing, QED, la la la. It's lazy, and it's bullshit, and it's beneath anyone of intelligence.

b) Respect. Making the sloppiness of your thinking that evident isn't just an insult to your own intelligence, it's an insult to the intelligence of anyone who would carry on the argument with you.

Which is why I'm done.

and this statement: As I see it, the people who ordered the Enola Gay to attack, and the people who carried it out, are no different from Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 hijackers.

is so utterly relativistic that we might as well just all go on a killing spree right now because it's the same thing as being born. I'm outta here too.

If you didn't think it was right and proper, you wouldn't find it "necessary." "Necessary" acts as a positive value judgement - an action was "required."

Then what purpose do "distinctions" and "contexts" serve here? I've asked this several times.

If war doesn't act as a mitigating circumstance - which, in fact, it does ("self-defense"), then what "distinction" is made?

Is there a distinction between war and peace? Yes. One is war and one is peace.

Does that distinction matter when looking at actions? Not that I can see, and not that I have been shown here.

2) I could name a thousand types of distinctions that have nothing to do with acceptability -- gender, color, anything perceptible by any sense, and the several-times-mentioned apples versus oranges -- but who has time for that? If you don't get it, you don't get it; if it's inconvenient to the type of rhetoric you want to stick to, you'll pretend not to get it, judging by what Blount implies.
Thousands of distinctions are irrelevant here.

You're arguing that there exists a distinction between "actions undertaken in times of war" and identical or similar "actions undertaken in times of peace."

What is the point of this distinction, other than to create two standards of conduct for the actions?

a) intent -- if you automatically lump the WTC bombing and the Hiroshima bombing together, you "pre-win" any arguments about the possible intents or motivations for the Hiroshima bombing. Without doing so, someone could conceivably argue that those who ordered the Hiroshima bombing were motivated by a desire to preserve American life -- whether their actions resulted in that or not, that motivation could be proposed.
You're right. I consider the "preserving American life" argument a matter of the historical record, and a non-issue.

But you know what the counter-argument here would be? For someone to show that the bombing preserved American life. Or even that it had the chance to.

By equating it with the WTC bombing, you are automatically denying that possibility without bothering to argue it -- Osama couldn't possibly have thought the lives of his people would be preserved by the WTC bombing, and therefore no one could have thought the same for the Hiroshima bombing, QED, la la la. It's lazy, and it's bullshit, and it's beneath anyone of intelligence
They're separate issues. First we dealt with the necessity of the bombing - and I feel that has been safely put to rest. If anyone can provide any sort of counter-argument involving saving American lives, I'd love to hear it.

But the only recent time that has been raised was by Blount, who immediately backed off of it.

Milo, Mark S. is OTM. I think you're heavily influenced by conspiracy laced hindsight. No one knew what would happen if/when the USA would have to invade the Japanese mainland. Based upon Japanese tactics and behavior throughout the war (the barbaric slaughter of Chinese civilians, American and British POWs, the willingness to send Kamikaze planes by the thousands), it would be hard to look at a few confused missives going through Moscow (who we were already suspicious of) as a sign that we wouldn't have to invest enormous resources and risk the lives of thousands of servicemen in a bloody assault on an island nation - after all, even Hitler decided against 'Sea Lion' largely because of the unknown costs of invading an island fortress with millions of possibly fanatical civilians.

No one has provided any sort of evidence to support this view. It's complete and utter conjecture. "Well, maybe we thought they were going to act barbaric." Maybe so. Maybe we thought they were Martians.

But the opposing view, that there would never have been an invasion and the war would have ended within two-three months - that actually has some evidence presented in its favor. What we know is that a) we needed to scare the Russkies b) no invasion would have been necessary, according to the military c) the Japanese were already discussing surrender d) the attacks served no military goal, civilians were the target.

and this statement: As I see it, the people who ordered the Enola Gay to attack, and the people who carried it out, are no different from Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 hijackers.

is so utterly relativistic that we might as well just all go on a killing spree right now because it's the same thing as being born. I'm outta here too.
Howso?

If I order thousands of civilians killed with a general's star that makes it more acceptable than doing so without one?

By stating a view and defending it?

The irony here is that what you've whined about elsewhere, that I won't "take a position," is exactly what I've done here, and now you whine about that.

This is one of the few times in history where I can look at it and make a judgement call - killing 250,000 civilians solely to serve a political purpose was wrong. Dead wrong. And the people involved should have been tried in an international court.

Likewise, the people responsible for killing 3,000 civilians were wrong, and should see justice.

1) The Japanese regime != the Japanese civilan population, but the former were always happy to exploit the latter for many different ends and means

2) War is bloody, destructive, insane.

3) Monday morning quarterbacking is hardly limited to football (right now I'm reading Michael Carley's 1939 on the failed attempt to pull together an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance in the face of Nazi Germany).

4) The intentions, goals and desires of those carrying out actions which can and do result in death are as variable and multiple as the stars in the sky, as the atoms in a galaxy -- none of which is meant to excuse or ignore the saddest and simplest fact:

5) The innocent can die. Those who caused their death may never see justice as we would like it to be in a perfect world. That, regrettably, is life, but at least we can honor their memory and hope for better -- while not being surprised that it will happen again. And again.

We bombed Hiroshima to "favor American lives" over "the enemies'." Is that a valid summation of your argument?

