three months pass...
two months pass...
Science and the Law: Schreber's Illegitimacy
Insofar as science exists in a dichotomous relation to religion, i.e., it is what religion is not (i.e., religion is based upon 'faith,' whereas science bases itself on 'empirical fact'), science is particularly well suited to this task. Furthermore, as a dominant discourse, science is governed by a definite set of laws based on logic and rationality. In other words, science brings order to chaos. In a semiotic 'universe' that is quite literally predicated upon nothing, the 'structuring' capacity of science cannot be underestimated. However, when science does eventually prove inadequate, when Flechsig (as a man of science) proves incapable of curing Schreber's 'nervous condition,' this semiotic distance collapses. This point is essential in determining the specific nature of Schreber's (second) psychotic break. The argument in general circulation is that in assuming the position of Senatspräsident to the Superior Court, Schreber is confronted with men who are in superior positions, and as such represent the father. Thus, try as he may, Schreber can not approximate this position; he found himself lacking (which was subsequently turned into a God that was lacking). Put another way, Schreber is called upon by the Law to a position for which he has no answer.
The task was all the heavier and demanded all the more tact in my personal dealing with the members of the panel of five Judges over which I had to preside, as almost all of them were much senior to me (up to twenty years), and anyway they were much more intimately acquainted with the procedure of the Court, to which I was a newcomer" (Memoirs, MH 63-64, D 47).
However, if we closely examine the Memoirs, it becomes clear that it is not Schreber's inability to carry out the tasks required of him, but rather, it is when (in his own words), he "had largely mastered the difficulties of settling down in [his] new office and in [his] new residence" (Memoirs, MH 63-64, D 47) that he experiences his (second) break. In other words, it is not that Schreber is 'in over his head.' Rather, because the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father (as that which functions as a 'third term' and as such secures his place and his continuity in a overriding kinship structure), is not available to Schreber because it is foreclosed, there is no legitimate place for him in the Law8. Thus it is in illegitimately (albeit 'successfully') occupying the place of Senatspräsident to the Superior Court–the realm of Law–that triggers Schreber's psychotic break.
To the extent that foreclosure of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father excludes the subject from the Symbolic Order–the realm of society and culture–psychosis often involves a profound disturbance in the realm of kinship relations9, and specifically names10. Schreber thus contends that the 'rent' in the 'universe' was instigated through the unlawful usurpation of proper name and 'place' of the forebears of Schreber and Flechsig–a 'crime' he equates with 'soul murder.'
I want to say by way of introduction that the leading roles in the genesis of this development, the first beginnings of which go back perhaps as far as the eighteenth century, were played on the one hand by the names of Flechsig and Schreber (probably not specifying any individual member of these families), and on the other by the concept of soul murder (Memoirs, MH 54, D 33, emphasis mine).
'Soul murder' becomes the loss of one's name, or more specifically, the loss of one's legitimate place, one's right to exist as a subject of the Law. To the extent that the Symbolic Order–the overarching structure governing kinship relations– establishes one's legitimacy, one's right to exist and be recognized as a subject of the Law, such a loss would constitute 'soul murder.' Insofar as Flechsig specializes in nerves, Schreber (paranoically) believes that by acting upon his nerves11, Flechsig 'steals' his soul. (Memoirs, 54-55, D 33) In this capacity, Flechsig (as a signifier) plays leading role in Schreber's delusion.
