WARNING! Really odd, exacting, seemingly pretentious questions ahead! :)
...but they do serve a point for some work I'm doing, so any help by this forum's Philosophy experts would be appreciated:
1) Which philosopher(s), either during or after the Stoic movement (epitomized by Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca), were the most vocal critics or opponents of the Stoic ideal of emphasizing "reason"/cognitions/interpretations of events to achieve balance/peace of mind? What I mean is which philosophers would most champion the position that, say, a person's emotions or affect (or other attribute) will ultimately prove the stronger influence no matter how rationally or "objectively" they try to think about an event that has happened to them?
For example, I know Blaise Pascal appears to support this position at least a couple of times in Pensees, though I've also seen him described as a latter-day Stoic (which I could also see, but I think it's because of different issues; for example, his criticism of people's vanity and their need for diversion to create happiness). Other names that spring to mind as possibly relevant on this issue are Montaigne and Nietzche, though I don't remember much in detail about their positions.
2) Is there a good book out there that provides a solid historical context on the Stoic movement and its principal figures (how it arose, why it died out, etc.)?
― Joe (Joe), Saturday, 4 January 2003 01:52 (twenty-one years ago) link
My readings of the Stoics bring me to the conclusion that they did not so much think that rationality could control one's emotions, as that rationality must control one's actions. The discipline they sought to impose upon themselves was not to become unfeeling, but to prevent their outlet into words and deeds - not exactly repression in the pure Freudian sense, in that it was far more of a concious self-control. Ignoring a feeling, to a Stoic, was like ignoring an armed foe: much too dangerous to attempt.
When you ask about which Stoic would grant feelings a greater "influence", I don't think any of them denied their existance or their strength, but all of them would take the position that a concious discipline could prevent feelings from shaping one's words or actions.
The many, many rationalizations of feelings they developed were used to calm oneself internally, over time, to ease the rigor of keeping a tight rein on oneself as one's emotions raged on. Thus, a grieving father or spouse was not expected to feel nothing at the death of a loved one, but was expected to act in a seemly fashion, while meditating on such ideas as "I still have many friends who yet live" and "the dead are in the Elysian fields or else feel nothing".
― Aimless, Saturday, 4 January 2003 19:26 (twenty-one years ago) link