T|S One Box or Two Boxes (Newcomb's Paradox)

Wrong. Because if you take both boxes there's no reverse-correlation. It might mean you are the kind of person who would take both boxes, but you haven't damned yourself to less money because you took them in the moment. You were damned from the moment Bob made the prediction. Any chooser should simultaneously want to be the kind of person who would only take Box B, and recognize the impossibility of being that kind of person (because at the moment of choice, you are totally free to take both boxes). A similar paradox that explains this problem is Kavka's toxin puzzle.

An eccentric billionaire places before you a vial of toxin that, if you drink it, will make you painfully ill for a day, but will not threaten your life or have any lasting effects. The billionaire will pay you one million dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, you intend to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon. He emphasizes that you need not drink the toxin to receive the money; in fact, the money will already be in your bank account hours before the time for drinking it arrives, if you succeed. All you have to do is. . . intend at midnight tonight to drink the stuff tomorrow afternoon. You are perfectly free to change your mind after receiving the money and not drink the toxin.

The problem is similar to the one here. In Kavka, you simultaneously want to have intended to drink the poison and realized that any practical person would not drink the poison. Similarly, you want to be the kind of person who would only pick Box B, but must grapple with the fact that at the moment of choice, you'll inevitably take both boxes.

Because if you take both boxes there's no reverse-correlation. It might mean you are the kind of person who would take both boxes, but you haven't damned yourself to less money because you took them in the moment. You were damned from the moment Bob made the prediction. Any chooser should simultaneously want to be the kind of person who would only take Box B, and recognize the impossibility of being that kind of person (because at the moment of choice, you are totally free to take both boxes).

but that assumes things that aren't stated in the puzzle's premises. nowhere is it said that bob's prediction is indirect, based on the kind of person you are, or the kind of person bob takes you to be. it's instead an "almost perfect" estimate of what you will actually do. it therefore can't be circumvented by speculating about the kind of person that bob envisions or the kind of person you actually might be. no matter what you choose or why, no many how much analysis you subject the choice to, bob's prediction remains "almost perfect." and it is therefore almost perfectly certain that box B will be empty if you take both boxes -- no matter what rationale you use to arrive at that choice.

kava's toxin seems similarly non-paradoxical. it's only when one begins to question whether or not one should actually drink the toxin that the attainment of the money comes to be in jeopardy. therefore, the real question is not the wormhole implied by the hidden paradox, it's a straightforward, "should i drink the toxin?" and the answer is a similarly straightforward, "yes, you should." if one puts aside all thought of what one might gain by NOT drinking the toxin and instead simply plans to do it, then one remains assured of gaining the money.

strike

"...no many how much analysis you subject the choice to..."

sub

"...no matter the analysis to which you subject the choice..."

working through the booze here

i mean, i get what you're saying: if you choose to take box B and really mean it, then bob very likely predicted that. okay, so having made that sincere choice, what's to prevent you from changing your mind and taking both boxes, thus somehow "fooling" the supposedly near-infallible bob?

two things:

1) if it's a truly sincere choice, then once made, it cannot be undone. i.e., sincere choice is irrevocable. i say this because any mental decision that IS revocable can be described as a part of the pattern of consideration that might eventually lead to a real and final choice, and that's not what bob seems to be predicting.

2) although reverse causation cannot be assumed, we must still act as though reverse causation is in effect. i say this because we do not understand the actual mechanism that governs bob's predictions. that's what i meant earlier. we only know that the act of taking both boxes seems to drastically reduce the likelihood that box B will contain anything, and given the absence of any other information, we might as well go with what we've been given.

There's certainly a correlation between taking both boxes and Box B not containing anything. Not a causation though. (The causation is that Bob predicted you'd take both boxes, that's why Box B doesn't contain anything. That you took both boxes is incidental.)

OT: I kinda want to run a bunch of other polls in a similar vein (A priori knowledge: Yes/No, Abstract Objects: Platonism/Nominalism, etc). Peeps be interested?

There's certainly a correlation between taking both boxes and Box B not containing anything. Not a causation though. (The causation is that Bob predicted you'd take both boxes, that's why Box B doesn't contain anything. That you took both boxes is incidental.)

yeah, i get that. but as a chooser, you have to assume a quasi-causal relationship between the choice you make (the only part of this situation you can control) and the outcome you hope to receive. you cannot know how bob came to possess this almost perfect understanding, after all. nor can you know what bob has predicted. you only know that whatever choice you ultimately do make, it is very likely to have been correctly anticipated by bob. therefore, by making a choice, and only from your own perceptual standpoint, you more-or-less "cause" the outcome. this has to do with the nature of time. in the scenario described, bob has predicted the future existence of something that did not yet exist at the time of prediction. in other words and regardless of what bob has predicted, prior to your actually making a choice, your choice does not exist. since it asks you (dear reader) to render a decision, this puzzle assumes the existence of free will. therefore, in the act of choosing, you validate (or invalidate) bob's prediction, and your choice IS causal in that sense. the problem is that you cannot possibly know how to invalidate bob's prediction, which makes it prudent to assume that bob has predicted things correctly and to make the choice that will provide maximum benefit under that circumstance.

the problem is that you cannot possibly know how to invalidate bob's prediction, which makes it prudent to assume that bob has predicted things correctly and to make the choice that will provide maximum benefit under that circumstance.

This is my reasoning as well.

The only thing that violates this is the friend who can see into the boxes, and the interesting thing is that if you assume Bob is near-infallible, the odds that you will get $101K after your friend looks at the money goes down dramatically.

contenderizer otm

Automatic thread bump. This poll is closing tomorrow.

I kinda want to run a bunch of other polls in a similar vein (A priori knowledge: Yes/No, Abstract Objects: Platonism/Nominalism, etc). Peeps be interested?

yeah, there ain't enough philosophy in this place.

Automatic thread bump. This poll's results are now in.