Allow me to reiterate this point. While Schreber's illegitimate position in relation to the Law drives his psychic structure to its very limits (hence Schreber's heightened anxiety), science (as a discourse) still maintains the necessary distance from the place of foreclosure. Because science still functions as the master signifier par excellance (the discourse that 'grounds' Schreber's universe), Schreber turns to Flechsig–a man of science and a 'nerve' specialist–to cure his 'nervous illness.' In this capacity, Flechsig is the 'representative' of the sinthome, that which maintains the necessary distance from the place of the foreclosed signifier. Flechsig's inability to relieve Schreber's 'condition' however, simultaneously reveals the inability of science to function as the sinthome. It is thus my argument that when Flechsig is 'exposed' as incapable of 'curing' Schreber, and as such, science is 'exposed' as incapable of continuing to function as a substitute, Schreber collides with the abyss in place of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father, i.e., he confronts a thoroughly inept God who is (not surprisingly) 'embarrassingly exposed.' From this point on, science in and of itself can no longer function as the barrier, or sinthome that maintains Schreber at a safe distance from the place of the foreclosed signifier–from what must remain at a distance. (As an aside, it can be argued that Schreber's delusion–the construction of a hybrid discourse–functions as the new sinthome.)
The Break with the Øther
This semiotic collapse severs Schreber's relation to the Øther and leaves Schreber (quite literally) on his own. In fact, by the time Schreber left for Pierson's Asylum (the "Devil's Kitchen") in approximately mid-June 1894, his illness had advanced to the state that all people and even surroundings were 'derealized,' i.e., Schreber saw them as merely "theater props" (Memoirs, MH 102, D 100). Schreber can now only imagine himself as real to the extent that he is (again, quite literally), the center of his signifying universe. Put another way, with the distance breached, Schreber is positioned in this 'empty' semiotic place–the place of foreclosure–alongside an 'empty,' and thoroughly inept 'God'12.
Because Schreber no longer has a relation to the Øther13, he must rebuild his signifying structure within a closed Imaginary circuit, a circuit where he himself functions as the master signifier par excellance. Consequently, Schreber asserts categorically that "everything that happens is in reference to me," (Memoirs, MH 197, D, 233, emphasis mine) or "[i]t is demanded of me to relate to myself everything that happens" (Memoirs, MH 198, D 235, emphasis mine). In other words, 'meaning' is achieved only to the extent that it is incorporated in and through Schreber14. To further illustrate this point, consider the clause "[l]acking now is only the leading idea," to which Schreber responds "we the rays have no thoughts"15 (Memoirs, MH 234, D 199). That is, Schreber must do the thinking (e.g., even the "so-called not-thinking-of-anything-thought" [Memoirs, MH 144, D 158] is still thinking insofar as Schreber must "not-think-of-anything" incessantly). As the master signifier par excellance, it is incumbent upon Schreber, indeed his most profound duty, to 're-compose,' or as his delusion manifests, to repopulate this rotting world through his feminized body16, i.e., he must fill the emptiness, resolve the futility of the world, and restore it so that it again makes sense.
Within this context, it is hardly surprising that Schreber associates the withdrawal of 'rays' (or nerves) with becoming a "frivolous human being given only to the pleasures of the moment" (Memoirs, MH 129, D 138). This is an important point. Through his delusion (and as I will demonstrate, through the concentration of literalized nerves), Schreber establishes his place as the 'ground' of the universe. If he were to lose this 'ground,' he would become redundant–indeed a "frivolous human being" (Memoirs, MH 129, D 138). Schreber thus asserts that "I lived in the belief–and it is still my conviction that this is the truth–that I had to solve one of the most intricate problems ever set for man and that I had to fight a sacred battle for the greatest good of mankind" (Memoirs, MH 130, D 139).
Schreber as the Master Signifier par excellance
Essential to the argument I am putting forth in my thesis, is that Schreber's 'universe' is in actuality the expulsion of his own disconnected and as such, unrecognizable signifying structure. Indeed, Schreber's assertion that "the whole solar system would now have to be disconnected...the whole group of stars had to be drawn together into a single sun" (Memoirs, MH 84, D 75) epitomizes his (seemingly divine) task. To elaborate, the whole solar system that must now be disconnected is the unpinning of Schreber's signifying structure; the whole group of stars that must be drawn together into a single sun, is Schreber himself as the master signifier par excellance–the signifier to which all other signifiers in Schreber's closed Imaginary circuit are eventually 're-pinned' (Memoirs, MH 84, D 75).
