FREE WILL

There's no more moral responsibility in having your strings pulled by dice rather than the cogged wheels of 18th century mechanical determinism.

but there can only be one actual future that IS going to happen, i.e. THE future.

― sleepingbag, Saturday, January 14, 2012 2:03 AM (11 hours ago) Bookmark Suggest Ban PermalinkI don't buy this at all. It's only after the fact (i.e., after the future has arrived) that we can reasonably say that there IS only one future: the one that has now become part of the past. Prior to that, prior to what on a quantum level we'd call wave function collapse, there's no reason to insist that only one future is possible. As Aimless said, "It is one thing to assert that only one future happens, but quite another to assert this proves that no other future could have happened" [emphasis mine].

^ please mentally insert a carriage return

Yeah sleepingbag is mistaking what is soon to be the past for "one actual future".

Kinda settled for me in 1748...

http://bibliothek.bbaw.de/quellendigital/lamettrie/metr_homm_fr_1748/1/LaMettrie00008.jpghttp://bibliothek.bbaw.de/quellendigital/lamettrie/metr_homm_fr_1748/1/LaMettrie00135.jpg

we're at a position where it's not possible to really define a coherent "free will" for the evidence to be against.

― stet, Saturday, January 14, 2012 12:50 PM (57 minutes ago) Bookmark Suggest Ban Permalink

I don't know about this. Considerations of free will have always been tied to the idea of moral responsibility. The concept arose from a religious question that asked whether human beings could be considered morally responsible for choices that God had designed them inevitably to make. Once the atheists got done killing God, the question was reformulated to deal with the supposedly deterministic mechanics of classical physics: are meatbots morally responsible for choices forced on them by a clockwork universe?

It's only when we attempt to divorce free will from questions of and ideas regarding moral responsibility that it becomes difficult to define.

In this conversation I don't see the future and the past as distinct. The things we 'can' do... either we do them in the past or in the future or else they never really existed other than in our minds. Any thoughts on what alternate future 'could have happened' are pleasant to think about but have nothing to do with reality. Just because we can conjecture about what might have happened if I had waken up an hour later today or if you bought a lottery ticket last week or if anything 'else' had happened other that what did happen doesn't make those things any more a part of reality than if I conjecture about what might happen if I do either A or B (assume mutual exclusivity here) tomorrow -- either A or B but not both will occur, and no matter whether I think I chose A or my brain's chemistry chose A or the butterfly effect chose A, once we get there that's it, it's set and done, and B is/was no longer a possibility. Contenderizer/Aimless are right... it's only when we get there that it becomes the past and no other 'future' could have occurred. I guess I have faith that this will continue to happen as it always has, i.e. time will continue to pass?

The fact that we can't by definition make a number of mutually exclusive 'choices' simultaneously and then revel in the conflicting consequences of each of those choices simultaneously in the past or in the present means to me that we won't be able to do it in the future either (barring aside quantum multiverse nonsense, which like I said, takes place outside the universe and as such is supernatural 'science'). So the future is written to the extent that once the arrow of time passes over tomorrow, we've discovered what the future will be, and whatever things we've done during that time will have been the only things that we could have done during that time. It's kind of irrelevant/semantic whether we believe that I've 'decided' those things or if those things were 'determined', one set of things happens and the rest don't. We're already well along the path of the things that have happened, and they will continue to be the basis for everything that will happen.

It's only when we attempt to divorce free will from questions of and ideas regarding moral responsibility that it becomes difficult to define.

I may not have read enough on this, but whenever I see the moral angle dragged into it, it is more as an undesirable consequence than anything else -- usually some quasi attempt at reductio like "there must be free will, otherwise we could not have moral responsibility and that's absurd and we would have to empty all the jails"

Is there anybody saying "determinism (or whatever else) means there is no such thing as free will and therefore there can be no moral responsibility"?

It seems to me it is much easier to support moral responsibility without free will than it is to support "free will" at all.

Is there anybody saying "determinism (or whatever else) means there is no such thing as free will and therefore there can be no moral responsibility"?

It seems to me it is much easier to support moral responsibility without free will than it is to support "free will" at all.

I don't know that anybody's currently saying anything like your hypothetical argument, but it's how contemporary discussions of free will hook back into the older, religious debate.

At least tentatively disagree with the second statement. Personal moral responsibility is tied to the idea that we have the ability in any given situation to choose to behave in either the "right" or the "wrong" way. To choose incorrectly is to morally transgress, and thus to morally deserve some sort of consequence. This is in turn dependent on freedom of the will - the idea that more than one choice is possible at any given time, and that human will is the agent that causes differing outcomes by making these sorts of choices.

