I can't make sense of this statement. It's written in some sort of code that I was never taught.
Anyway, for the sake of argument, let's say that, except where I explicitly dispute Kuhn, every idea that I attribute to Kuhn on this thread can also be assigned to me. And of course any of the ideas on this thread that I seem to be presenting as my own can also be assigned to me, even if I stole them. So now let's rewrite your sentence as follows:
kogan relativizes the cartesian divide without overturning it, and therefore renders it general.
So, now, explain and support this contention, using the actual words on this thread as your evidence. Not from anywhere else; just this thread. If you think an idea or an assumption is Kuhn's/Kogan's, check the idea against the words on this thread. And if a sentence or two on this thread seems to point towards a particular belief being Kuhn's/Kogan's, check to see if other Kuhn/Kogan words on the thread are compatible with that belief.
A brief thought, from Kogan if not Kuhn: Descartes' mind-matter divide has nothing to do with the functioning of science one way or the other, including Descartes' science. ("Nothing to do with" being a bit of an exaggeration. Descartes and others never put the divide into effect, but some of them used the divide in their philosophy, some of which was used to justify, explain, and protect science. But it was never an integral part of science.)
Another brief thought from Kogan: I haven't read Descartes in 30 years, and don't remember much of what I did read.
― Frank Kogan (Frank Kogan), Sunday, 7 August 2005 04:13 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― Frank Kogan (Frank Kogan), Sunday, 7 August 2005 04:15 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― kingfish (Kingfish), Sunday, 7 August 2005 07:55 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― Atom Heart - Dots, Sunday, 7 August 2005 08:30 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― latebloomer (latebloomer), Sunday, 7 August 2005 13:09 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― Momus (Momus), Sunday, 7 August 2005 14:42 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― dahlin (dahlin), Sunday, 7 August 2005 14:44 (eleven years ago) Permalink
I can't give a full answer to yr. post right now Kogan, which would involve the "cartesian divide" thing and also pulling objectionable quotes from Kuhn on "normal science." I will though, I promise. In the meantime, the points you consider Kuhn's main ones are interesting, and are useful, but aren't all that contestable. Opposition to teleology and belief that scientific knowledge doesn't accumulate incrementally are key, yeah, but once you accept them then.. what. I want to know what you think Kuhn thinks "normal science" mainly involves.
One interesting extension of Kuhn was by Lakatos who coined the idea of "Kuhn loss" which encompasses the *destructive* element of scientific revolutions -- those things which had been theoretically encompassed prior, but which a new paradigm fails to account for.
(v/v the cartesian divide thing, a small explanation for now is that Kuhn holds that every paradigm is as "true" as every other -- hence relativizes -- but, he holds that there is a divide between those who CREATE the paradigms and those who do the "puzzle solving" of "normal science" -- hence between the theorizers and the "doers" and so rather than bridging the gap between "theory" and "reality" [i.e. mind and body, knowledge and substance, etc] he simply creates many theory-reality pairs. a monist account of science would recognize that the difference between paradigm-innovative science and "normal" science is in how they are recieved nore than how they are conducted, and thus render them part of a single process rather than two distinct entities)
― Secundus Covarient (s_clover), Sunday, 7 August 2005 23:23 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― don, Monday, 8 August 2005 03:59 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― don, Monday, 8 August 2005 04:06 (eleven years ago) Permalink
― don, Monday, 8 August 2005 04:28 (eleven years ago) Permalink
attn kogan: http://lareviewofbooks.org/article.php?type=&id=564&fulltext=1
― s.clover, Friday, 20 April 2012 20:32 (four years ago) Permalink