The expulsion of Schreber's (now) disconnected and, as such, unrecognizable signifying elements appears to turn his 'universe' inside out; or rather, it is as though in this 'big bang'17, Schreber's signifying elements shoot out and disseminate18 into an externalized universe filled with planets and stars– God's 'outposts' (Memoirs, MH 72, D 59)–all connected by 'rays' or nerves (lesser or greater souls), and significantly, all eventually connected and united within Schreber19 through a feminine 'soul-voluptuousness, where 'feminine' is associated with 'fullness' and 'abundance,' i.e., being full of nerves20. Put another way, the implosion of a semiotic distance effects a semiotic explosion where signifying elements (manifesting in Schreber's delusion as 'celestial bodies') disseminate throughout the 'universe.' Insofar as these 'celestial bodies' are Schreber's own signifying elements (even though he does not recognize them as such), his 'cure' consists in their reincorporation.
The Schreberian Universe: A Bundle of Nerves
Nerves are the most over-determined signifying element in the Memoirs–appearing no fewer than four hundred times. In keeping with the precarious nature of Schreber's 'nervous condition,' nerves manifest as "extraordinarily delicate structures–comparable to the finest filaments" (Memoirs, MH 45, D 19, emphasis mine). Schreber's 'nervousness' is both the literal means of installing himself as the center of the universe–the master signifier par excellance–and (ironically) that which constantly threatens to undermine his position. Insofar as Schreber's nerves are the literal infrastructure of his nascent universe, i.e., as 'concretized' rays of God (the foreclosed signifying element Schreber is attempting to reconcile), to the extent that they are elements of the foreclosed signifier, i.e., the means he uses to reconstruct his universe, they are also the means that (in his delusion) constantly threaten to destroy it. This is particularly evident in what Schreber designates as the "flight of rays" (Memoirs, MH 136, D 147). In elucidating this phenomena, Schreber asks the reader to envision a scenario where
...the rays of a whole world, [Schreber's disconnected, externalized and unrecognizable signifying structure], are somehow mechanically fastened21 at their point of issue [Schreber's head], which travel around one single head [as in orbiting a celestial body] and attempt to tear it asunder and pull it apart in a fashion comparable to quartering" (Memoirs, MH 136, D 147).
This 'push and pull' dynamic is characteristic of the Imaginary realm; in fact, it could be argued that the Imaginary realm is particularly well suited for this reconstruction, i.e., because it involves rivalry, it incites Schreber to action, to actively (even if it is undertaken passively) reconstruct his signifying structure.
Schreber asserts as an axiom that "the human soul is contained in the nerves of the body." (Memoirs, MH 45, D 19, emphasis mine). This sentence attests to another key feature of psychotic language, i.e., literalization. The 'literalization' of Schreber's signifying structure occurs both on a macro- (universal) and a micro-level. For example, Flechsig's soul is 'thrown' into Schreber's belly where it manifests as a 'bulky bundle' that Schreber compares with a "volume of wadding or cobweb" (Memoirs, MH 92, D 86). In both cases, i.e., macro (the universe) and micro (Flechsig), these elements are depicted as a web or a sort of network. However, in the latter case (Flechsig's soul), it is as though it is compressed. It is worth noting at this point that Schreber explicitly states that he had a vision where Flechsig shot himself, which was followed by a funeral procession. At this time (and in close proximity in the Memoirs), Schreber felt that Flechsig had exceeded himself, e.g., referring to himself as "God Flechsig" (Memoirs, MH 91, D 86), and that he should be reduced to size. Flechsig, as such, is compressed into a ball and subsumed in Schreber's belly (where Schreber could not 'stomach him'); as Schreber states, "[i]n view of its size it would in any case probably have been impossible to retain this soul in my belly, to digest it so to speak" (Memoirs, MH 92, D 86). As another case in point of this psychotic literalization, when the 'souls' renounce the implications of Schreber's corporeality– specifically his need for, and enjoyment of food–Schreber (literally, albeit delusionally) exists without a stomach.