Absent the ability of the free will to make "real choices" of this sort, moral responsibility becomes essentially meaningless. We can label certain behaviors unacceptable, but it's difficult to blame a clock for ticking.

but it's difficult to blame a clock for ticking

I think that's too reductionist. If a clock's accuracy could be affected by shaming it, then it would be very easy to blame a clock that wasn't keeping good time.

It seems that humans are exactly the sort of clocks where blame is a relevant input, for sure. Blame, punishment, reward, all play a part in the causal chain (maybe with some caveats for ledge about this being at a macro level etc).

It may be the case that what was used to *justify* the moral code (at first in terms of religion and later in terms of personal responsibility) needs revising to address a lack of free will, but that doesn't alter the efficacy or applicability of morality itself.

Bad robots still get punished, assuming they're sufficiently complex that this will correct their behaviour.

but there can only be one actual future that IS going to happen, i.e. THE future.

And yet the future is even less real than the past.

Ofcourse the future is less real.

but there can only be one actual future that IS going to happen, i.e. THE future.

This just isn't true, for you can only conclude THE future is the öne actual future" when that future has transformed into being a past, when looking back. There's an infinite number of "actual futures", of futures. The "actual future" you speak of is only actual once it has happened, which goes against the very definition of future: something that has not happened yet.

Automatic thread bump. This poll is closing tomorrow.

Automatic thread bump. This poll's results are now in.

Someone should have been able to predict this.

every poll should have (I got a complicated answer for you...) as an option

i'm still confused that geddy lee up there appears to be wearing a "RASH" t-shirt.

I got a complicated answer but I still voted "exists, I mean c'mon"

i got a complicated answer but i still voted "I was forced" because epiphenomenalism ftw

I'm really annoyed I missed this thread. I was having just this debate with people over New Year, who all believed in free will, in the sense of meaningful choices and moral responsibility.

I am firmly in the camp of the non-deterministic but unwilled decisions; i.e. mostly outcomes are dependent on inputs, though there may be random events, and these random events may feel like decisions, but they cannot be willed.

If you think about a decision that you felt you made, let's say the colour of paint for the bedroom, anything. If you turned back the clock, and changed nothing, no hindsight, what possible mechanisms could there be for you making a different decision to the one you made the first time?

IMO, it's random events, or nothing, so there can be no such thing as moral responsibility. However, I agree that it's moot. Not only does our response to someone's behaviour influence their future behaviour and the behaviour of every other actor with the same effect as if there were such a thing as moral responsibility, but we have no choice about the response.

\o/

it's random events, or nothing, so there can be no such thing as moral responsibility.
Well, there still can be a moral reponsibility, it's just our understanding of what that means has to change because it was formerly based on unsupportable definitions of will.

really? really

?

that way madness lies

You're right, sorry, I will curb my use of italics for emphasis from now on.

I don't see how. Moral Responsibility is still a pragmatically useful concept to retain. I don't see why we have to abandon it merely because we can't reconcile what we know about the will with hoary old religious conceptions of same.

(but I don't agree that it's random events or nothing. There's a difference between unforced choices and operating on sheer randomness)

it was the idea of changing our understanding that had me smdh rmde. also i still have serious problems with the disconnect between "there is no free will" and "therefore we have to change this". if anything "has to change" that's only because of the cold heartless unstoppable motions of fundamental particles. (assuming no free will)

i can't see any gap between determinism and randomness. where would a choice come from? either it's based on some prior event or events, i.e. determined, or it's not based on anything.

yeah, "there is no free will" = "this debate is happening whatever"

Is changing our understanding -- I may be clearer if I rephrase to say "change our definitions" or "amend our supporting arguments for"? -- so controversial? To me it's a shakier path to say "if something we used to support something else falls down, we have to let the whole edifice collapse" rather than just replacing the bit that failed, no?

also i still have serious problems with the disconnect between "there is no free will" and "therefore we have to change this".

That's because the connect is in the omitted "therefore we have to change this thing that depended on that definition of free will"

Hm. You can recast moral responsibility from something innate to the individual to something that acknowledges that, given the circumstances, the guy who killed your cat and set your gran on fire could not have done anything different. It probably doesn't change your reaction or the appropriate reaction of society.

(but I don't agree that it's random events or nothing. There's a difference between unforced choices and operating on sheer randomness)

A huge difference, and it's unforced choices I can't see a mechanism for. For unforced choices to be real, there has to be a will that can make the choice, and shape the universe by making that choice, and yet make the choice independent of circumstances, by which I mean the state of the universe in that moment. So it has to be outside the universe -and we're back to talking about magic.

xposts

If we aren't free, how can we change anything?