My response was to point out the government's words - no invasion was necessary. Thus "favor[ing] American lives" is irrelevant. No American lives would be lost by not bombing.

Do you disagree?
Have you any evidence that American lives were saved by the attack?

is becuz any sort of discussion with you is impossible since the discussion inevitably becomes about semantics, your terms of the debate, you you you instead of what the discussion was originally going to be about.
Except the only semantic distinction here has been about the role "distinctions" in war vs. peace, and then only because I can't pinpoint what purpose Tep's distinction serves. If it doesn't serve to create different standards, to mitigate some actions (and I'll argue that war is a mitigating circumstance in many contexts, but not all), then what purpose does the distinction serve?

To bring up another context - had the Enola Gay wandered off-course, or somehow a mistake was made and the people of Hiroshima were accidentally killed, that would make a huge difference to me.

That's the role distinctions and contexts play - accident v. determination in this instance.

But we specifically (and avoidably) targeted a civilian population for annihilation, an action that served neither military nor humanitarian (saving American lives) purpose, but sought to terrorize the population and governments of Japan and the Soviet Union.

So what purpose did it serve? It kept the Russians out of Japan (and thus out of post-war negotiations). It fired up the Cold War.

That's a political purpose.

Secondly, what was that political purpose? How do you know that it didn't save future American lives from even being threatened?
So basically, your argument is that I should assume that Truman and co. did the right thing? Based on what?

As I've said, the historical record doesn't bear out any kind of "save American lives" claim. Unless someone can find me where it did.

murder = bad
death = bad
killing = bad
suffering = bad
war = bad for these reasons and plenty of others

I mean we'd ALL like to live in PerfectWorld but we DON'T and we definitely weren't living in it in 1945. Calling it unnecessary is just more 20/20 hindsight and I do believe we've learned our lessons considering that no nuclear weapon has ever been used by anyone for other than testing and research purposes since.

Howzabout, you show me the evidence that "it was necessary" or that anyone "thought it was necessary." What have you got? Assumptions.

and again, even the 'it weren't neccessary' smoking gun you have states the end of the war as no earlier than november 45 - do you think there wouldn't have been any american casualties in those three months?
You're right. I am balancing the deaths of 250000 vs. possible casualties over a couple of months of bombing.

I mean your argument isn't that different from the 'we shoulda invaded' argument, except even less plausible!
Damn that historical record!

Milo, I'm not going to get drawn into this argument with you, that's why I posted the way I did and left it at that -- at this point I myself have no exact conclusion on this matter, like I said two years on this very thread even. But trying to argue that a government might have different goals other than ones officially stated is like saying that the sky is blue, and trying to push this as some sort of arch-surprising revelation here is a goddamn bore.
But I wasn't arguing with you. Your last point just reminded me of something else.

And simply because we can't change the past we shouldn't examine it, examine the popular mythology of the past?

http://www.doug-long.com/hst.htm

an excerpt:

7/18/45 Letter to Bess Truman:

"...I've gotten what I came for - Stalin goes to war [against Japan] August 15 with no strings on it. He wanted a Chinese settlement [in return for entering the Pacific war, China would give Russia some land and other concessions] - and it is practically made - in a better form than I expected. [Chinese Foreign Minister] Soong did better than I asked him. I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That is the important thing."

and...

7/18/45 Diary Entry:

"P.M. [Prime Minister Winston Churchill] & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan [atomic bomb] (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland. I shall inform Stalin about it at an opportune time."

I was stopped at a redlight today behind an old Ford Bronco that had "kill 'em all" "go get 'em Bush" and "BOMB IRAQ" shoe-polished on the rear window.

Maybe if that person had any thoughts of questioning his government, he wouldn't be so supportive of pre-emptive war.

This is a discussion on Gar Alperovitz's book on Hiroshima.

But I'm not out specifically to change people's views to fall in line with mine. Even if I were, I wouldn't worry about it on a small-scale like this.

put words in other peoples mouths
Funny, when accused of this, I immediately asked what was meant by the statement and got a "well, yeah, you're right."

and then demand they defend statements they never made (show me a single post calling Hiroshima necessary by the people you accuse of doing so),
Where did "accuse" anyone of "calling Hiroshima necessary"? The one person who did so, in my reply, I noted that they did so "for rhetorical purposes."

What I see a lot of people doing is making a half-assed condemnation. "Well, I don't really support it, but it's not like Harry Truman and the military higher-ups were war criminals. They just killed a quarter-million civilians to serve no actual military or humanitarian purpose."

Let me ask you, had the Japanese managed to build a bomb and take out, say, San Francisco - how would you feel? Would they have been "favoring Japanese lives" over "the enemy"? Is that acceptable? Does being an "enemy population" make everyone a viable target?

and do anything and everything to make sure no thought will be provoked other than 'wow, whatta belligerant asshole' - 80% of your posts on this thread are the same as 80% of your posts on other threads.
You're right, when it comes to defending mass murder, or just making it a joke - see your first posts today - I am a belligerent asshole. Gosh golly, lock me up, I don't find the slaughter of non-combatants to be a non-issue or funny!

You've still done nothing to convince me you're not a right wing plant.
Which kind? Fern?

If you're going to make baseless accusations and character attacks, you should at least be man enough to back them up.