Later for a time the miracles were in preference directed against my stomach, partly because the souls begrudged me the sensual pleasured connected with the taking in of food, partly because they considered themselves superior to human beings who require earthly nourishments; they therefore tended to look down on all eating and drinking with some disdain. I existed frequently without a stomach (Memoirs, MH 133, D 144, emphasis mine).
As a final case in point, this 'literalization' is evidenced in Schreber's delusional belief that the contents of his head and his spinal cord were being "pumped out...in the form of little clouds," i.e., (like a 'puff of smoke') where they might "vanish into [thin] air" in order to make him demented (Memoirs, MH 135, D 147).
When we situate these delusional manifestations in semiotic terms, abstractions are reduced to the concrete; connotations are reduced to denotations, and various denotations themselves are collapsed into a concrete singular meaning (nerves, or their manifestation as [divine] rays are the exemplar of this phenomenon). Schreber makes this explicit in the following passage:
...one must assume therefore that the capacity to be transformed into a human shape or become a human being, is an innate potentiality of divine rays. An entirely new light is thus shed on the well-known word of the Bible: "He created man in His image and in the image of God created He him." It appears that this passage from the Bible has to be understood literally, which no human being has so far dared to do (Memoirs, MH 193-194, D 228-229, emphasis mine).
This passage attests to another key feature of Schreber's delusion, i.e., while Schreber claims that rays must create, this creation is in fact a transformation of that which already exists. "They [the rays] have in particular the faculty of transforming themselves into all things of the created world; in this capacity they are called rays; and herein lies the essence of divine creation" (Memoirs, MH 46, D 21, emphasis mine). Schreber thus asserts that "great changeability is a marked feature of the soul-character" (Memoirs, MH 134, D 144). Insofar as Schreber is "filled with nerves of voluptuousness from the top of [his] head to the soles of [his] feet" (Memoirs, MH 204, D 243, emphasis mine) and "great changeability is a marked feature of the soul-character" (Memoirs, MH 134, D 144), the massive influx of rays (manifesting as 'nerves'), transforms Schreber into a voluptuous (i.e., nerve-filled), female being. Put another way, despite the manifestation of Schreber's delusion to create a new world (or to be the instrument of this creation), to the extent that Schreber no longer has access to the Øther, he cannot create, i.e., bring forth something new; rather, he can only transform, or in semiotic terms, reconnect and reorganize his disconnected signifying elements.
This reduction of abstractions to the concrete–this literalization–is particularly striking in what Schreber refers to as 'nerve language,' i.e., nerves as literalized souls (or rays) 'speak' in a manner consisting in the vibration of nerves approximating the movement of vocal chords (Memoirs, MH 69, D 54). In other words, language (arguably the exemplar of abstraction) is reduced to concrete action. Moreover, Schreber conflates his 'nervous illness' (generally understood as a state of mind, i.e., an abstraction) with the excitability of his physical nerves. In a very definite sense then, these two disparate denotations (not to mention connotations) are collapsed into the concrete. And we are not simply dealing with Schreber's physical nerves; rather all 'souls' in Schreber's 'universe' exist as literalized nerves (or rays). Having said this, however, to the extent Schreber exists within a closed Imaginary circuit, this semiotic collapse manifests as a literal proliferation, i.e., the only others (souls) Schreber encounters are himself, i.e., his own small others, or unbarred, perverse, status-seeking big Others. In this world turned inside-out, rather than securing the universe, 'God,' as an inept master signifier, continually loses his nerve(s)22 and as such, cannot 'ground' the universe; nor can He contain his nerve, i.e.,"[a]s a rule God did not interfere directly in the fate of peoples or individuals." Schreber designates this "state of affairs [as] in accordance with the Order of the World" (Memoirs, MH 48, D 23).