Lack of free will seems like a concept that it's impossible to take seriously, even if it's true.

you just have to be stoical about it

i can't see any gap between determinism and randomness. where would a choice come from?
No me neither. That's what i don't get about Zora's non-deterministic decisions. To me it's mostly deterministic with the possibility of randomness. I don't see what else there can be.

If we aren't free, how can we change anything?
Define "free", especially in terms of the above.

Lack of free will seems like a concept that it's impossible to take seriously, even if it's true.
Consider a chess-playing machine. It is "free" to make whatever moves it thinks will win the game, but it's still wholly deterministic.

If it was as complicated as we are and had interiority, it'd probably feel like it was making the choices it does, but that still wouldn't spring a "free will" into existence.

They're not decisions? I meant the things we think of as decisions; there are no free choices in my model.

Consider a chess-playing machine. It is "free" to make whatever moves it thinks will win the game, but it's still wholly deterministic.

I know, i just don't see how it is helpful or even possible to consider ourselves as determined, or use that to change our ideas of moral responsibility.

I don't think we need to change our ideas of moral responsibility as such. Free will is a convenient fiction we can use -- it feels like we have it (it'd be almost impossible to act otherwise), it feels like others have it, and moral responsibility works for affecting behaviour.

The change I'm really trying to avoid is the one that says "but you say there's no free will and therefore there can be absolutely no responsibility and it's wrong to put people in jail when they couldn't help it so let them out".

Which is equivalent to saying "the chess machine couldn't help making those choices so you can't say it won the game". There's a category or level confusion at work.

on a personal level i think the sense of human beings as determined can alter your thinking about them as guilty or sinning or deserving of punishment or whatever. on a societal level i don't think even a widespread acceptance of determinism wd change much.

more problematic is pondering whether there's an "i" that can think anything but that.

i got genuinely unsettled when i convinced myself of epiphenomenalism. the thought of being a passenger in your own brain is spooky.

helpfully it goes away, roughly as soon as you get hungry.

in all honesty i think "i" is a convenient fiction. it's fun to speak like other people sometimes etc.

stet, is there really a category confusion? I haven't seen anyone suggesting that a lack of free will means you shouldn't punish people. If anything - and I think this is what NV is saying too? - it makes it easier to do that confusing* Christian thing of condemning the sin but not the sinner, but you still have to try to stop people doing 'bad' things.

*Confusing because it's Christian notions of evil and original sin that tie bad behaviour to an eternal supernatural coherent 'self' in the first place.

Badly formed post. I am hungry.

I haven't seen anyone suggesting that a lack of free will means you shouldn't punish people.

Yeah, not here, but it comes up super often in this discussion. You go directly from "no free will" to "so no responsibility for actions you can't help but do" to "isn't it wrong to punish people for doing things they can't help?"

SEP as usual covers it pretty well, but not in c&p friendly soundbites, damn them

there're strains of catholics who are big on 'punish the sinner', tbf, while damn-near worshipping the sin

you just have to be stoical about it

'k, will find some colonnaded walkways to hang around in.

like you have a choice

Epiphenomenalism means the actor is but a link in the causal chain, and perhaps a passenger. One can still convict individuals of crime, but the focus becomes sequestering them from society, deterrence, and rehabilitation rather than punishment.

I doubt any epiphenomenalists actually go about their lives as automatons. Free will is a handy illusion for all but saints, monks, and the stoic doomed. And its very hard-wired. The prefrontal neocortex has been around for 50+ million years.

Slightly OT, but I'd like to recommend Peter Watt's novel Blindsight (Creative Commons, so free) to fans of hard sci-fi here. Blindsight's central themes revolve around consciousness, indeed the alien antagonists are so formidable because they lack this parasitic activity.

One can still convict individuals of crime, but the focus becomes sequestering them from society, deterrence, and rehabilitation rather than punishment.

which, tbh, sounds reasonable enough to me.

If you think about a decision that you felt you made, let's say the colour of paint for the bedroom, anything. If you turned back the clock, and changed nothing, no hindsight, what possible mechanisms could there be for you making a different decision to the one you made the first time?This in no way negates the idea of free will or free choice. It simply suggests that we are who we are. People for whatever reason have a hard time with this: reconciling the straightjacket of identity with the idea of choice. The assumption is that identity precludes choice, because the nature of the self determines the choices we make. But we might just as easily say that the choices we make determine the nature of the self. It doesn't have to be one or the other. And again, even if the choice is wholly determined by the situation, the nature of the choosing self if one of the most important aspects of that situation, allowing no clear line to be drawn between the determined and the determiner.

fug