Oooh, you really got me there.

a right wing plant - see also rnc funding of nader 2000 campaign

At least I'm in excellent company, then.

what does it say about our macho sensibilities that we wouldn't even consider peace without Japan totally capitulating? why not blockade japan let them rattle their bamboo spears? why wasn't humiliating their military and dismantling their empire enough to expiate pearl harbor?

so that's what's on my mind. who was it who said "it's not the future i'm afraid of. it's the past."

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic explosion was certainly not necessary for a military victory by the allies (USA + British Empire + USSR) over Japan. By August of 1945 Japan was incapable of effective military resistance. However, it was, by most political measures, a very, very expedient act.

Its use was explained to the US public and to the world as necessary to save 'a million lives' during an invasion of the Japanese home islands. This is pure speculation and must ever remain so. The only important question about this speculation is whether it was believed by Truman or merely officially employed by him to justify morally an act that had too many political attractions to resist.

There is no way to know the answer to this question. Among other things, humans are capable of hiding the truth of their own motives even from themselves, and this inner evasion only grows stronger as time passes and all that is left of the action or decision is the residue of memory. By the time Truman died he may have firmly believed the truth of the 'million lives saved', even if he didn't especially believe it on the day he gave the order.

As a Canadian, I was always particularly displeased with this quote from then Prime Minister Mackenzie King:

It is fortunate that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe.
-- William Lyon Mackenzie King (uncensored diaries) (I re-located that quote at http://dominionpaper.ca/original_peoples/2005/04/05/canada_rac.html , however I definitely had a page number from those diaries when I cited them in my paper)

Eisenhower:

in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan.... "During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude...

- Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380

In a Newsweek interview, Eisenhower again recalled the meeting with Stimson:

...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing.

- Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63

ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY
(Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman)

It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

- William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441.

HERBERT HOOVER

On May 28, 1945, Hoover visited President Truman and suggested a way to end the Pacific war quickly: I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over.

Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg. 347.

On August 8, 1945, after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Hoover wrote to Army and Navy Journal publisher Colonel John Callan O'Laughlin, "The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul."
Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 635

In early May of 1946 Hoover met with General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover recorded in his diary, "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."
Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 350-351

"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs." Barton Bernstein in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian, pg. 142

GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled... Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary."

William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.

Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur, "MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed." He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor."

Norman Cousins, The Pathology of Power, pg. 65, 70-71.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARTER CLARKE

(The military intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted Japanese cables - the MAGIC summaries - for Truman and his advisors)

...when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs.

Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 359.

From a study of the evidence and in particular the declassification of a lot of Truman's post-war NSC discussions and some of Eisenhower's remarks (like the ones posted up thread), I'd say it was militarily unnecessary.

well yes of course it's pure speculation. it was equally pure speculation that the a-bombs would bring about surrender. but speculation involves weighing things up, and the important thing is not just truman's moral qualms but whether the speculation was on balance right.

the idea japan had stopped fighting by summer 1945 is insane.

*i know of wherefore i speak

-- Millar (tmilla...), August 11th, 2003. (Millar)

maybe my favorite ILE post ever.

Your use of "you people" shows that you see this issue in black and white, and that it is you that have come to the table with predetermined ideas.

Did you read any of the quotes from any of the high ranking US military leaders who were opposed to the use of the bombs? They appear to fall under your description of "you people".

Similarly, 20 years on, when some of Lyndon Johnson's advisers objected that bombing North Vietnam's factories and rail lines would not do much harm to an agrarian country in which industry accounted for only 12% of its minuscule GNP, America's air-force chiefs argued that since its industrial sector was so small, the country was that much more dependent on it, and would suffer all the more if it were destroyed. In fact, the North Vietnamese responded to the bombing of their oil tanks and railways by dispersing fuel across the country in small drums and hauling supplies around on bicycles. But zapping railways, factories and oil tanks was something the air force knew how to do.

By that time bombing, whether effective or not, seemed much more attractive than sending in more troops. As America's ground forces in Vietnam found themselves increasingly impotent against an elusive and resourceful foe, the military commanders proposed endless variations on the same bombing strategy that had so far failed. Johnson one day dressed down the army chief of staff in front of his underlings: 'Bomb, bomb, bomb, that's all you know. Well, I want to know why there's nothing else. You're not giving me any ideas for this damn little pissant country. Now, I don't need ten generals to come in here ten times and tell me to bomb.' "

The following is a list of historians who signed a letter which challenges (to say the least) the "facts" displayed at the Smithsonian's original Enola Gay exhibit. The letter can be read at http://www.doug-long.com/letter.htm

List of signatories:

Kai Bird, co-chair of the Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima

Martin Sherwin, co-chair of the Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima

Walter LaFeber, Professor of History, Cornell University

Stanley Hoffman, Dillon Professor, Harvard University

Mark Selden, Chair, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton

Jon Wiener, Professor of History, University of California, Irvine

William O. Walker III, Ohio Wesleyan University

Dr. E.B. Halpern, Lecturer in American History, University College London

John Morris, Professor, Miyagi Gakuin Women's Junior College, Sendai, Japan

Gar Alperovitz, historian and author of The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb

Stanley Goldberg, historian of science and biographer of Gen. Leslie Groves

James Hershberg, historian and author of James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age

Greg Mitchell, author of Hiroshima in America

Gaddis Smith, Professor of History, Yale University

Barton J. Bernstein, Professor of History, Stanford University

Michael J. Hogan, Professor of History, Ohio State University

Melvyn P. Leffler, Professor of History, University of Virginia

John W. Dower, Professor of History, MIT

Priscilla Johnson McMillan, Author and Fellow of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University

Bob Carter, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Worcester College of Higher Education, England.