Insofar as 'God' (as a signifier) maintains His distance, conditions remain in accordance with the Order of the World, i.e., Schreber's 'propped-up' signifying structure functions provided this distance is maintained23. As I have emphasized, it is the collapse of distance (between science, the substitute master signifier, and religion [or 'God'], the foreclosed signifier) that triggers Schreber's psychotic break. However–and this is decisive–rather than re-establishing distance (an impossible task given that despite appearances, Schreber's 'universe' consists only of him), he negates himself–and in particular, as a man. In a very definite sense then, Schreber does not 'own' himself. Indeed one could argue that to the extent Schreber is 'occupied' by holy thoughts (literalized rays of 'God'), he cannot 'occupy' himself, e.g., he indicates that he "considered absolute passivity almost a religious duty" (Memoirs, MH 127, D 135). To resolve this 'universal crisis24,' as a sort of 'Great Mother,' Schreber reincorporates himself by 'absorbing' (Memoirs, MH 94, D 90) or 'soaking up' rays (which are in fact his own disconnected, externalized signifying structure). Schreber speaks of this task throughout the Memoirs as a task he does not desire, but one that he firmly believes is necessary if the Order of the World is to be restored25.
This state of Blessedness is mainly a state of voluptuous enjoyment, which for its full development needs the fantasy of either being or wishing to be a female being, which naturally is not to my taste. I must however submit to the necessity of the Order of the World which forces me to accept these ideas... (Memoirs, MH 240, D 291, emphasis mine).
While Schreber does insert himself as the master signifier par excellance, he does not, and cannot (given his closed Imaginary circuit) introduce the quality of negation characteristic of radical Øtherness. Instead, he must continually negate himself by 'sacrificing' to a greater good. However, to the extent that he must to do this incessantly, it becomes more of a 'habit'–a necessary nuisance. Thus as counter-intuitive as it may sound, it is in the very act of negating himself, i.e., 'absorbing' or 'soaking up' rays, that Schreber regains himself (albeit as a literal 'bundle of nerves').
Now Schreber contends that when conditions are in accordance with the Order of the world, 'God' deals only with 'dead' nerves, i.e., by incorporating (or reincorporating) the nerves of corpses into Himself. Schreber further contends that "the nerves of living human beings particularly when in a state of high-grade excitation, have such power of attraction for the nerves of God that He would not be able to free Himself from them again, and would thus endanger His own existence" (Memoirs, MH 48, D 24, emphasis mine). In other words, 'God' was (necessarily) self-sufficient; He didn't need to approach the living human being, just as living human being didn't need to approach 'God.' (Here we get a glimpse of Schreber's pre-psychotic 'distance' from 'God' and religion.) Before Schreber's psychotic break, this distance manifests as a sort of disinterest in religion, i.e., he was not averse to it, yet not inclined toward it either.
...Nor was I (in my youth) a truly believing person in the sense of our positive religion. But neither have I been at any time contemptuous of religion; rather I avoided talking much about religious matters and I had the feeling that people who had luckily retained in their later years a pious child's belief, should not be disturbed in their happiness. But for my own part I had occupied myself too much with the natural sciences, particularly with the works based on the so-called modern doctrine of evolution, not to have begun to doubt, to say the least, the literal truth of all Christian religious teachings (Memoirs, MH 80, D 70, emphasis mine).
From this passage, it is clear that 'God' (or religion) did not and could not function as the master signifier par excellance. However, while 'God' is not a grounding master signifier for Schreber, 'God' (or religion) represents the symbolic legacy of Schreber's father. Thus when Schreber confronts the rent in his signifying structure, insofar as his father's symbolic legacy is religion–a legacy and/or grounding signifier Schreber rejects (or forecloses)–he encounters a void in the place of 'God26.' As such, Schreber is compelled to insert 'God'/ religion into his signifying structure. However, to the very extent that religion was inadequate as a master signifier prior to Schreber's psychotic break, it remains inadequate even as it is inserted with certainty.
― milord z (nakhchivan), Tuesday, 11 November 2014 18:33 (nine years ago) link
eight months pass...
seven months pass...
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