Douglas Haynes, Associate Professor of History, Dartmouth College

Bruce Nelson, Department of History, Dartmouth College

Walter J. Kendall, III, The John Marshall School of Law, Chicago

Patricia Morton, Assistant Professor, University of California, Riverside

Michael Kazin, Professor of History, American University

Gerald Figal, Asst. Professor of History, Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Oregon

R. David Arkush, Professor of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City

Barbara Brooks, Professor of Japanese and Chinese History, City College of New York

Dell Upton, Professor, University of California, Berkeley

Eric Schneider, Assistant Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania

Janet Golden, Assistant Professor of History, Rutgers, Camden

Bob Buzzanco, Assistant Professor of History, University of Houston

Lawrence Badash, Professor of History of Science, University of California, Santa Barbara

Kanno Humio, Asociate Professor of Iwate University, Japan

Robert Entenmann, Associate Professor of History, St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN

Mark Lincicome, Assistant Professor, Department of History, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA

Kristina Kade Troost, Duke University, Durham NC

Peter Zarrow, Assistant Professor of History, Vanderbilt University

Michael Kucher, University of Delaware

Lawrence Rogers, University of Hawaii at Hilo

Alan Baumler, Piedmont College

Timothy S. George, Harvard University

Ronald Dale Karr, University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Kikuchi Isao, Professor of Japanese History, Miyagi Gakuin Women's College, Sendai, Japan

Ohira Satoshi, Associate Professor of Japanese History, Miyagi Gakuin Women's College, Sendai, Japan

Inoue Ken'Ichiro Associate Professor of Japanese Art History, Miyagi Gakuin Women's College, Sendai, Japan

Yanagiya Keiko, Associate Professor of Japanese Literature, Siewa Women's College, Sendai, Japan

Sanho Tree, Research Director, Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima

Eric Alterman, Stanford University

Jeff R. Schutts, Georgetown University

Gary Michael Tartakov, Iowa State University

W. Donald Smith, University of Washington, currently at Hitotsubashi University in Toky

"However," claims the Smithsonian, "the use of the bombs led to the immediate surrender of Japan and made unnecessary the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands." Presented as fact, this sentence is actually a highly contentious interpretation. For example, an April 30, 1946 study by the War Department's Military Intelligence Division concluded, "The war would almost certainly have terminated when Russia entered the war against Japan."[3] (The Soviet entry into the war on August 8th is not even mentioned in the exhibit as a major factor in the Japanese surrender.)

if they *had* mentioned the entry of the USSR, then they'd have to get into why the US government wasn't oh so keen on the USSR extending its sphere of influence over the pacific rim -- quite justifiably within the purview of washing dc circa 1945, however you feel about US puppet regimes there during the cold war.

Um... Huh??

Good one.

Decisions are black and white when you make them. It's everything that happens afterward that fucks it all up.

Exactly. That's why they sent it to the Smithsonian which was presenting its own interpretation as fact. These historians were arguing that a subject that is so controversial should not be exhibited as fact at a respected institute like the Smithsonian.

Talking about projected casualties from invasion vs. casualties from the bombs is not an argument for or against the decision that was made. That discussion is called "lessons learned;" and it would seem we've all learned a lot since not a single one has been dropped on any other people since.

tom i was under the impression that a- and h-bombs aren't being dropped/fired because of strategic wargame type issues, rather than a firm moral resolve that melting the flesh off children is not "the done thing" any more.

Plus it's bluff anyway since the abundant natural resources in the Middle East in general make nuking an economic no-no.

The reason why this debate occurs is that the answer to what Truman believed to be true is inaccessible. The fact that he said he believed it is not enough, since we all know that in such matters any leader would willingly lie about his motives. In light of this, there is no answer to this debate and can't be. Even hindsight is not always 20/20.

xpost

and as stated various times, "more died in tokyo" -- but anyway what's *your* estimate of US fatalities in an invasion of japan? if not half-a-million, perhaps a quarter-of-a-million. would a US president destroy a japanese city to prevent this? in mid-1945 yes he certainly would. innocent japanese and germans died in greater numbers for less direct purposes.

Talking about projected casualties from invasion vs. casualties from the bombs is not an argument for or against the decision that was made. That discussion is called "lessons learned;" and it would seem we've all learned a lot since not a single one has been dropped on any other people since.

How fortunate for you that your parents/grandparents were not Japanese civilians. How unfortunate for the Japanese civilians that "we" learned a lesson at their expense.

To paraphrase the character of William Parcher in "A Beautiful Mind" (one of the characters imagined by John Forbes Nash), your conviction, it turns out, is a luxury that can only be enjoyed by those on the sidelines.

I still feel that the link Tom posted is completely relevant to the thread, it's just that I see it as one that undermines the entire premise that the bombs were necessary to end the war.

Of course no one has an answer to this, nor do I need one. Since Truman is the one for whom "the buck stops here", and it was his decision that caused this debate, I believe the heavier burdon of proof to fall on the "yes" decision. Albert Einstein "said that he was sure that President Roosevelt would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive". So why is it that everyone wants to believe Truman's motives but not those of others like Eisenhower, Leahy, MacArthur, Zsilard and Einstein?

Exactly! MacArthur was anything but peace loving, and even he was opposed to the use of the bombs. Since he was in charge of the Pacific war, and subsequently Japan's occupation, I find his opinion on the matter to be highly relevant.

you really need to read Rise of the Vulcans! Armitage is a piece of work all right, but he comes of positively rosy compared to the rest of that generation. thousands of Vietnamese owe him their lives, personally, post-Saigon

Why FDR made unconditional surrender his policy and why, apparently, Truman followed it, is something I never can quite fathom.

I agree with your statement M. Ironic that "we" allowed them to retain the Emperor after dropping the bombs anyhow.

Supporters also point to an order given by the Japanese War Ministry on August 1, 1944. The order dealt with the disposal and execution of all Allied POWs, numbering over 100,000, if an invasion of the Japanese mainland took place.[36] It is also likely that, considering Japan's previous treatment of POWs, were the Allies to wait out Japan and starve it, the Japanese would have killed all Allied POWs and Chinese prisoners.

Father John A. Siemes, professor of modern philosophy at Tokyo's Catholic University, and an eyewitness to the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima wrote:

"We have discussed among ourselves the ethics of the use of the bomb. Some consider it in the same category as poison gas and were against its use on a civil population. Others were of the view that in total war, as carried on in Japan, there was no difference between civilians and soldiers, and that the bomb itself was an effective force tending to end the bloodshed, warning Japan to surrender and thus to avoid total destruction. It seems logical to me that he who supports total war in principle cannot complain of war against civilians."[37]

Japanese government did not decide what terms, beyond preservation of an imperial system, they would have accepted to end the war; as late as August 9, the Supreme War Council was still split, with the hard-liners insisting Japan should demobilize its own forces, no war crimes trials would be conducted, and no occupation of Japan would be allowed. Only the direct intervention of the emperor ended the dispute, and even then a military coup was attempted to prevent the surrender.

One of the most notable individuals with this opinion was then-General Dwight D. Eisenhower. He wrote in his memoir The White House Years:

"In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives."[47][48]
Other U.S. military officers who disagreed with the necessity of the bombings include General Douglas MacArthur (the highest-ranking officer in the Pacific Theater), Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (the Chief of Staff to the President), General Carl Spaatz (commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific), and Brigadier General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials),[48] Major General Curtis LeMay,[49] and Admiral Ernest King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard,[50] and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.[51]

Curtis Le May??!!

Others have argued that the U.S. should have waited a short time to gauge the effect of the Soviet Union's entry into the war. The U.S. knew, as Japan did not, that the Soviet Union had agreed to declare war on Japan three months after V-E Day, and the Soviets did indeed attack Japanese forces in Manchuria, Sakhalin Island, and the Kuril Islands on August 8, 1945. This represented the loss of any possibility that the Soviet Union would serve as a neutral mediator for a negotiated peace, as well as the entry into combat of the Red Army, the largest active army in the world. Because no U.S. invasion was immediately imminent, it is argued that the U.S. had nothing to lose by waiting several days to see whether these events would convince Japan to surrender without use of the atom bomb. Historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's research has led him to conclude that the atomic bombings themselves were not even the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, he contends, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories in Manchuria that forced the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.[54]

Your intelligence is staggering Timbit. So I disagree with you, with research and citations, and that makes me "a goddamed fucking idiot (that) aught to learn to read".

I would say that your childishness simply proves my points, but that would not be fair to those that disagree with me but use rational discourse and research to do so.

Sherman justified his brutalizing of the South by implying that it would shorten the war and thus actually minimize the final Southern tally of suffering and a man like Le May did very much the same with regard to his approach in Asia, though he did admit that, had the U.S. lost, he fully expected to be tried as a war criminal. Without 20/20 hindsight, it's vey hard to gauge how one's decisions will affect the future, and strangely, whether a leader depends on popularity, aquiescence or elections, he or she must sometimes pay attention to popular grievances in formulating the policies of war and peace - see Koizumi and the shrine (I have seen the ugly side of Japanese nationalism with their strident flags and bullhorns in the streets of Tokyo) or Truman's echo of the angry and often racist sentiment of 40's American men on the street to beat the hell out of 'the Japs', and to merely say that they should hold themselves to higher standards is, though sometimes commendable, sometimes terribly easy when the actual responsibility doesn't actually weigh upon one's shoulders.

You're an absolute fool and I'll not repeat myself any further on this thread. You infuriate me with your pompously worded and completely, COMPLETELY redundant additions to this thread. You are in no way genuinely interested in discussing the topic or perusing what's already been said long ago because you came here to make incredibly dull observations about the sanctity of human life and fell self-righteous. You're actually a pretty terrible excuse for a sentient being and I am sick of reading posts by people like you. Fuck off and die.

M. White: OTM.

M, once again I can agree with your statement. As one who has also studied 'clio's craft', I know that it is unfair for me to use Western 21st century values to judge a person who was in control of one of the most powerful nations 60 years ago. However, what I can do is read the opinions of his contemporaries and do my best to objectively (not possible, I know) use that information as if they were a jury of his peers, so to speak.

-- TOMBOT (tombo...), September 27th, 2006.

It really shouldn't be this way, but you can't begin to imagine how much it pleases me that I have infuriated such an apparently belligerent person as you Tom.

I also simply can't resist pointing out the humour in the following statement: completely, COMPLETELY redundant additions to this thread That's hilarious man! Well said.

It's also funny that you claim that I have brought nothing to the conversation, yet it is you that is ranting and swearing.

So Tom, admit it. You're also one of those who still thinks the weapons of mass destruction will be found in Iraq aren't ya.

I completely agree gear.

So does he just need to tip a few right now then?

That explains a whole lot.

Having any luck with that drink recipe yet M? ;)

um, if roosevelt allowed the bomb to be made in the first place why would he have forbidden it to be used against a country we were still at war with?

*Yawn*

Seriously, why are you people even talking to this person? I'm completely floored.

Squirrel, don't you have any huffing to do?

http://www.bookmice.net/darkchilde/japan/japan/bonds1.jpg

xposts

I wonder if there's was a war stamp discount on larger amounts? Maybe, 60 bullets for $1.00.

I would surmise that he was behind the building of the bomb because he knew he was in a race with Germany over who would accomplish it first. That doesn't mean he actually wanted to use it on a city or two. The reason Einstein is relevant to the discussion at all is because he had originally sent a letter to FDR to advise him to start the program:

In 1939 Einstein signed a letter to President Roosevelt that was drafted by the scientist Leo Szilard. Received by FDR in October of that year, the letter from Einstein called for and sparked the beginning of U.S. government support for a program to build an atomic bomb, lest the Nazis build one first.

Einstein did not speak publicly on the atomic bombing of Japan until a year afterward. A short article on the front page of the New York Times contained his view:

"Prof. Albert Einstein... said that he was sure that President Roosevelt would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive and that it was probably carried out to end the Pacific war before Russia could participate." -Einstein Deplores Use of Atom Bomb, New York Times, 8/19/46, pg. 1

I was in no way attempting to say that Einstein's opinions about FDR were true. I was simply adding another name to the movers and thinkers of the era who were opposed to the use of the bomb at the time.

Heh heh heh heh I missed this earlier. Ally, I can certainly see how you would see that quote from "A Beautiful Mind" would seem pretentious as hell. It seems I fergot to mention that the characters were discussing this very debate, which is why it seemed appropriate to me at the time.

Imagine this: It is August 1, 1945. Everything about the war has occurred exactly as history indicates except for one item - the Trinity test of the first uranium bomb failed because the design was wrong, and Los Alamos determines that the design flaws will take several years to fix.

Now ask: could the war with Japan successfully be ended within that time frame, without the bomb's availability? If so, then the bomb was not (strictly speaking) necessary to end the war, but only sufficient.

It is pretty clear to me that the bomb was not necessary by that time. That is why the question in thread is probably the wrong question in my view. The answer is too obvious.

By the same token, there is no doubt whether the bomb was sufficient to end the war, as the events of history prove that it was.

I am pretty sure Truman knew this, too. He had a weapon sufficient to end the war, but not strictly necessary. Under those conditions he was ultimately responsible, as no one else was, for weighing the pros and cons of using it and deciding what approach would provide the "best" result. That is why I focus on him. It was in his hands exclusively. No one else. No one. Period.

Since Truman, like any other person, could not foretell the course of the future with any accuracy or great confidence, he simply did the best he could and selected the line of reasoning that seemed to him to be the strongest. We do not know his reasoning, only the outcome of it and the official explanantion for it.

In arguing over the merits of this decision, it seems to me that we have to grant that Truman could not have known what answer was "correct" and neither could we, in his place. We, too, would have been reduced to doing our best, choosing the strongest line of reasoning we could identify, and sticking to it.

Our basic problem now, in 2006, is that we cannot discover the actual line of reasoning Truman based his decision on and so we cannot effectively either criticize it or commend it. We are blind men feeling an elephant.

If we consider the different question of whether the bombs ought to have been dropped, then we immediately engage in speculations similar to those that limited Truman's view of the future outcome of his decision; we cannot say what would have happened with any accuracy or great confidence. We can argue from probability only.

I don't doubt there are justifications in Truman's autobiography or in the records of Dean Acheson and George Marshall; but I'm not going to dip into those at the moment.

"The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his." - General George Patton

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/08/07/why_did_japan_surrender/?page=full

interesting!

we've argued about this on other threads, but i don't think the nuclear bombing are morally special or different from, like, the plain old bombings we were doing

Nagasaki was necessary because it occurred on 9 August, which is also my birthday

― dave q, Monday, 20 August 2001 Bookmark

The real reason for this revival...

The important part of Hasegawa's argument is that Nagasaki was totally needless. We couldn't give them a week to surrender? And the third bomb was on its way!

But I have a lot of problems with that article:

1. Yes, Tokyo's firebombing was worse. But Tokyo was essentially a tinderbox-- a forest of paper and wood. The atomic bombs showed that one single weapon could obliterate any city. There are important psychological and practical effects to that.

2. A big reason that the Japanese likely weren't pushed to surrender by the atomic bombs is that they didn't know what the fuck happened. At that point most of Japan's military leadership was secluded in a bunker and they weren't able to get a full picture of what had really happened in Hiroshima. Indeed there was some speculation that the US was exaggerating. If they had actually known fully what the Americans had done, and what they were threatening to do again and again, who knows what their reaction would have been?

3. The worst part of the article is the idea that this somehow disproves nukes as a deterrent. My usual conception of nuclear deterrence is that nukes are an amazingly powerful weapon that can literally destroy an entire country. It isn't that one nuclear bomb is so horrible. It's that theoretically we could destroy EVERY city in a country. Complete obliteration is the "deterrence" of nuclear warfare, especially with ICBMs in play. And again, nukes are just more powerful than anything else.

Hasegawa doesn't (and probably can't) bring up the cabinet meeting where Hirihito bascially overrode his govmt and told them a last-ditch stand was off the table. Was he more influenced by the Soviet declaration of war or the bomb? How about both? It was definitely one of the first rounds of the Cold War, regardless, and as I have increasingly come to think, Truman could not have afforded to NOT use the bombs since their existence would at some point or another have become public and mourning mothers and families would have excoriated him.

The worst part of the article is the idea that this somehow disproves nukes as a deterrent. My usual conception of nuclear deterrence is that nukes are an amazingly powerful weapon that can literally destroy an entire country. It isn't that one nuclear bomb is so horrible. It's that theoretically we could destroy EVERY city in a country. Complete obliteration is the "deterrence" of nuclear warfare, especially with ICBMs in play. And again, nukes are just more powerful than anything else.

― Matt Armstrong, Tuesday, August 9, 2011 8:34 PM (36 minutes ago) Bookmark

i can't remember when 'deterrence' on that scale became the big thing. but it wasn't immediate. it may not even have been till after the worst of the cold war. either way, wasn't part of the point of dropping the bomb (and bombing dresden) to show off to the russians how hard we were?

slight self-contradiction there but ehh

yeah IANAH but showing the russians you have The Bomb would be a good way to get them on your side

The worst part of the article is the idea that this somehow disproves nukes as a deterrent.

I'm not sure that this what the article tries to do, though. Had we publicly had the bomb in Dec '41 would they have foregone Pearl Harbor? Probably. At this point, he's saying that the Japanese decision to surrender instead of fighting it out was more about the fear of their neighbor (and recent victim) getting territory off of them than about nuclear bombs. How many bombs did they or the USSR think we had then, though?

as I have increasingly come to think, Truman could not have afforded to NOT use the bombs since their existence would at some point or another have become public and mourning mothers and families would have excoriated him.

just naive thinking i suppose, but i always wonder what would have been the problem with demonstrating the power of the atomic bomb OUTSIDE of a major city, as a warning shot.

then, if we had to be bloodthirsty and all of that, we could have said "we calculate that this will murder 100,000 of your citizens. we will decimate one of your major cities in 72 hours unless you surrender."

That sorta sounds like how India and Pakistan treat each other, i.e. Oh yeah? Watch us test THIS.

*punches self in face*

"Now imagine if that hadda been YOUR FACE."

hard to see the japanese high command believing it, still less surrendering on the basis of a threat, but either way the US wasn't in the business of making threats. it had already levelled tokyo.

need to go away and revise this topic though.

Very good and classical point, ZS. It's often said they chose two sites of dubious (or middling importance) and different topography 'cause they wanted to see what kind fo mayhem their gadgets would unleash in different circumstances.

My point above was that I don't think the confluence of racism and anger is well understood now. Ppl really wanted to fcuk Japan up; not just 'cause they were 'yellow', not just because of Pearl Harbor, and not just because of the atrocities that were known but because they were tenacious fighters who killed a lot of American boys.

Interesting thread this.

i thought dresden was basically revenge

I'm not sure that this what the article tries to do, though. Had we publicly had the bomb in Dec '41 would they have foregone Pearl Harbor? Probably. At this point, he's saying that the Japanese decision to surrender instead of fighting it out was more about the fear of their neighbor (and recent victim) getting territory off of them than about nuclear bombs. How many bombs did they or the USSR think we had then, though?

― publier les (suggest) bans de (Michael White), Tuesday, August 9, 2011 8:24 PM (37 minutes ago) Bookmark

Hasegawa’s scholarship disturbs this simple logic. If the atomic bomb alone could not compel the Japanese to submit, then perhaps the nuclear deterrent is not as strong as it seems. In fact, Wilson argues, history suggests that leveling population centers, by whatever method, does not force surrender. The Allied firebombing of Dresden in February of 1945 killed many people, but the Germans did not capitulate. The long-range German bombing of London did not push Churchill towards acquiescence. And it is nearly impossible to imagine that a bomb detonated on American soil, even one that immolated a large city, would prompt the nation to bow in surrender.

If killing large numbers of civilians does not have a military impact, then what, Wilson asks, is the purpose of keeping nuclear weapons? We know they are dangerous. If they turn out not to be strategically effective, then nuclear weapons are not trump cards, but time bombs beneath our feet.

then, if we had to be bloodthirsty and all of that, we could have said "we calculate that this will murder 100,000 of your citizens. we will decimate one of your major cities in 72 hours unless you surrender."

― future events are now current events (Z S), Tuesday, August 9, 2011 8:27 PM (36 minutes ago) Bookmark

Yeah, what about the idea of blowing the top off Mt. Fuji?

How many bombs did they or the USSR think we had then, though?

― publier les (suggest) bans de (Michael White), Tuesday, August 9, 2011 8:24 PM (37 minutes ago) Bookmark

Good question! I think they would have to presume that we could make them fairly quickly, right? Since we'd obviously cleared all of the significant hurdles.

I think the third bomb that was ready to ship out to Japan was the last one we had ready to go.

http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26253535/barton-j-bernstein-american-conservatives-are-forgotten-critics

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/oct/23/descent-hell/

Two things jump out about this big book. One is that it is unusual to read extensive personal accounts of civilians on the enemy side who suffered in large numbers during World War II. The second is that, at least to judge by the inhabitants of Okinawa, many Japanese civilians, together with their emperor, were unwilling to surrender.

The huge US offensive in Okinawa—the only part of Japan where US forces fought on the ground—lasted eighty-two days in the spring of 1945 and cost about as many lives altogether as the atom bombs themselves. The US invading force of 1,050 ships carrying 548,000 men vastly outnumbered the 110,000 Japanese soldiers defending the island. But the Japanese held out with remarkable tenacity, and 77,000 Japanese soldiers and over 140,000 civilians would be killed before the US could declare victory. On the US side, more than 14,000 troops lost their lives, including 4,900 sailors felled by Japanese kamikaze—“divine wind”—suicide pilots, of which there were 3,050. As Hanson W. Baldwin, the New York Times war correspondent, described it, “Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious sprawling struggle.”

I was thirteen at the time and recall my feelings of pride that American soldiers were yet again beating the fiendish, barely human Japanese. This was bolstered by the press and by super-patriotic films like Wake Island, in which Americans lost but only temporarily. Later, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a new belief took hold among liberal and leftist Americans: that the reasons given for dropping the bombs—among them, above all, that the Japanese would never surrender unless pulverized—were self-serving and false. Because of this new book I am thinking again.

Per that last bit, I've noticed hearing more about the sadism and extreme brutality of the Japanese more in recent years, too. They were like a different kind of Nazi, with similar theories of superiority but slightly different means of expressing it.

One of these days I need to read a good book about World War II, one that explained how the Germans and Japanese managed to hook up in the first place.

marriage of convenience - Japan useful to Germany as a counterbalance to Russia and later America etc.

Yeah, but how did it even come about? How often did Germany and Japan cross paths? How did this come up? "By the way, we want to take over the world, you in?"

I have recently been reading Catastrophe by Max Hastings, which delivers what you are requesting, but for WW1 as an unravelling theatre of death with lots of splendid period flavour. I'd guess there is a similar WW2 type book somewhere. probably try the book thread.

There was a lot of debate internal to the Nazi party. Germany had a policy of siding with and sending advisors to aid the Kuomintang in their suppression of the Chinese communist party. Hitler thought the Japanese military government were more potent anti-communists, hence the Anti-comintern Pact of 1936, followed very shortly by the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

Its easy to forget these days that in 1937, Germany was a serious player in the far east, with the leased territory of Qingdao, trade ports at Hankou, Beihai, and Harbin, and missionaries travelling the interior. Everyone (including America) had their fingers in the Chinese pie at the time. Indeed WWII was as much created by the China grab and post-1918 anti-Communism as it was by resentment over the Versailles Treaty. Germany, or at least Hitler, thought they could get a better deal from Tokyo than Chiang Kai-shek,

I'm really skeptical of any "the Japanese would have fought tooth and nail for every inch of Japan" argument - some of them quickly verge into racism, but even the ones that don't seem to assume that "the Japanese," having been programmed for tenacious, relentless civilian defense, would all stay in that mode forever, regardless of whatever else developed, unless what developed was an atomic bomb, in which case they would all switch over to being okay with surrendering. It kinda doesn't compute on its face, but it also just imagines that, had the war continued, it would have been somehow ahistorical and continuous in its progress, nothing changes, the ongoing invasion and the ramping-up of the already-severe deprivations and limitations of civilian life as a result of the water have no effect on the home front.... You'd think even just the Soviets declaring war on Japan would have been a game-changer.

The surrender of Japan hinged entirely on the decisions of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War and the emperor. It was never a matter of the Japanese people being programmed for tenacious, relentless civilian defense, but more a matter of disobedience to authority being so socially unacceptable as to verge on the unthinkable. The people were heartily weary of the war and dreaded being asked to make further sacrifices, but they would have obeyed.

this is a good read

http://whowhatwhy.org/2016/05/25/classic-hiroshima-bombing-gets-hollywood-makeover/

i've always found the 'it was necessary to avoid more bloodshed' a convenient yet unconvincing excuse but i haven't done enough reading on the subject.

anything of recommendation on either side of the aisle?

bugger "both sides", if you want to know about the bomb and how decisions on when and where to use it were made you need to check out alex wellerstein, full stop.

thanks

a thread from last year, pretty informative:

Today is the 74th anniversary of the bombing of Nagasaki. Often overlooked, compared to Hiroshima, as merely the "second" atomic bomb, the Nagasaki attack is far more tricky, and important, in several ways. THREAD pic.twitter.com/UQYoz6ftzN

— Alex Wellerstein (@wellerstein) August 9, 2019